CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF
UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN
EASTERN SUDAN
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1
Comprehensive
Peace?
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF
UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN
EASTERN SUDAN
2
COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN
Sara Pantuliano
Institute of Development Studies, University of Dar es Salaam (sarapantuliano@imapmail.org)
This report was researched and authored by Dr. Sara Pantuliano. The study was commissioned by the International Rescue
Committee, with support from CARE International, Christian Aid, Oxfam International, Save the Children UK and Tearfund.
This work was made possible through funding from the UK Government’s Department for International Development
(DFID) and contributions from the six agencies. It was done with cooperation from the Humanitarian Aid Commission
(HAC) of the Sudanese Government of National Unity and the Secretariat for Humanitarian Affairs in the Liberated Areas
(SHALA), which facilitated the work.
The views presented are those of the author and not necessarily those of the agencies involved. Similarly, the analysis
does not necessarily reflect the views of individual stakeholders or interviewees, or the Government of National Unity.
Credits
Sara Pantuliano is a Lecturer in Conflict Analysis and Development at the University of Dar es Salaam. She has a long
standing association with the Sudan, which includes carrying out her doctoral research with the Beja in the East, developing
and managing an innovative aid response to the crisis in the Nuba Mountains (NMPACT) and being involved in the
IGAD peace process as a resource person and an observer for the Government of Italy.
All photos in this report are copyrighted to Thomas Goisque. For the past ten years, Thomas Goisque has been travelling
around the world capturing international events and hidden worlds. His photos are featured in many French news magazines
and he has also published six photography books, including his most recent on Iraq in 2004 (“Irak, année zero”;
Gallimard). He works with Sébastien Degalaup who is an independent journalist, writer, and editor of the web magazine
Terra Australis Incognita (www.tai-expeditions.org). His next book is dedicated to “Rebel Peoples all over the World” (to be
published in 2007 by Editions du Rocher).
Report editing and formatting was done by Joyce Maxwell.
For further information, contact the agency spokespersons: +254 20 364247 or +249 9121 60771.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank the staff of the six agencies which
commissioned and supported this study for their input
throughout the assessment and for shouldering the logistical
demands. Sorcha O’Callaghan (CARE), Dan Jarman
(Save the Children), Rebecca Dale (IRC), Nadia Ali El Tom
(IRC) and Robert Warwick (IRC) deserve special mention
for the time and energy invested in supporting every dimension
of the research.
In particular, I would like to extend my appreciation to
the team members who accompanied me throughout the
assessment in the government controlled areas of eastern
Sudan: Abu Amna Hashim, Eatizaz Mohammad (IRC),
Dr. Mohammad Hussein Dafaalla (HAC), Dr. Mohammad
Fadlalla Sirageddin (HAC) and Ali Karim. The team spirit
and the professionalism and friendliness of all team members
made the experience very enjoyable. To Ali in particular
I am very grateful for his experienced facilitation
of community meetings and incisive analysis of the context
in eastern Sudan. I would like to thank Amna Osman
Taha (IRC) and Jamila Imam Abdelrahman (IRC) for their
assistance with the translation from and to TuBedawye in
meetings with women.
I also wish to express gratitude to the Government of
National Unity in the Sudan, the Civil Administration of
the NDA controlled areas and the Government of Eritrea
for their cooperation and to HAC and SHALA for their involvement
and support.
Finally and importantly, I would like to thank the communities
of eastern Sudan, the key informants, the officials
and the local authorities, who gave a lot of their time
and patiently discussed and debated the issues raised in
the report during the assessment. All the people listed in
Annex I deserve special thanks for the time and interest
they have devoted to the research and for sitting in
lengthy interviews, in some cases in extreme weather
conditions. I hope this work will contribute to making the
situation in eastern Sudan better understood and helping
the people in the region to finally start to reverse long,
ongoing patterns of underdevelopment and
marginalisation.
Sara Pantuliano
Acknowledgements
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COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN
Acknowledgements 3
Acronyms 5
Map of Eastern Sudan 6
Executive Summary 7
Recommendations 8
Introduction and Methodology 11
1. Background 12
1.1 Historical trends 12
1.2 Main actors 14
2. Peace and Development in Eastern Sudan: Current Perceptions and Perspectives 21
2.1 The perceived causes of unrest 21
2.2 The significance of the CPA in eastern Sudan 23
2.3 The agenda for peace and development: emerging perspectives 25
3. Peace, Stability and Development in Eastern Sudan: An Attainable Dream? 30
3.1 Unemployment and key livelihoods issues 30
3.2 The impact of international assistance in eastern Sudan 33
4. Recommendations for Action 36
4.1 Humanitarian issues 36
4.2 Development issues 36
4.3 Conflict mitigation and peace building 39
Selected References 42
Annex I - List of People Met 44
Contents
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ACRONYMS
ACORD Agency for Co-operation and Research in
Development
CBO Community Based Organisation
CMR Crude Mortality Rates
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSO Civil Society Organisation
DfID Department for International Development,
UK
DUP Democratic Unionist Party
EU European Union
FAO Food and Agricultural Organisation
GAM Global Acute Malnutrition
GNU Government of National Unity
GOS Government of the Sudan
HAC Humanitarian Aid Commission
IDP Internally Displaced Person
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural
Development
IGAD Inter-Governmental Authority on
Development
INGO International Non-Governmental
Organisation
IRC International Rescue Committee
JEM Justice and Equality Movement
NC National Congress
NDA National Democratic Alliance
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NMPACT Nuba Mountains Programme Advancing
Conflict Transformation
Acronyms
NRM National Revolutionary Movement
OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
PDF Popular Defence Force
RSS Red Sea State
SAF Sudan Alliance Forces
SHALA Secretariat for Humanitarian Affairs in the
Liberated Areas
SC-UK Save the Children UK
SECS Sudanese Environmental Conservation
Society
SLM/A Sudan Liberation Movement/Army
SPLM/A Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army
SRC Sudanese Red Crescent
TANGO Technical Assistance to NGOs
TB Tuberculosis
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNMAS United Nations Mine Action Service
UNMIS United Nations Mission to Sudan
UN-OCHAUnited Nations Office for the Co-ordination
of Humanitarian Affairs
US United States of America
USAID United States Agency for International
Development
UXO Unexploded Ordinance
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COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN
Map of Eastern Sudan
7
This study was undertaken to gain a better understanding
of the situation in eastern Sudan in order to inform
the development of an appropriate action oriented programming
strategy for a number of agencies with interests
in the region. The findings of the research were generated
through extensive fieldwork with large numbers
of key informants, including senior government and opposition
representatives, local leaders, diplomats, academics,
international agencies staff and community members.
The document describes how the Beja and others in eastern
Sudan have coped with the complexity of their local
eco-system and been able to recover from recurrent
drought and outbreak of famine. It argues that the resilience
of their livelihoods system has been significantly
weakened due to external factors, many of which date
back to misguided policies in colonial times. Such policies
continued after independence, resulting in systematic
underdevelopment and marginalisation. This situation
led to the emergence of a political opposition and
latterly to tension and armed confrontation in part of the
region. Whilst the conflict has been very low key over the
last decade, it is apparent that the tension is rising in many
parts of eastern Sudan, particularly in urban centres.
The research analyses in detail the main actors to the conflict
and highlights how traditional political and tribal
leadership in eastern Sudan appears to have progressively
lost support within the communities. This is especially
evident in urban centres where a new generation of
young militant leaders has emerged, which draws its support
from the disaffected youth, particularly in towns. The
document discusses the involvement of and the
interlinkages between established actors such as the Beja
Congress, the Raishada Free Lions, the NDA, the SPLM/A
and the government, as well as the implications of the
presence of newer forces such as the JEM and SLM/A for
the politics of the region. Finally, the role and impact of
the regional and international players is also analysed.
The complex set of interrelated factors which drives the
conflict is examined. These include underlying grievances
such as historical feelings of exclusion and
marginalisation, demands for fair sharing of power between
different groups, inequitable distribution of economic
resources, underdevelopment, the absence of a
genuine democratic process and other governance issues,
including the failure of national leaders to address grievances
dating back to independence. In the last few years,
though, environmental factors have contributed to aggravate
the already dire socio-economic conditions of the
population in eastern Sudan and led long-standing discontent
and grievances to erupt into conflict. There are a
number of flash points which have exacerbated feelings
in the region, such as the loss of traditionally owned land
to mechanised agricultural schemes and the
mechanisation of the port in Port Sudan. Rampant poverty
and shockingly high malnutrition and mortality rates
have created widespread anger amongst the community,
who feel that the region is excluded from the national
context notwithstanding the fact that it is very rich in strategic
and natural resources. Most recently, the fallout from
the violence that occurred during the demonstrations in
Port Sudan in January 2005 has itself become a factor of
further resentment. Perspectives of key stakeholders in
the East on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA),
as well as its impact on the escalation of the tension in
the region are discussed in detail.
The study analyses the danger of a further escalation of
the conflict. The youth in urban centres are becoming increasingly
militant largely due to the lack of employment
opportunities and livelihoods options. There is a general
sense that resorting to armed confrontation is the only
option left to attract attention to the plight of the
marginalised in the East. The planned withdrawal of the
SPLM/A from the NDA controlled areas in accordance with
the CPA appears to be leading to a more confrontational
and less conventional military strategy by the Eastern
Front. The prospect of negotiations between the government
and the armed opposition in eastern Sudan has so
far acted as a restraining factor to those advocating more
militant solutions. However, the widespread distrust of
any initiative associated with the central government
means that there is an urgent need for a series of confidence
building measures around critical issues such as
employment opportunities in town and services in the
rural areas. Such initiatives need to be accompanied by
Executive Summary
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN
an immediate international effort to identify a negotiated
solution to the underlying causes of conflict.
Contemporary socio-economic data illustrate the degree
of chronic underdevelopment that characterises eastern
Sudan. Neonatal, post-natal and infant mortality are the
highest in the country. Annual income per household varies
between US$ 156 per capita in rural Kassala to US$ 93
in rural Red Sea State. Illiteracy is highly pervasive, with
rates of over 50% being the norm for the entire region
and there being pockets as high as 89%. The limited health
services are almost exclusively to be found in town, in a
context where anaemia (a major killer of pregnant women
and newborns) and TB are endemic. Whilst the lack of services
and livelihood opportunities are the core issue in
rural areas, in town, where services are available, the level
of income earning is so low that people cannot afford to
access food or services. This condition has worsened as a
result of the considerable loss of jobs caused by the
mechanisation of the port, a development which fuelled
discontent by depriving many households of a critical
safety net.
The last section of the study reviews the role of the international
community in eastern Sudan which, despite
more than a decade of conflict, has shown little to no interest
in understanding its roots causes or attempting to
mitigate the situation. International humanitarian and development
funding has been extremely limited and interventions
have been mostly confined to small scale,
short-term emergency projects.
However, appropriate assistance could greatly help to
mitigate the tension in the East, where the conflict is
closely linked to socio-economic marginalisation and livelihoods
issues. In conclusion, the paper argues with concrete
examples that the international community could
help stem the escalating crisis in eastern Sudan with relatively
little investment at this stage, while the costs of a
potential humanitarian crisis further down the line would
be much higher.
Boy at a well under construction.
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Recommendations
The two most urgent recommendations from this study
are as follows:
• Esablish a mechanism for a strategic, co-ordinated action
by international agencies: International agencies
should better co-ordinate interventions and focus on
strategic responses to key livelihoods issues for the
region, including joint advocacy to catalyse attention
to the situation in the East and enlist donor support
for a large scale, integrated, strategic and sustainable
response to the development needs of the region,
aimed at de-escalating tension.
• Sustain the momentum for negotiations: The international
community should prioritise the identification
of a suitable venue and mediation institution to initiate
talks between the concerned actors and to support
the implementation of a possible agreement with
adequate resources. Rehabilitation and development
assistance to the East should start immediately to
strengthen people’s confidence in the peace process.
A detailed set of recommendations is presented at the
end of the document which advocates for immediate action
to address triggers and fundamental causes of the
conflict in eastern Sudan through a multi-pronged approach
focused on humanitarian, development and
peace-building issues. Main recommendations include
the following:
Humanitarian issues
• Establish an emergency early warning system linked to
a Disaster Management Plan: Prepare a detailed Disaster
Management Plan to set up a system to track key
indicators of vulnerability throughout the region in
order to inform key actors in the East.
• Build up the Strategic Grain Reserves in Port Sudan: Build
up the Reserves to stabilise sorghum prices in the
market, in order to make it more affordable for the
poor.
• Establish assistance programmes aimed at eradicating
tuberculosis, anaemia and other diseases: International
agencies specialising in the health sector should support
local authorities to design effective systems to
combat TB and anaemia.
Development issues
• Support local government planning capacity: International
donors and agencies should support local government
reform, decentralisation and civil society capacity
building. Central government should send
skilled financial cadres to Red Sea and Kassala States
to design and help implement an inclusive, comprehensive
development plan for the region.
• Support income generating activities in urban areas:
Appropriate mechanisms should be identified to address
income poverty of people living in urban slums,
particularly those directly affected by the
mechanisation of the port in Port Sudan.
• Support key services in rural areas: Basic services should
be developed, particularly in areas with worst vulnerability
and mortality indicators, but should be accompanied
by support to local economic and productive
capacity, including pastoralist livelihoods.
• Introduce TuBedawye in schools: Introduction of
TuBedawye as primary or complementary means of
instruction should be considered for the first years of
primary school, in order to reduce the educational disadvantage
for Beja children.
• Exploring the possibility of a cross-line operation: The
possibility of devising an access mechanism to deliver
assistance cross-line to the NDA controlled areas
should be explored in order to reduce costs and
maximise assistance for the local communities.
Conflict mitigation and
peace building
• Facilitate confidence building measures: While plans for
the negotiations progress, the government should promote
confidence building measures to mitigate tension
in the region, including 1) the prompt payment
of the diyya to the families of those killed and in the
29/1 incidents in Port Sudan and to the injured; 2) carry
out an independent investigation into the killings and
disclose its findings; 3) engage with local community
and youth leaders to initiate a dialogue about development
priorities at the local level;.
• Promote emergency employment projects: Launch emergency
employment projects aimed primarily at unskilled
youth in urban areas to help de-escalate tension
by providing immediate job opportunities
through labour intensive initiatives. These
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
10
COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN
programmes should be accompanied by support to
small business, micro-finance projects and employment
skills training to create sustainable opportunities
for the youth long term.
• Support reduction of natural resources based conflict
between pastoralists and farmers: Urgent attention
must be paid to land tenure issues. Legislative reforms
should be promoted to acknowledge pastoralists’
rights to land where these have been alienated, possibly
through the institution of transparent and representative
State Land Commissions.
• Promote awareness about the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement through the dissemination of simplified
Arabic versions of the CPA and radio and TV
programmes in TuBedawye.
11
This study was commissioned by IRC with the support of
CARE, Christian Aid, Oxfam International, Save the Children
UK and Tearfund. The primary objective of the research
was to gain a better understanding of the situation
in eastern Sudan in order to inform the development
of an appropriate action oriented programming strategy
for the agencies concerned as well as other national and
international actors. The study focused on analysing the
underlying causes of underdevelopment and conflict in
eastern Sudan by identifying and exploring the socio-economic,
political, humanitarian and cultural issues that
have given rise to underdevelopment, tension and/or conflict,
in order to provide action oriented recommendations
to develop appropriate agency responses.
The research was conducted between 26th July and 23rd
September 2005 and included visits to Khartoum, Port
Sudan, Sinkat, Tokar, Kassala, Asmara, Tessnay and the NDA
controlled areas of Telkuk, Rubda and Hamashkoreb. In
Khartoum, Asmara and the NDA controlled areas the research
was conducted by the author with the support of
an international agency staff, while in the government
controlled areas of eastern Sudan the author was accompanied
by a national consultant, a national agency staff,
two senior HAC officials, a local community facilitator and
two translators.
In order to provide an in-depth analysis of the current situation
in eastern Sudan and appropriate recommendations
for action, a combination of data collection procedures
was used which included:
• A literary review of secondary sources, both published
and grey, which included relevant academic material
Introduction and Methodology
on eastern Sudan, humanitarian assessment reports,
policy briefings, conflict analysis reports and countrywide
studies with regional data breakdown. The material
reviewed was then used to formulate two separate
questionnaires which were used during the assessment
on the ground with key informants and community
groups respectively.
• Primary data collection was carried out through semistructured
interviews based on the questionnaires described
above. The questionnaires aimed at gaining an
understanding about underlying causes of underdevelopment
and insecurity in the region through a number
of different entry points. The questionnaire for the
key informants was developed on the basis of a conflict
assessment methodology with the purpose of
examining structures, actors and dynamics of the conflict
in eastern Sudan. The community questionnaire
was structured along the lines of a livelihoods framework
and focused on analysing local and meso-level
political and economic structures and processes in
eastern Sudanese society and understanding how patterns
of power and vulnerability in the region have
come about and are developing at present.
• A total of 376 people were interviewed, which included
representatives from government institutions at different
levels, local authorities, traditional leaders, members
of the Native Administration, diplomats, academics,
staff of international agencies, key informants and
community members. In total, officials and key informants
amounted to 147 while community members
interviewed were 229.
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY
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COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN
1.1 Historical trends
Eastern Sudan is made up of the states of Red Sea, Kassala
and Al-Gedaref. The total population of the three states
is estimated to be approximately 3,746,000. The two states
which are the focus of the study, Kassala and Red Sea, have
respective populations of 1,507,000 and 724,000 (World
Bank, 2003b:2), occupying about 260,000 square
kilometres (TANGO, 2005:6) and with very low population
density in rural areas (about 3.3. per square kilometre in
Red Sea State). Red Sea State’s capital city, Port Sudan, is
however home to about 55.2% of the State population
and over 90% of the overall urban population in the region.
Environmental conditions are adverse in both states,
though these are more extreme in Red Sea State, where
rainfall is highly variable, with mean annual rainfall being
between 33mm in Halaib and 307mm in Kassala, and the
annual coefficient of variation being as high as 200% in
Halaib Province, as compared to 27% in Kassala. Second,
water is very scarce, with the annual moisture range in
Red Sea State varying between –40mm and –60mm. Third,
the natural biological productivity is low, the soils being
predominantly saline, rocky and sandy, with decreasing
vegetational cover. Finally, there are extreme temperatures
with the mean annual temperature varying between
28oand 32o; cyclical droughts occur every three to six years
(Pantuliano, 2000:66-72).
The area is primarily inhabited by Beja pastoralists and
agro-pastoralists, although a wide variety of ethnic groups
from across the Sudan can be found in the two state capitals,
Port Sudan and Kassala. The Beja are a confederation
of tribes united by a common language, TuBedawye, a
Cushitic idiom, and a common segmentary structure,
where each lineage is linked to a common ownership and
use of land. The Beja have retained a distinct culture and
their own language despite having mixed for centuries
with Arab immigrants into their region. The three main
groups making up the Beja are the Bishariyyn, the
1. Background
Amar’ar/Atmaan and the Hadendowa. There is much discussion
in the literature (Palmisano, 1991; Morton, 1989)
and amongst Beja intellectuals over whether another
group, the Beni Amer, can also be considered Beja, given
that the large majority of them speak a different language,
Tigre’ (a Semitic language related to Tigrinya and Amharic)
and have a different social structure based on a caste system
rather than a segmentary structure. The region is also
inhabited by another pastoral group, the Rashaida, who
are mostly found in the Kassala area, although their mobility
patterns see them move throughout the eastern
region, up to the Egyptian border and beyond. The
Rashaida are a Bedouin group who migrated from the
northern Arabian peninsula in the 19th century; many of
them maintain close social and economic connection
with Gulf countries.
Over the centuries the Beja and other pastoral groups in
the region have devised flexible and dynamic strategies
to cope with the complexity and the variability of their
eco-system and to recover from droughts and outbreaks
of famine. Such strategies include mobility, herd diversification
and redistribution1, rules for environmental protection
(e.g. the prohibition of cutting trees) and the development
of a multi-resource economy where livestock
keeping is complemented by a set of alternative livelihoods,
including cultivation and labour migration to
town. The life of the Beja groups has been regulated by a
customary law called silif, a complex but flexible body of
rules based on Beja traditional values. Silif regulates access
to and redistribution of resources, reciprocal use of
environmental resources (grazing land, water points, arable
land or firewood), conflict resolution and reciprocity
around major social events (birth, marriage and death).
Clear land rights codes embodied in the silif (asl and
amara)2 have helped minimise conflict over land, supported
by the mediation of the tribal authorities who
were entrusted with the management of land rights. However,
the resilience of this system has significantly weak-
1 Lahagen and yahamot, respectively gift and loan of livestock to destitute households.
2 Asl is the customary right over a piece of land and its resources inherited from the ancestors for the entire lineage; amara is the usufruct right
given to non lineage members to use pasture, water and cultivable land on the asl of another lineage against the payment of a tribute called
gwadab.
13
ONE: BACKGROUND
ened over the last three or four decades due to a number
of external factors.
Under the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, the Beja suffered
from colonial policies which contributed to undermine
the basis of their economic and social well being. A
number of agricultural schemes which had been introduced
by the Turko-Egyptian administration in the southern
part of the region (Gash and Tokar Delta) were considerably
expanded by the British to increase cotton cultivation.
The expansion of the schemes deprived the Beja
of key pasture reserves which they had used in years of
severe drought and laid the basis for the decline of their
pastoral economy (Niblock, 1987:148). In the northern
part of the region the Bishariyyn Beja were affected by
the impact of the damming of the River Atbara for the
irrigation of the New Halfa Agricultural Scheme, which
reduced the amount of downstream water in the area they
occupied, as well as by the seizure of land around the gold
mines of Gebeit al Ma’adin and Ariab.
The effects of the British colonisation were also felt at the
political level with the imposition of the Native Administration
system in eastern Sudan. The model of Native Administration
created for the Beja did not mirror existing
indigenous leadership but imposed artificial hierarchical
units onto a flexible institutional setting. This resulted in
undermining traditional leadership and creating ruling
elites which were not truly representative of the local
population. In addition, in the planning of Port Sudan (created
in 1905), which was developed along strict ethnic and
social lines, the Beja were confined by the British administrators
to the worst of the four classes of residential areas
created in the town, the ‘native lodging areas’, which
accommodated casual labourers on the docks and the
railway (Pantuliano, 2000:114; Gubti, 1993:3).
The discrimination felt during the British colonisation
pushed the Beja to organise a regional political movement.
This was precipitated by the publication by a Beja
intellectual, M. Ismail, of a political pamphlet entitled
Kifah al-Bija (‘The Struggle of the Beja’) in 1953, in which
he denounced the social and economic conditions in
which the Beja were living and pointed to the destructive
effects that the agricultural schemes and the gold
mines were having on Beja interests. The pamphlet called
for the development of the Beja and the rural areas in
which they lived socially, economic and politically. The
pamphlet generated much discussion amongst Beja in-
Beja fighters on patrol near the front line.
14
COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN
tellectuals and notables and eventually led to the formation
of the Beja Congress in October 1958 by a group of
educated Beja who had come together to discuss how to
attract the attention of Sudan’s political leaders to the
problems facing the Beja areas (Niblock, ibid.:149).
The Beja Congress’s main aim was to draw attention to
the underdevelopment and marginalisation of Beja areas
and to advocate for more administrative and political autonomy.
However, its leaders were soon arrested and imprisoned
when the parliamentary government was overthrown
by General Abboud later in 1958. The Congress
was then allowed to engage in democratic elections in
the 1960s, when it was able to win several parliamentary
seats. With the advent of Numairi’s regime, political parties
were disbanded, including the Beja Congress, though
Beja politicians loyal to Numairi were able to attain high
political office at regional level. These leaders however
badly let down their people when they failed to catalyse
national attention to the famine which caused considerable
loss of life amongst the Beja and killed 80% of their
livestock in the mid-1980s.
The brief democratic interlude from 1985 to 1989 between
Numairi and the Government of National Salvation
saw the return of the Beja Congress. At that point the
political focus, which had previously concentrated on the
marginalisation of the Beja, started to shift towards the
preservation of Beja culture and land, largely as a reaction
to the demographic transformation that the region
had begun to experience due to the influx of refugees
form Eritrea, Internally Displaced People (IDPs) from
southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains and economic
migrants from the north and west of the Sudan. The Congress
was however once again banned in 1989 along with
other political parties. Form this time the party was accused
of fomenting political destabilisation in eastern
Sudan. Repression against Beja dissidents, the execution
of the former Governor of the Eastern Region, Major General
Mohammad Karrar, following his participation in a
coup attempt, the continued alienation of land and the
reported conscription of Beja into the Popular Defence
Force (PDF) combined to create a resurgence of Beja resistance
(Johnson, 2003:138). The Government of the
Sudan also denounced Eritrea for training Sudanese Beja
in camps in their country (Verney, 1995:28) while the
Eritrean government severed diplomatic relations with
the Sudan in December 1994 on the grounds that Islamic
terrorists had been training in the Sudan and then infiltrated
into groups of Eritrean returnees. The Beja Congress
resurfaced again in Asmara under the umbrella of the
National Democratic Alliance (NDA), a coalition of northern
opposition parties a well as the SPLM/A (see 1.2.3
below), and for the first time in its history it became involved
in military operations in collaboration with other
NDA forces. Fighting between the Sudanese army and
NDA groups started along the Sudano-Eritrean border in
1995, although military operations largely consisted of
guerrilla strikes against government military installations
as well as the Khartoum-Port Sudan highway and the oil
pipeline. The border was mined and this had a terrible
effect on traditional pastoral migration. In 1996 the Beja
Congress was charged with having backed a failed coup
attempt in Port Sudan in August of that year and fighting
between the parties intensified in the southern area of
Tokar and Kassala Provinces, with the opposition groups
eventually occupying most of the area between the border
and the areas surrounding Tokar town in spring 1997.
The area around Tokar was retaken by government forces
shortly afterwards, but the NDA continues to control
much of the border region, including the towns of Telkuk
and Hamashkoreb.
1.2 Main actors
1.2.1 The Beja Congress/Eastern
Front
Like many regional movements in the Sudan, the Beja
Congress was the creation of an educated political elite
which rejected their families’ affiliation to the two dominant
sectarian political parties, the Umma and the Democratic
Unionist Party (DUP). The dissatisfaction with the
DUP, which traditionally dominated the political life of the
Beja, was a direct consequence of the perceived neglect
by the party of the Beja quest for development, its failure
to address the uneven distribution of development resources
in the region and the appropriation of land by
traders loyal to sectarian political parties (Salih, 1999:97).
All these factors led to the creation of the Beja Congress
and to the development of an agenda of regional autonomy
to fight against the marginalisation and underdevelopment
of the Beja areas and protect Beja identity
and land.
15
The agenda of the Congress has not changed much from
that of its early days, although there is now a much stronger
emphasis by Congress leaders on equitable power and
wealth sharing as well as political representation both at
the regional and national levels. Although during the
study some of the Congress leaders met called for the
right of the Beja to self-determination, the central demand
seems to focus on the establishment of a genuine
federal system with true devolution of powers to the regions
and fair representation of all political forces at the
local and national levels within a united Sudan.
Today the Congress is represented by its political and
military leadership based in the NDA controlled areas as
well as by representatives based inside the Sudan. Over
the last few years the Congress leaders have worked to
expand their political platform to other groups living in
eastern Sudan. This led to the formation of the Eastern
Front in February 2005. The Front is a political alliance
between the Beja Congress, the Rashaida Free Lions (see
1.2.2 below) and representatives from other small ethnopolitical
groups belonging to the Shukriya and the
Dabaina. The formation of the Front is an attempt by the
Beja Congress and the Rashaida Free Lions to deethnicisise
their political agenda and appeal to other
communities in eastern Sudan to unite in the fight against
the marginalisation and the underdevelopment of the
region. However, interviews with non Beja and non
Rashaida groups, particularly in Kassala, revealed that the
Front is still largely seen as closely affiliated to its two
main ethnic groups and therefore not representative of
other eastern Sudan communities, including immigrants
from northern, western and southern Sudan.
The Beja Congress enjoys a widespread political following
in rural areas and amongst the Beja in Port Sudan,
where it is extremely popular amongst the youth and the
intellectuals. Both groups see the Congress as the only
genuine representative of Beja interests, unlike traditional
parties like the DUP or traditional leaders, who have lost
much of their clout amongst the younger generations
(see 1.2.3 and 1.2.7 below). Despite its vast popularity,
though, many external observers have commented that
the Congress has so far failed to build an efficient
organisation on the ground and that its transformation
from a protest movement into a fully fledged political
party is far from realised.
1.2.2 The Rashaida Free Lions
The Rashaida Free Lions were created in the late 1990s
and have been carrying out military operations in the area
south of Kassala over the last few years, although not in
co-ordination with the NDA forces. The political agenda
of the Free Lions is similar to that of the Beja Congress
and is centred on the marginalisation and the underdevelopment
of the region, the lack of fair representation
and power sharing and the expansion of mechanised
farming at the expense of nomadic migration routes
which is affecting Rashaida livelihoods. Many of the
Rashaida interviewed have mentioned the confiscation of
a large number of 4WD vehicles by the government in the
mid 1990s as an indicator of oppressive policies against
the Rashaida and as a trigger for rebellion.
Notwithstanding the fact that there is now an alliance
between the Beja Congress and the Rashaida Free Lions,
many external observers feel that the relations between
the two groups are rather uneasy and that the alliance
could be only transient given the animosity that has
characterised Beja-Rashaida relations in the past and the
fact that part of the Rashaida do not support the Free Lions.
Over the last two decades Beja and Rashaida groups
have been embroiled in local strife over land and water
use. In addition, in the mid 1980s the Rashaida requested
from the government the appointment of their own Nazir,
the highest tribal authority, in order to disenfranchise
Rashaida omdas from the overall authority of the
Hadendowa Nazir. However, Nazirates are linked to the
possession of tribal land and historically the Rashaida
have no claim to land in eastern Sudan; their transhumance
routes have always been negotiated with Beja
tribal leaders and they have traditionally paid the symbolic
tribute which sanctioned the recognition that they
were guests on Beja land. In 1989, though, the government
of Sadiq el Mahdi decided to grant the Rashaida a Nazirate,
but this provoked heated reaction from the four Beja
Nazirs and the government had to backtrack and downgrade
the Nazir to the rank of Rais al Idara (Head of Administration),
a de facto Nazir without land. The dispute is
however far from settled and the Rashaida claim that they
have a full Nazirate with land that has been granted to
them by the current government. While the Eastern Front
dismisses this dispute as an anachronistic battle over old
tribal feuds, Rashaida and Beja communities met in and
around Kassala still seem to attach much importance to
ONE: BACKGROUND
16
COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN
the issue and tension over land and water resources between
the two groups continue to exist and flare up from
time to time. The Rashaida Free Lions feel that the
Rashaida are Sudanese citizens and as such they have a
right to land, regardless of historical claims by tribal
groups over the whole region. The right of all eastern
Sudan citizens to have equitable access to resources was
further underscored by Beja Congress leaders.
Another element which is important to underline is that
unlike the Beja Congress where support is unconditional
with the exception of a few Beja politicians close to the
ruling party, there seems to be much less unquestioning
support for the Free Lions amongst the Rashaida. The Free
Lions seem to enjoy following amongst the youth, but
community and tribal leaders question the need for the
rebellion, especially, as they emphasise, since the government
has recently been very supportive of Rashaida communities,
allotting them land and providing services.
Many external observers have commented on the danger
of a split amongst the Rashaida, with some potentially
supporting the government against the Free Lions.
1.2.3 The National Democratic
Alliance
The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) was created in
October 1989 as a reaction to the policies of the new
Government of National Salvation. The Alliance included
key northern opposition parties such as the Democratic
Unionist Party (DUP), the Umma (which left the alliance
in 2000), the Sudan Alliance Forces, the Communist Party,
the Baathist Party as well as the SPLM/A. The Beja Congress
became part of the Alliance in 1993 while the Dar
Fur based Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)
joined it in 2004. The NDA’s main aim was to overthrow
the dictatorship through a non-violent campaign to abolish
Islamic laws and form a new transitional government.
The rivalry of the Umma and DUP within the alliance and
intense government repression, though, undermined its
capacity to be very effective in northern Sudan.
Beja girls on donkey along the Eritrean-Sudanese border, near
the Sawa river.
17
Over the last few years the relations between some of the
partners within the Alliance have been put under considerable
strain. The signing of the Machakos Protocol in
2002 led to serious complaints to the SPLM/A by the NDA
leadership and the DUP in particular, since it was felt that
the deal on issues of religion and state and self-determination
exclusively for the South undermined the NDA
agenda of radical transformation of the Sudan as a whole
and left the marginalised areas in the North out of the
agreement. The evolution of the Naivasha process has
forced the NDA to discuss a strategy about its future role
in the country. An important turn of events for eastern
Sudan took place at the NDA Leadership Summit of July
2004, when the DUP representatives asked for the expulsion
of the Beja Congress after this had signed a memorandum
of understanding with the Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM), one of the main rebel movements in Dar
Fur. The Beja Congress on the other hand accused the DUP
of taking a conciliatory line with the government with the
aim of getting to power at all costs and recovering its old
constituencies in eastern Sudan (Polloni, 2004:19). The
friction between the two parties worsened during one of
the earlier rounds of the NDA-government talks in Cairo
in December 2004, when the Beja Congress walked out
of the talks, claiming that their interests were not represented
and subsequently threatened to withdraw fully
from the NDA (Justice Africa, 2005:6).
Although the Beja Congress never left the NDA, the split
with the DUP has never been mended. The main reasons
behind the friction lie in the different political demands
of the two movements, with the Beja Congress advocating
for strong regional autonomy and the DUP not being
favourable to regional autonomy settlements for minorities
in northern Sudan. The divide also reflects a fight over
leadership in eastern Sudan, with the Beja Congress
emerging as a strong and popular political force and the
DUP suffering from a significant loss of credibility and
support in many quarters.
Attempts to reconcile the two former allies have been
made by other forces within the NDA, but with little success
so far. The Eastern Front (the Beja Congress and the
Rashaida Free Lions) resent the fact that the DUP has
reached an agreement with the government and has done
little to raise issues related to eastern Sudan during the
Cairo negotiations. DUP representatives have argued that
the Cairo talks had a national focus and that a separate
track is being prepared for the negotiations on eastern
Sudan, although this is only a very recent development.
Now that the negotiations on eastern Sudan seem likely
to happen, the DUP and the Eastern Front are also fighting
for representation around the table. The Front feels
that the DUP has no role to play in what will be a forum
to discuss issues specific to eastern Sudan and that the
only groups with legitimacy to negotiate with the government
are those directly involved in the armed struggle.
Although many Beja still follow the Khatmiyya tariqa, the
Sufi order of which the DUP is the political expression,
the most senior Congress leaders think that the party has
lost any political following and people resent the DUP’s
attempt to exploit their religious influence for political
purposes. In addition, the Eastern Front feels that the DUP
has no significant military forces on the ground and that
it is now a government allied force.
The DUP obviously believes that they should be part of
the negotiations since they have traditionally had a strong
presence in eastern Sudan together with their military
wing, the National Revolutionary Movement (NRM), which
others though discount as almost non existent. Although
DUP leaders are aware of their diminishing support in the
region, especially amongst the younger generations, they
feel that the ethnicisation of politics in eastern Sudan is
very dangerous in that it represents a step backward in
the evolution of Sudan’s politics and could create further
divisions within the opposition movements as with the
case of Dar Fur. DUP leaders also commented that most
ethnic based parties are protest movements more than
structured political parties, but felt that the return of
ethno-regional politics in the Sudan is weakening the
DUP and other national political parties.
1.2.4 The SPLM/A
The SPLM has been active in eastern Sudan since the early
1990s within the NDA umbrella, although its military involvement
scaled up after 1997 with the creation of the
New Sudan Brigade. The relation between the SPLM and
its allied forces in the NDA has been evolving after the
signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA),
particularly in light of the commitment of the SPLM/A to
withdraw its troops from the NDA controlled areas by 9th
January 2006. Whilst the planned SPLM withdrawal does
not please the Eastern Front, they seem to understand the
motivations behind the agreement to withdraw and do
ONE: BACKGROUND
18
COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN
not seem to hold hard feelings towards their ally. Less
understanding was instead voiced by JEM leaders who felt
that the SPLM has exploited the Beja and their land for
its own political objectives.
Many of the actors interviewed during the assessment,
including representatives from the Eastern Front, the
SPLM and the government had high hopes that the movement
could play a pivotal conciliatory role in the forthcoming
negotiations between the Eastern Front and the
government. The SPLM leaders emphasised that they are
now part of the government and as such want to play a
role in quelling the fighting all over the country. Some
Beja actors expressed preoccupation that the SPLM may
have a less inclusive agenda after the death of former Vice-
President Garang, but hoped that the new leadership
would uphold his vision.
1.2.5 The JEM and the SLM/A
A new element in the political and military dynamics of
eastern Sudan is the presence of the two main forces engaged
in the insurgency in Dar Fur. The JEM was the first
of the two movements to become involved in eastern
Sudan and to date has the largest military presence on
the ground. JEM senior leaders met during the assessment
emphasised the national nature of the movement, which
seeks to fight for justice and equality all over the country.
The JEM started operating in eastern Sudan through local
activists of Dar Furi origin, but is increasingly recruiting
militants amongst indigenous eastern Sudanese (especially
Beja) as well, particularly amongst refugees along
the Sudano-Eritrean border. The movement’s leadership
has stressed that they do not want to import fighters from
Dar Fur into eastern Sudan, but are now working at setting
up a separate eastern Sudan JEM cell to maintain
overall control of the movement’s operations in eastern
Sudan. The JEM is also working to define its relations with
the Eastern Front beyond the memorandum of understanding
signed in July 2004 with the Beja Congress. The
two movements have already carried out a number of
joint operations in the region (most notably the kidnapping
of three Sudanese MPs after the Kassala Conference
in April 2005 and an attack on Dolobiay in June 2005) and
both sides stated that their collaboration is cordial and
fruitful. The JEM is not a member of the NDA and has no
intention of joining the Alliance. JEM leaders emphasised
several times that the nature of the problems in eastern
Sudan is similar to that of Dar Fur and other marginalised
parts of the Sudan and that there are minimal differences
between the JEM and the Eastern Front about the approach
to take to tackle such problems. It is important to
underline that many external observers commented that
without the additional presence of the JEM the recent
escalation of the conflict in eastern Sudan would have
probably not taken place, particularly after the SPLA
stopped all military operations in the region, leaving the
Eastern Front in a much weaker military position.
The SLM/A became a member of the NDA in February
2004 and has also been involved in part of the Cairo negotiations.
However, so far they have not been active militarily
in eastern Sudan, although they have military personnel
in the region, and do not have ambitions to take
part to the negotiations for eastern Sudan. As with the
JEM, the SLM/A leaders met during the study emphasised
the national nature of the movement and their objective
to promote fundamental change throughout the country.
Although the movement is yet to engage in military
action, it is considering the possibility of future military
operations in eastern Sudan along with the Eastern Front.
Notwithstanding the emphasis placed by both movements
on their national character and their efforts to
bring about political change throughout the Sudan, some
well-informed observers have commented that the involvement
of the Dar Furi movements in eastern Sudan is
probably due to reasons of military expediency and aims
to overstretch government forces particularly because
they fear that government troops being withdrawn from
southern Sudan may be redeployed in Dar Fur.
1.2.6 The Government of the
Sudan
The Government of the Sudan is seen by the opposition
groups in the East as the primary cause of the tension
because of its lack of attention to the region and its adverse
policies. Senior government officials met during the
assessment emphasised that the government is aware of
the problems of eastern Sudan and of its chronic underdevelopment
and marginalisation affecting in particular
Beja communities and stressed the openness and readiness
of the government to find a negotiated settlement
to people’s demands. The government has been negotiating
separately with the various actors in the eastern
19
Sudan conflict but is now ready to consider opening a
new negotiating table focused on eastern Sudan only.
Despite the stated good intentions of the government,
concern was expressed in several quarters by both opposition
leaders and local youth in Port Sudan and Kassala
that some government elements may be trying to play
the local tribal tensions to their advantage, particularly
by offering support to pro-government Beni Amer militia
to patrol the border as well as by promoting a new
political group called Beja Congress for Reform and Development.
Youth in Kassala in particular remarked that
there was an attempt to politicise tribal conflict and ignite
division between the Beni Amer (particularly of
Eritrean origin, living now in the Sudan) and other Beja
groups, and that this could have dangerous repercussions
for the region.
1.2.7 The traditional and the
emerging leadership
An important actor in the evolving dynamics of eastern
Sudan is the traditional leadership, in particular the Native
Administration and the religious leadership linked to
the Khatmiyya and Betai tariqas. As said above, the Beja
have four Nazirates who have traditionally exercised considerable
power over the decisions of the tribal groups
and have played an important role in mediating conflict
at the local level both amongst the Beja and with other
groups like the Rashaida. However, over the last two decades
the power and influence of the Native Administration
seems to have considerably weakened, particularly
in urban areas. Many in eastern Sudan consider this institution
as elitist, undemocratic, highly politicised and gender
blind and feel that it should undergo profound restructuring
to become truly representative of their communities.
During the interviews many Beja community
representatives throughout eastern Sudan voiced their
dissatisfaction with a leadership that they saw more inclined
to advance the interests of the central government
than to advocate for the rights of the Beja to adequate
resources and services. Such people felt that the Native
Administration has lost its leadership capacity and is more
focused on personal gain. These feelings were particularly
widespread amongst educated urban dwellers and youth
in town, though to a considerably lesser extent in the rural
areas. In urban areas the Native Administration seems
to have lost its leadership to a new and younger generation
whose authority is not based on tribal loyalties. The
new leaders are educated or semi-educated youth who
appear to have authority over the whole community, particularly
in Port Sudan deims (suburbs). The youth have
organised themselves and are widely represented, especially
in the bigger towns. The politics of the new leadership
are such that they promote solidarity across the Beja
and speak of all the Beja groups as one, including the Beni
Amer; their support for the Beja Congress and the Eastern
Front appears to be unreserved.
1.2.8 The regional players
The geographical location of eastern Sudan puts it in the
political sphere of influence of its neighbours, particularly
Eritrea. Almost all the actors interviewed spoke of the role
the Government of Eritrea has been playing in influencing
eastern Sudan politics over the last decade. Many track
down its involvement to the support allegedly provided
by the Government of the Sudan to Islamic elements
amongst Eritrean youth (the ‘Eritrean Islamic Jihad’) in
camps set up in eastern Sudan in the early 1990s, which
eventually led Eritrea to sever relations with the Sudan in
1994, given the threat that fundamentalists pose to the
country’s religious and ethnic stability. Other actors felt
that the support provided by Eritrea to eastern Sudan
groups can be ascribed to the fact that the Government
of Eritrea sees the growing relation between Sudan and
Ethiopia as a threat and the Sudanese border as a danger
in a new, potential Eritrea-Ethiopia war, so the Eritreans
want to create a buffer zone.
There are vastly different perceptions about the role of
the Eritrean support to the Eastern Front and its allied
forces. The Government of the Sudan has publicly denounced
Eritrea for providing military support to these
groups and attempting to undermine the implementation
of the CPA in the Sudan. Such a position underplays
the role of national actors in leading the conflict. The
Government of Eritrea claims that their role is limited to
logistical and moral support to the NDA forces. Field observation
during the assessment suggests that Eritrean
support is not overt on the ground; Eritrean military personnel
do not appear to be present in the NDA controlled
areas. However, it is clear that Eritrea is actively involved
with Sudan opposition movements hosted on its territory.
ONE: BACKGROUND
20
COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN
Another regional player which cannot be ignored is Egypt,
which has co-opted a sizable piece of land known as the
‘Halaib triangle’ in the northern part of Red Sea State and
has kept it under its control since 1994, injecting considerable
resources to build infrastructure and services and
develop work opportunities. The development that has
demonstrably taken place in the triangle has, in the view
of some Beja interviewees, served to heighten a sense
amongst the Beja youth of the wholesale neglect of the
region by the Sudanese government.
1.2.9 The international
community
Very little attention has been paid so far to the dynamics
of the conflict in eastern Sudan by the international community.
Although the conflict has been active in the region
for more than a decade, international actors have
shown little to no interest in understanding its root causes
or attempting to mitigate the situation. Government representatives
met during the assessment have stated that
they have requested the support of the international
community both in terms of development assistance to
mitigate some of the causes of unrest in the region and
to foster a dialogue between the government and armed
opposition troops. All the senior government officials met
emphasised that it is important to tackle the roots of the
conflict in eastern Sudan before further escalation and
that the support of the international community is
needed at this stage in order to identify preventive measures
to de-escalate the crisis in eastern Sudan and prevent
its degeneration into a Dar Fur-like situation. Many
interviewees concurred that the window of opportunity
to mitigate conflict in eastern Sudan is still open, but that
it is shrinking and commented that the international community
could help stem the crisis with relatively little investment
at this stage, while the costs of potential humanitarian
crisis further down the line would be much
higher.
However, although there has been a marginal increase in
the attention of the international community towards
eastern Sudan recently, this is yet to translate into material
assistance to the population of the region, which
could greatly help to mitigate the tension in the East
where the conflict is closely linked to socio-economic
marginalisation and livelihoods issues (see 3.1 below).
Although a number of international organisations, primarily
small and medium sized INGOs, have been operating
in eastern Sudan for a number of years, the amount of
humanitarian and development assistance extended to
the region by the international community has been extremely
limited and mostly confined to small scale, short
term emergency projects. The limited space awarded to
eastern Sudan in the UN Country Workplan for 2006 confirms
this trend.
21
TWO: PEACE AND DEVELPMENT IN EASTERN SUDAN
2.1 The perceived causes
of unrest
As with many other conflicts taking place in the Sudan,
there is no single root cause for the fighting in the East. A
complex set of interrelated factors is driving the war
which, as described above, has been at its height since
1997 and includes the military occupation of the NDAcontrolled
territory. Historical grievances, feelings of exclusion
and marginalisation, demands for fair sharing of
power between different groups, inequitable distribution
of economic resources and benefits, underdevelopment,
the absence of a genuine democratic process and other
governance issues are all interlocking factors to the conflict,
but none of them is a sole or primary cause. Unequal
access to resources and services and disparities in resource
distribution has been exacerbated by the long
standing failure of national leaders to address the grievances
stemming from the region since independence. In
the last few years, though, environmental factors have
contributed to aggravate the already dire socio-economic
conditions of the population in eastern Sudan and led
2. Peace and Development in Eastern Sudan:
Current Perceptions and Perspectives
long-standing discontent and grievances to erupt into
conflict.
As discussed in section 1.1 above, grievances in eastern
Sudan, particularly amongst the Beja, date back to the
colonial time and are primarily linked to the seizure of
prime land and the ensuing dwindling of pasture which
badly affected people’s livelihoods and generated local
conflict around resources. Dissatisfaction about the lack
of political representation for the Beja, socio-economic
marginalisation, underdevelopment and lack of services
were also amongst the reasons which led to the formation
of the Beja Congress in 1958. Today the causes of the
conflict cited by the different actors met during the study
are not much different from the grievances voiced by the
Beja Congress 60 years ago. One of the most recurrent
complaints that communities, local and political leaders,
and external observers alike quoted as a cause of conflict
was the socio-economic marginalisation of the people in
eastern Sudan, particularly the Beja, and the feeling of
social exclusion which is so pervasive within their com-
Eastern Front troops.
22
COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN
munities. One international observer commented that she
was stunned by the extent of the exclusion from the national
context felt by many communities in Port Sudan.
Eastern Sudan is one of the poorest regions in the country
and most of the people resent the state of neglect in
which its communities have been left, both in the rural
areas and in the urban slums. People have complained
consistently and incessantly about the lack of services
(education, health and water), lack of job opportunities,
barriers to access to natural resources (e.g. agricultural
land and water), general state of underdevelopment, extremely
high rates of maternal and infant mortality, poverty,
food insecurity, vulnerability and morbidity. Some of
these issues are discussed in detail in section 3.1 with the
help of available data and indicators.
Several of the actors interviewed, particularly the Beja
youth in the towns and the communities in the NDA controlled
areas, have linked the general state of neglect and
marginalisation of eastern Sudan to the lack of eastern
Sudan representatives, particularly Beja, in the central and
to a lesser extent in the state government. Many local and
external observers have emphasised that eastern Sudan
is a very rich region, considering that it has prime agricultural
land, gas, gold and other minerals, livestock, fisheries,
oil potential and the only port in the country, as well
as being crossed by the highways to Egypt and to
Khartoum, the railway and the oil pipeline. Some Beja
leaders commented that the Beja occupy the most strategic
piece of land in the country and one of the richest,
but do not share any of the wealth which is produced by
the region. Similar comments were made by Rashaida
leaders who remarked that the Rashaida do not receive
any services in return for the levies they pay on their livestock,
remittances and trade. There was a widespread feeling
amongst local communities that many private companies
and well connected individuals are doing profitable
business in the area, especially with the gold, oil, gas
and fishery sectors, without any benefit trickling down
to the community. Interviewees felt strongly that in general
revenues earned from eastern Sudanese resources are
not redistributed locally; on the contrary, people complained
that they were being directly deprived of their
land, as in the case of the community in Hosheiry (rural
Port Sudan), whose land has been confiscated to develop
a new port for oil exports. The resentment against the
central and local government for the unfair redistribution
of resources and lack of development affecting the region
was very strongly articulated by almost all actors met in
eastern Sudan, including pro-government actors. At the
community level resentment gave way to anger and a
feeling that people had to fight to attract attention to the
situation in the East.
Many complained about the fact that the almost total
absence of services and development initiatives in the
rural areas has pushed much of the population to move
to the towns, particularly Port Sudan. In town, where services
are available, the complaint was that rampant poverty
does not allow people to be able to afford school
fees or pay for drugs. A very high number of people are
vulnerable to diseases such as tuberculosis, which is directly
linked to malnutrition. In Port Sudan anger was very
palpable amongst many communities about the
mechanisation of the port, which has had a direct impact
on individual and household income for thousands of
families (the number of people laid off was reported by
local government officials to be in excess of 28,000) and
which people felt should have been compensated by parallel
employment creation. The mechanisation of the port
in Port Sudan has undoubtedly contributed to radicalise
anti-government feelings amongst the Beja. Beja men,
particularly Amar’ar/Atmaan, have been working on the
docks as porters and casual labours since the early 1930s
and stevedoring work was a crucial safety net for the Beja.
Seasonal male youth casual labour on the port was a key
source of complementary income for rural households,
but the port also provided an alternative source of livelihoods
to those who have lost all their livestock, particularly
after the mid-1980s famine. Much frustration was
voiced by young university graduates in Port Sudan and
Kassala about the general lack of job opportunities for
educated people as well and about the perception that
ethnic Beja were being discriminated against when applying
for jobs. Similar grievances were voiced by the
youth in Kassala, where the lack of job and labour opportunities
were lamented by almost all people met. In
Kassala much resentment was also voiced about the lack
of government investment in preventing and controlling
the flash floods which recur almost every year along the
river Gash.
In Kassala there was mention of the alienation of land to
non indigenous landowners who have progressively come
to own much of the agricultural schemes, while local
people no longer have access to farming land. While it was
23
not possible to verify the extent of these allegations, it is
nonetheless important to mention that many Beja in
Kassala have a perception that their land has now been
seized by other people and they can only work as agricultural
labourers on other people’s farms. Furthermore,
a limited number of Beja actors claimed that their culture
and their language have been discriminated against
by a series of governments and that it is important for
the Beja to preserve the use of TuBedawye. The desire to
retain TuBedawye as a language and a form of cultural
expression was widely expressed. However, the communities
interviewed indicated an almost univocal preference
for Arabic as a means of instruction, since they believe
that this would allow them to overcome some of the
traditional isolation of Beja communities and would increase
access to economic opportunities. Many felt that
the lack of use of TuBedawye during the first years of primary
school puts Beja children at disadvantage vis-à-vis
children of Arab origin and is one of the main reasons for
the high drop out rates amongst the Beja.
Traditional tribal leaders, many of whom are affiliated to
the ruling party, felt that most of the grievances raised by
the Beja youth and by the communities were legitimate
and that the Native Administration has been alerting the
central government to the tension in the region and warning
that immediate action is required to avoid eastern
Sudan becoming another Dar Fur. However, the general
view amongst much of the Beja youth was that lack of
job opportunities and development were a direct consequence
of the political marginalisation of the Beja and
their lack of power. Much of the justification behind the
fighting was attributed to the need for the Beja and other
local groups to take charge of the decision making affecting
their communities in order to reverse the prevailing
trend of marginalisation and underdevelopment and redistribute
economic resources more fairly. Many felt that
although some Beja are already part of the local government
they are more focused on their own personal gain
than on the well being of the community and that in any
case there is no systematic, institutionalised attempt to
address community problems. Some commented that
more people are dying because of the neglect of the authorities
than because of the conflict.
It is apparent that the Beja youth, particularly in Port
Sudan, are seething with anger and resentment and that
many feel that armed confrontation is the only means to
reverse the situation in the region. Some of the actors
observed that such feelings can be easily manipulated for
political purposes. Whilst this is undoubtedly true, the
perception was, though, that the feeling of desperation
ran so deep amongst the communities at all levels in Port
Sudan slums that the youth were prepared to do whatever
they could to attract national and international attention
to the situation in eastern Sudan. It is clear that
the call for action has been prompted by the Naivasha
process as well as the fighting in Dar Fur, with more Beja
youth coming to the conclusion that armed confrontation
is the only route to change. Such feelings have been
aggravated by the killing of an estimated 25 Beja men and
the wounding of 196 others1 by the police during the
demonstrations by a large numbers of Beja in late January
2005 in Port Sudan to protest against the exclusion of
eastern Sudan from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
The events of 29th January 2005 have become a symbolic
turning point for many Beja in Port Sudan and have directly
contributed to escalate tension in the region, since
many reportedly have started to feel that the police action
was the proof that dialogue with the government is
not possible. The delay in the payment of the diyya (blood
money) and in releasing the results of the investigation
into the killings promised by the government is also contributing
to further exacerbate tension.
Eastern Front leaders emphasised that the demands of
the people of eastern Sudan are not any different from
those of the groups fighting in Dar Fur or from the SPLM
in the South. Lack of development, basic services and
employment in eastern Sudan are in their opinion the
direct result of the concentration of power in the hands
of a restricted elite, which has resulted in political
marginalisation and lack of attention to the peripheries
throughout the country. Similar comments were made by
the leaders of the Rashaida Free Lions as well as the JEM.
1 Source: Associated Press, 1st February 2005 (quoting Amna Derar, Eastern Front spokesperson).
TWO: PEACE AND DEVELPMENT IN EASTERN SUDAN
24
COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN
2.2 The significance of the CPA
in eastern Sudan
There is no doubt that the signing of the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement has prompted the Beja and other
groups in eastern Sudan to seek redress similar to that
gained by the SPLM in the South. The CPA was seen by
most actors in the region as a bilateral agreement between
the National Congress Party and the SPLM/A, which
has failed to take into account the instances of the many
different groups living in the Sudan. Many people
emphasised that the title ‘comprehensive’ is highly inappropriate
for an agreement that has been so exclusive.
Most of the people interviewed in eastern Sudan felt that
the signing of the Machakos Agreement and the process
leading to the signing of the other Protocols has led other
groups to resort to armed confrontation (e.g. in Dar Fur)
or to escalate fighting (e.g. in eastern Sudan). However,
many actors, including representatives from the Beja Congress
and the Rashaida Free Lions, believed that the CPA
also represents an opportunity for stakeholders in eastern
Sudan and elsewhere to address and resolve some of
the grievances which lie behind the tension in the region,
including issues of power and wealth sharing. One commentator
observed that the attention should be placed
on the CPA as a process, rather than on its text, as the process
deriving from the CPA could inform change in eastern
Sudan, unlike the letter of the agreement which focuses
exclusively on the North/South conflict. Some of
the issues addressed in the CPA (e.g. fairer political representation,
effective decentralisation) are all relevant to
eastern Sudan and many interviewees felt that if the CPA
were effectively implemented, it would definitely carry
benefits for the region. In order to do so, though, the
agreement would have to be ‘Easternised’, with power and
wealth sharing made relevant to the different parts and
groups in the region and through in-depth restructuring
of local institutions.
Some of the Eastern Front leaders commented that they
consider the CPA to be a good framework for change, but
that it has to be amended to accommodate the interests
of the other groups in the country which have been ignored
by the CPA in the redistribution of power and
wealth. Many of the demands raised by the Front and the
other groups fighting in eastern Sudan are framed along
the lines of the CPA and focus on allocation of power for
eastern Sudanese actors at both the national and the re-
A camp of the Beja Congress Movement, near Balasit.
25
gional levels and fairer redistribution of wealth in the region.
Several opposition leaders stated that the distribution
of power at the federal level should reflect the population
size in the different regions while many external
observers saw the Two Area Protocol as a possible framework
for negotiation between the government and the
Eastern Front.
The Beja youth, in Port Sudan in particular, felt that there
is no guarantee that the agreement will bring real redistribution
of power and wealth in the country. They
emphasised that the CPA process has heightened the feeling
of exclusion amongst the Beja and that people have
gathered together to ask for the agreement to be extended
to include provisions for eastern Sudan (this is
what they were demanding during the January 2005 demonstration).
They remarked that the CPA could provide an
entry point for the solution of other conflicts in the Sudan
if the international community strongly supported an
extension of the CPA process to Dar Fur and eastern Sudan
that would make the agreement truly comprehensive.
Some international observers commented that the CPA
could provide a platform to address most of the mains
causes of tension in eastern Sudan and offer a framework
to reach a separate agreement between the Eastern Front
and the government. However, they felt that while waiting
for the positive effects of the agreement to be realised,
action is required to deal with the immediate impact the
agreement has had on exacerbating the already existing
tension in the region.
One obvious gap in the CPA highlighted by many of the
people interviewed is that the provision envisaging the
withdrawal of the SPLA from the NDA controlled areas and
the handover of the region to government forces has not
taken into account the presence of other armed groups
in the area such as the Eastern Front. Eastern Front leaders
emphasised that they are not bound by any agreement
to withdraw their forces and that they do not have
a cease-fire agreement with the government, therefore
they will continue military operations in the area after the
withdrawal of the SPLA unless an agreement is reached
with the government. JEM representatives in particular
stressed that UN monitors should wait to move in until
an agreement is reached between the government and
armed groups operating in eastern Sudan because the
region will be the theatre of military operations until a
negotiated solution is reached by all the parties involved.
An important element which emerged throughout the
assessment is that most people, particularly rural communities
as well as of much of the people living in urban
slums know very little about the CPA, its provisions and
the implications that it will have for eastern Sudan and
the country as a whole. An important issue for the region,
for instance, is the establishment of the Land Commission
envisaged in the Wealth Sharing Protocol. However,
it is not clear how people in remote rural areas will be
made aware of the Commission in order to claim back
their land where entitled to. Importantly, the mechanisms
of implementation of the agreement are not even clear
to some of the leadership in the region.
2.3 The agenda for peace and
development: emerging
perspectives
2.3.1 Possible escalation
Several factors need to be considered when weighing the
possibility of further escalation of the conflict in eastern
Sudan. While the planned withdrawal of SPLA forces may
point to an inevitable reduction of the military capacity
of NDA forces in the region, other factors have surfaced
in recent months that seem to suggest that the possibility
of an escalation of the tension should not be discounted.
The events of Port Sudan in late January 2005
have exacerbated feelings among the Beja in Port Sudan,
particularly the youth. Many of them were reported to
have joined the fighters in the NDA controlled areas in
the months following the killings in Port Sudan and several
others of those met during the study spoke openly
about their willingness to join the fight since they felt that
they had nothing to lose and, as they put it, ‘they are dying
of a slow death anyway’ (Deim al Arab - Port Sudan,
31st July 2005). It was astounding to hear young Beja
women, who are traditionally confined to a very secluded
life away from public and political life in Beja society,
speaking vehemently about their desire to ‘sacrifice’
themselves for their tribe. In addition, the presence of new
actors such as the JEM has bolstered the military capacity
of the armed rebellion in the East. At present the JEM
is reported to be actively recruiting amongst the youth
in IDPs and refugee camps along the Sudano-Eritrean
border.
TWO: PEACE AND DEVELPMENT IN EASTERN SUDAN
26
COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN
Despite the recent strengthening of their military capacity
and the support of new allies, the Eastern Front seems
to be aware that the withdrawal of the SPLA will inevitably
weaken its capacity to expand the territory under its
control. However, discussions with several well informed
actors seem to point to a change of military strategy and
an escalation that would focus on ‘hit and run’ operations
and targeting of the many strategic economic installations
located inside government controlled areas of the
East. Beja leaders commented that the port, the highway
and the pipeline could all become targets of a military
escalation which would find many supporters amongst
the Beja and other communities in eastern Sudan. Beja
youth representatives in Port Sudan argued that so far
economic infrastructure in the East have not been attacked
in sign of respect for the tribal leaders (the Nazirs)
who asked Beja communities to protect key installations
such as the pipeline. However, they felt that now there is
no alternative but to resort to new military tactics. There
was awareness amongst Eastern Front leaders that resorting
to unconventional military tactics and guerrilla warfare
may alienate the sympathy of the international community
towards the plea of the Beja people. However,
some of them commented that the international community
has never offered any meaningful support to the Beja,
so they would not stand to lose.
Notwithstanding the stated intentions to escalate the
fighting, all Eastern Front political and military leaders
stressed vigorously that the recourse to further violence
would be the last option and that they are keen to find a
negotiated settlement with the government. Several of
them emphasised that the offer of the government to
negotiate has deferred the immediate danger of an expansion
of the conflict, but that an escalation would be
inevitable if the promise to negotiate is not upheld. The
youth in Port Sudan made similar comments and remarked
that they want peace and are prepared to find a
solution through negotiations, but that negotiations will
have to be genuine and constructive and address people’s
grievances.
Should an escalation ever take place, some actors have
pointed out that it will be important to try and prevent
clashes between Beja groups, particularly between Beni
Amer and Hadendowa in the Kassala area. Other observers
also saw the possibility of a split within the Rashaida,
with some taking arms in support of the government
along with existing Beni Amer militia. Generally, though,
it was felt by most interviewees that the homogeneity of
much of the ethnic groups in eastern Sudan makes the
risk of an escalation of internal tribal conflict a low level
possibility and degeneration into a Dar Fur-like situation
unlikely.
2.3.2 Efforts to mitigate tension
There are attempts underway by many actors to try and
mitigate the tension in eastern Sudan. Government representatives
mentioned several initiatives the government
has undertaken recently to try and meet some of
the demands coming from the region. These include the
launch of a recruitment drive of Beja graduates from Port
Sudan, the recent launch of a two year project financed
by the Chinese government to divert water from the river
Atbara towards dry areas of eastern Sudan, including Port
Sudan and Suakin, and the expansion of the electricity
grid in Red Sea and Kassala States. The government has
also set up a Higher Committee for Eastern Sudan, chaired
by the Minister of Finance and National Economy and attended
by the Ministers of Agriculture, Irrigation and Humanitarian
Affairs as well as line ministries and state authorities.
The Committee is overseeing some of the
projects mentioned above as well as others, including an
intervention to eradicate the mesquite trees from Delta
Tokar in order to clear land for people to cultivate2, the
building of small dams in various parts of Red Sea State
and the initiation of studies to explore the potential for
treatment of salty water. Government officials have also
mentioned a series of emergency interventions they have
undertaken in the area, including government provision
of food aid to poorer households and school feeding
programmes. The government is also planning to re-open
boarding schools in the region to facilitate education for
children of nomadic families; this is in response to a widespread
local demand for the reopening of such schools3.
Local government officials also mentioned the compensation
for those who lost their jobs on the port through a
national insurance payment.
2 The need for the eradication of mesquite trees in the region was underscored by all communities met as well as by local leaders, including members
of the Beja Congress. Mesquite infestation has rendered large amounts of land unusable for either pasture or cultivation and has affected the
quality of underground water in much of the two states.
3 Whilst the interest of the government in re-establishing boarding schools following local requests is laudable, it is important to bear in mind that
27
These government efforts are not being met with much
enthusiasm by many community leaders and youth representatives,
though. Importantly, both Beja youth leaders
and some representatives of the Beja Congress have
acknowledged that after the events of January 2005 there
have been efforts by the government to take initial steps
to address some of the main grievances in the area. However,
the Beja youth leaders commented that projects
have been planned by the government unilaterally, without
community involvement, and that some of the initiatives
mentioned (e.g. the extension of the electricity grid)
will not benefit the communities at the grassroots level,
but only middle class urban dwellers. Much of the blame
was apportioned to traditional leaders working closely
with the government for not raising the issues which local
people consider as key. In addition, several actors in
the region commented that the much of the food which
was supposed to be distributed freely in the region went
astray and held traditional leaders responsible for its disappearance.
Several local actors observed that the
projects being promoted by the government are piecemeal
initiatives which do not fall within an overall strategic
plan to address the long standing problems of the
region.
Several Beja leaders, particularly in Port Sudan, remarked
that because of the chronic neglect and marginalisation,
people have completely lost their trust in the government,
so even initiatives aimed at improving the situation
locally are looked at with suspicion. Local leaders and
external observers stressed the importance for the government
to promote confidence building measures aimed
at rebuilding the social contract between the government
and the communities in eastern Sudan. People
emphasised the need for the government to open a dialogue
with the communities throughout the region, not
just in Port Sudan. Mention was made of the fact that
Halaib mahallia (administrative unit equivalent to a province)
has never received an official visit by the central
government (or at least this was the local perception).
People felt that the central government is hardly aware
of the actual living conditions of many communities in
TWO: PEACE AND DEVELPMENT IN EASTERN SUDAN
A patrol of Eastern Front fighters near the front line.
the re-opening of these schools should be placed in a wider strategy for support to nomadic education drawing on experience from other locations.
28
COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN
the rural areas and in the urban slums and suggested that
a good first step to start rebuilding a relation would be
to visit the areas and discuss priorities with the communities,
to be followed up by prompt action. An immediate
priority area highlighted by the majority of the
interviewees is that of employment for the youth, followed
by provision of services in the rural areas and the
initiation or rehabilitation of large scale development
schemes aimed at rebuilding people’s livelihoods. The
implementation of real decentralisation as well as fairer
redistribution of power and wealth were also mentioned
by several interviewees. In Port Sudan people saw the
payment of the diyya and the completion of a full and
transparent investigation as an essential step to de-escalate
tension locally. Some community leaders observed
that the elders are trying to mitigate the resentment
which is so pervasive amongst the youth, but the youth
are sceptical that a peaceful solution can be found to the
problems of eastern Sudan.
Negotiations with the Eastern Front were seen by most
actors as the key element to reduce tension in the region
and the declared readiness of the government to negotiate
was seen as having undoubtedly contributed to prevent
the escalation of the conflict in the immediate term.
2.3.3 The plans for negotiations
The need for a negotiated solution to the conflict in eastern
Sudan was without exception highlighted by all actors
during the study. Senior government officials
emphasised that the government is aware of the problems
in the East and is ready to sit with the armed opposition
to find a solution to the problems. Eastern Front
leaders also stressed their readiness to negotiate with the
government.
The government pointed out that it has already tried to
facilitate dialogue by organising the Kassala Conference
in April this year, which was attended by several prominent
Beja leaders, who in the view of the government articulated
clear demands centred on services and development
to which the government has already started to
respond through the initiatives mentioned in the previous
section. The Conference was however dismissed by
Beja youth and Eastern Front leaders as unrepresentative
since in their view it was attended only by pro-government
officials and did not include members of the Beja
Congress or the Rashaida Free Lions. However, youth leaders
in Port Sudan recognised that it is essential that the
negotiations be preceded by an attempt to build a conducive
environment for dialogue and suggested that a
step in this direction would be to stop adverse media
campaigns on both sides prior to the talks.
It is still not clear when and how the talks will be held.
Preliminary attempts to create a dialogue between the
parties had been made by the British NGO Concordis International,
which organised a first consultation between
the government and the Eastern Front in February 2005.
However, in June this year the Special Representative of
the UN Secretary-General, Mr Jan Pronk, offered his offices
to identify a venue and a mediator for the talks. Representatives
from both parties were under the impression
that negotiations were ready to start in August 2005, but
there appeared to be delays that neither of the two parties
could explain, given the readiness and willingness of
both to negotiate. The delay started spreading suspicions
amongst Eastern Front leaders that the government was
not genuinely interested to negotiate and was buying
time. However, well informed observers attributed the
delays to internal technicalities which had slowed the
action of the UN in identifying a suitable venue and mediator.
In addition, several actors commented that there
is a lack of clarity as to the extent to which this initiative
has been fully institutionalised within the United Nations
Mission to Sudan (UNMIS), given that the mission’s mandate
does not extend to eastern Sudan beyond the monitoring
of the SPLA redeployment. If this is the real reason,
it is essential that the international community supports
the identification of a suitable negotiating forum without
further delay since this could undermine the current
willingness of the parties to negotiate. The Eastern Front
also mentioned that they had asked the UN for capacity
building support for their representatives ahead of the
negotiation but that such support has failed to
materialise as yet. Frustration appeared to be rising
amongst some of the Eastern Front leaders who stated
that they were considering approaching other bodies in
the international community should the UN be unable to
overcome the impasse speedily.
Once an agreement about the venue and the mediating
body is reached, one of the problems to address will be
to reach a decision about who is to sit at the negotiating
table. Whilst the government and the Eastern Front are
29
the two obvious actors, a number of other stakeholders
are discussing their participation. The first is the SPLM/A,
which many expect to be part of the negotiations in its
new capacity as a member of the Government of National
Unity (GNU). Many youth and community leaders as well
as representatives of opposition parties and some government
officials felt that the SPLM/A could play an important
role in solving the conflict in eastern Sudan, given
its relations with the armed opposition, although several
interviewees feared that the death of former Vice-President
Garang made this mediation role less likely. Eastern
Front leaders remarked that the Front wanted to negotiate
with the Government of the Sudan, not with the National
Congress Party. SPLM/A representatives saw the
movement taking part in the negotiations as part of the
GNU and stressed that they would work to help the parties
reach a win-win compromise. The tribal leaders felt
that their presence at the negotiations was also crucial
to facilitate reaching an agreement quickly, although the
Eastern Front did not share the same opinion. The squabbling
between the Eastern Front and the DUP over the
participation of the latter in the negotiations has already
been described above in section 1.2.3. As for the Dar Fur
related movement, while the SLM/A is not asking to be
involved in the talks, it is clear that the JEM has ambitions
to sit around the table, although it is not yet clear whether
or not such ambition will be fulfilled. Senior JEM representatives
stressed that they had asked for a unified approach
to solve the problems in Dar Fur and in eastern
Sudan in order to avoid reaching piecemeal solutions and
to make the agreement really comprehensive, but that
their proposal had not been taken on board.
The agenda for the negotiations is still being discussed
at the time of writing. However, some of the questions
that may be put on the table by the Eastern Front and
other armed groups in the East came up clearly and repeatedly
during the assessment. The focus is on greater
access to power and wealth in order to be able to reverse
the socio-economic marginalisation of eastern Sudan and
to invest more resources to develop the region and provide
more services to its people. Claims to increased
power and wealth are being articulated within the context
of the CPA, with percentages being discussed for both
the federal and local levels. The Eastern Front and the JEM
stated very clearly that the division of power and wealth
sanctioned by the Naivasha agreement was unacceptable
and that allocations had to be amended, possibly on the
basis of regional population sizes, if a solution to the conflict
was to be identified for eastern Sudan (as well as for
Dar Fur). They strongly welcomed the proposal made by
Vice-President Kiir to the National Congress Party in late
August 2005 to amend the national power sharing percentages
of the SPLM/A and the National Congress in order
to redistribute some to opposition parties, including
armed movements in Dar Fur and the East. JEM representatives
also mentioned the request for a rotating vicepresidency
for both Dar Fur and eastern Sudan. Some of
the external actors suggested that the Two Areas Protocol
could provide a useful framework for negotiation at
the local level, but the issue was not broached with Eastern
Front leaders.
All actors involved underscored the importance of the
support of the international community in making the
negotiations successful. The Eastern Front commented
several times that the attitude of some international brokers
who consider the CPA as sacred is unhelpful and that
unless the international community realises that the
agreement has to become truly comprehensive there will
not be peace in the country and even the CPA process in
the South could be derailed. They however hoped that
the international community would support the parties
to reach a negotiated solution which will put an end to
the fighting in eastern Sudan.
TWO: PEACE AND DEVELPMENT IN EASTERN SUDAN
30
COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN
3.1 Unemployment and key
livelihoods issues
It is clear from the description of people’s perceptions and
perspectives presented in the previous section that issues
related to marginalisation and underdevelopment are key
in explaining the conflict and the current state of tension
in much of the region. It is therefore crucial to understand
some of these issues more in detail in order to identify a
possible response, from both national and international
actors, that could help mitigate the tension in eastern
Sudan.
Whilst the region suffers from a chronic lack of reliable
data (as does much of the country), some indicators are
available to illustrate the situation on the ground. UNICEF
data presented in the World Bank Country Economic
Memorandum (World Bank, 2003b:3) indicate that neonatal,
post-neonatal and infant mortality in Red Sea State
are the highest in the country; Kassala State is the second
worst for post-natal and infant mortality and third
worst for under-five mortality 1. With 56 deaths for 1,000
live births Red Sea State is also the third worst state for
child mortality (after the two war affected states of Blue
3. Peace, Stability and Development in Eastern
Sudan: An Attainable Dream?
Nile and Southern Kordofan) and with 165 deaths for 1,000
live births is second only to Blue Nile for under-five mortality.
In the NDA controlled areas crude mortality rates
(CMR) are estimated to be at 1.01 per 10,000 per day and
under-five mortality rates are reported to be as high as
2.01 per 10,000 per day (IRC, 2005:19).
The TANGO report recently undertaken in rural Kassala
and rural Red Sea States uncovered shocking levels of
malnutrition in the two states as shown in Table 1.
The same study showed that the annual income per
household in rural Kassala State is approximately 250,000
SD (US$ 156 per capita) while in rural Red Sea State is
125,000 SD (US$ 93 per capita); both indicators are well
beneath the international extreme poverty line of US$ 1
per capita (TANGO, ibid.:28).
In the NDA controlled areas a recent survey using a sample
size of 625 children indicated that the percentage of Global
Acute Malnutrition (GAM) is at a level of around 21.5%
while the prevalence of wasting is 7.8% with a 2.1% prevalence
of severe wasting (IRC, 2005:35). Reliable data on
income levels in NDA controlled areas are not available,
1 In the Red Sea State neonatal, post-neonatal, infant and child mortality rates are estimated to be at 50, 66, 116 and 56 respectively per 1,000 live
births; in Kassala State post-natal, infant and under-five mortality rates are respectively 63, 101 and 148 per 1,000 live births.
2 Wasting, stunting and underweight are all expressed using z-scores with internationally defined cut-off points for normal, moderate and severe
levels of under-nutrition, as follows (TANGO, ibid.:43):
· Normal: > -2 z-scores;
· Moderate malnutrition: < -2 z-scores and > -3 z-scores;
· Severe malnutrition: < -3 z-scores.
Table 1. Malnutrition rates in eastern Sudan (TANGO, 2005:44)
Levels of malnutrition Red Sea State Kassala State
Acute Malnutrition
Severe wasting (<-3.0 z-score2) 3.7% 5.8%
Global Acute Malnutrition (<-2.0 z-score) 19.4% 17.7%
Chronic Malnutrition
Severe stunting (<-3.0 z-score) 15.0% 19.1%
Global Chronic Malnutrition (<-2.0 z-score) 38.5% 43.8%
Underweight
Severe underweight 17.0 17.5
Moderate + severe underweight (<-2.0 z-score) 45.4 42.3
31
but the vast majority of the population is believed to be
living below the extreme poverty line (IRC staff, Rubda,
24th August 2005).
The TANGO study also showed that there is a significant
correlation between the literacy of household heads and
the chronic malnutrition in Kassala State and acute malnutrition
in Red Sea State: in rural Kassala State 43% of
the household heads are illiterate, compared with 54% in
rural Red Sea State; amongst the population over 15 years
of age, 56% are illiterate in rural Kassala State, against the
62% in rural Red Sea State (TANGO, ibid.:17). Official Ministry
of Education data relative to the entire region (including
urban areas) show that the illiteracy rate for the
over 15 is 48% in Red Sea State, 56.7% in Al-Gedaref State
and 62% in Kassala State (World Bank, ibid.:19). A survey
conducted in 1999 in Halaib mahallia though revealed
that the illiteracy rate is as high as 89% in Halaib mahallia,
where children currently in school represent 86.7% of
those educated; only 0.75% have secondary education in
the mahallia, of which only 11.5% are women (Abdel
Ati:1999). During the assessment people complained frequently
about the lack of school feeding and of qualified
teachers and whilst they acknowledged that some nomadic
communities would be reluctant to send their children
to school, they also pointed out that the abolition
of boarding schools has had a very negative impact on
the capacity of mobile children to have access to education.
Health services are mostly concentrated in Port Sudan and
other large centres like Sinkat or Kassala; only 20% of rural
Red Sea State villages has a health centre or a clinic,
while in Kassala State half of the villages have some form
of health facility, although these often lack doctors, laboratories
and medications (TANGO, ibid:17). In the late
1990s in the whole of the then Halaib Province (80,000
km2) there were only five basic primary health care centres
(Pantuliano, 1998: direct observation). Anaemia and
tuberculosis were mentioned in almost every community
as endemic, with anaemia being a major killer for pregnant
women and newborns and tuberculosis affecting a
very high percentage of the adult male population. In
Kassala bilharzia and malaria were also quoted as significant
hazards.
Access to water is grossly inadequate throughout the region,
especially in the rural areas. During the assessment
the communities complained incessantly about the shortage
of water both for human and animal consumption.
THREE: PEACE, STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN EASTERN SUDAN
Beja boys at school.
32
COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN
Drought and mesquite infestation have significantly contributed
to the decrease in water levels, but generally
there is a scarcity of boreholes and micro-catchments
throughout the region and where boreholes exist they
invariably suffer from lack of maintenance. People quoted
the shortage of water as one of the key factors in contributing
to push people out of the rural areas towards
urban centres. In Red Sea State the urban population has
grown from 38% of the total state population in 1993 to
a dramatic 61.2% in 2003. This trend points to ever deteriorating
living conditions in the rural areas.
The development gap and the disparity between urban
and rural centres are significant. However, although in
town there is a greater availability of services, people complain
about the fact that very few of them can afford to
pay for school fees, water or drugs. Official unemployment
rates in Red Sea State are very high, standing at 21.1%
against the national average of 11.8% (quoted in Oxfam,
1998:6), although actual data could be worse than these.
Unemployment rates have risen sharply as a result of the
mechanisation of the port in Port Sudan and the laying
off of many of the port workers, particularly Beja labourers
who were left with very little alternatives on the market.
Some observers have noted that outside the stevedoring
jobs, unskilled labour opportunities in Port Sudan are
available mainly in the construction sector, but the Beja
have to compete with migrant labourers from southern
and western Sudan who are more experienced in this field.
Many people survive by resorting to charcoal making,
especially out of mesquite which is said to make very
good charcoal. In Kassala labour opportunities are available
on the agricultural schemes, but people also complained
about the lack of work on the schemes, especially
since the mesquite infestation has made much land
uncultivable. Very few people from the region (Beja and
Rashaida) are employed in the formal sector, most likely
because of the very low level of education. Constraints to
marketing of livestock in rural areas, due mainly to long
distances, and restricted availability of credit for the poor
make living in much of the region a survival challenge.
It is clear that the modernisation and mechanisation of
the port in Port Sudan have created unacceptable levels
of unemployment amongst the Beja and that the discontent
following the disappearance of this important safety
net has greatly contributed to fuel the tension in the region
This warrants the need for interventions which can
compensate for the loss of employment on the port.
People felt that the government should identify ways to
use the revenues from local resources, including port,
gold, customs and minerals, to fund labour intensive
programmes. People in Port Sudan expressed outrage at
the thought that the government was spending millions
of Sudanese Dinars to build a modern, large meeting hall
in Port Sudan when so many people in the town and in
its surroundings were dying because of poverty and malnutrition.
People also observed that much money has
been spent to improve the appearance of the city through
increased street lights and tarring of roads, while no allocations
had been made to meet community priorities.
In the areas around Tokar and Hamashkoreb local communities
spoke at length about the negative impact of
landmines and Unexploded Ordinance (UXOs) on their
lives and livelihoods, particularly in terms of restricting
access to water and pasture. Very little attempt has been
made so far to explore the possibility of undertaking mine
clearance programmes to enable people to regain access
to key livelihood sources.
In Kassala several communities complained about the loss
of land and pastoral community representatives remarked
that there is no arrangement to register land for transhumance
routes in the current government plan for redistribution
of land in the Gash. They stressed that there is a
need to engage with pastoralist communities to identify
solutions for them as well, since conflict between
pastoralists and farmers (both within Hadendowa communities
and between Hadendowa and Rashaida) breaks
out frequently in and around the Gash scheme, especially
at harvesting times. The loss of key land resources for
many Beja because of drought, ecological degradation
and land alienation, the consequent forced abandonment
of the pastoral sector without alternative opportunities
and inadequate service provision have played a clear role
in creating resentment and tension in the region. Youth
representatives in Kassala complained that assistance by
the international community is mainly concentrated on
IDPs and refugees from Eritrea, while no attention is paid
to destitute Beja pastoralist communities whose living
conditions is far worse than those of the refugees.
33
3.2 The impact of international
assistance in eastern Sudan
Communities, government officials and armed opposition
alike lamented that the involvement of the international
community in eastern Sudan has been very limited. While
the primary responsibility to address socio-economic issues
in eastern Sudan rests with the national authorities,
the international community also has a role to play in
supporting these efforts. UN interventions have traditionally
been very restricted and have largely focused on food
distribution and assistance to the refugee and IDP populations;
the UN has no presence in the NDA controlled
areas. A number of INGOs also operate in the two states,
some of which have been on the ground for nearly two
decades. As this study was not a humanitarian assessment,
it does not provide a detailed analysis of humanitarian or
development activities in the East. Rather, it provides a synthesis
of general perceptions of communities and key stakeholders
on the work of the international community. There
was strong dissatisfaction amongst communities, government
and leaders about the performance of most international
actors in the region. People complained that their
action was mostly focused on emergency assistance and
that projects were short term, small scale and often inadequate
to address people’s real needs. Though there are
some islands of success, it is also clear that some agencies
have spent considerable time and resources on problems
without having brought about any significant
change. Some well informed observers pointed out that
many interventions were often designed without the real
involvement of the community and that they often followed
‘funding fashions’.
People from all areas interviewed, but particularly in government
controlled areas, spoke of their concern that a
high proportion of the little assistance that is coming their
way appears to be spent on administrative and running
costs. People also cited examples of resources going
astray, particularly around relief distribution. There was
dissatisfaction with the biases towards a few target
groups, with IDPs and refugees being particular favourites.
Rural areas were perceived to receive more assistance
than the urban slums where many of the worst socio-economic
problems are found and which are also the hotbeds
of discontent. In Kassala people commented that
some of the most destitute Hadendowa would pretend
to be IDPs in order to access desperately needed support
by moving into displaced camps. When projects are undertaken,
communities observed that there tends to be
something of a predictable package that is offered and
that many of the responses frequently do not address
critical needs in a strategic fashion. Whilst recognising the
contributions of INGOs particularly in the service sectors,
often addressing immediate needs, people commented
that there has been a dearth of interventions which have
created employment or sustainable increased income. The
perceived lack of appropriate programming comes despite
the high number of assessments of which people
are tired of being the subject and which informed observers
point out have invariably been of very low quality.
Government officials also complained that the findings
of the studies conducted by international agencies are
rarely shared with the government or with community
leaders.
Community leaders have noted the fact that INGO responses
have tended to be scattered and isolated and that
there has been a lack of co-ordination between actors.
This has also led to a degree of duplication of projects
and assistance to some communities and what people
and government officials have defined as a ‘piecemeal
approach’. Community leaders and youth in Kassala also
complained about the lack of a facilitative and coordinating
role of the Humanitarian Aid Commission in
the state, which was seen as confined to office work and
‘permits screening’ rather than facilitating co-ordination
between national and international actors and supporting
the harmonisation of plans to avoid duplication and
share lessons. The lack of a government master plan for
the two states which could provide a framework for international
response is also said to be notably lacking.
HAC officials as well as international aid workers operating
in the region indicated the lack of capacity within HAC
as a major constraint in playing a more productive co-ordination
role. The youth in Kassala also lamented the lack
of focus on capacity building of local community structures
and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), a criticism
which was though not echoed in Red Sea State.
Concerns about the creation of a dependency syndrome
because of the free distribution of aid and other relief inputs
was voiced repeatedly both in Kassala and in the NDA
controlled areas. In NDA controlled areas there were similar
complaints about lack of support to local NGOs and
CSOs, lack of community participation in the preparation
THREE: PEACE, STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN EASTERN SUDAN
34
COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN
of proposals and plans and a focus on handouts rather
than long term rehabilitation and development
programmes. The Secretariat for Humanitarian Affairs in
the Liberated Areas (SHALA) has apparently tried to push
the agencies operating in the areas under NDA control to
sign up to a Protocol regulating their engagement in the
region, but the NGOs have so far not signed. According to
SHALA officials, the protocol is meant to set a clear strategy
for humanitarian operations in the NDA controlled
areas3.
The shortcomings of the international response need
however to be contextualised. Whilst international agencies
may be responsible for a number of the weaknesses
described above, there is no doubt that they have been
constrained by certain key factors, chief amongst which
is the long standing lack of availability of donor funding
for rehabilitation and development programmes in the
Sudan. Furthermore, eastern Sudan has never been able
to attract major donor interest notwithstanding the fact
that its development indicators are amongst the worst in
the country. The little funding that has been made available
has often reflected donor rather than community
priorities. Some international aid workers pointed out that
there is a lack of awareness and understanding about the
situation in the East within the international community,
which is most likely linked to the overall marginalisation
of the region in the national context. Well informed observers
feel that expectations on international agencies
are much greater than might otherwise be the case because
of the almost total lack of government assistance
to the poor. In addition, some international donors observed
that in NDA controlled areas the lack of an agreement
for a cross-line operation from the Sudan means
that a lot of resources are used on logistics to reach very
remote areas which could be easily accessed from within
the Sudan.
While the overall picture is not very positive, there are a
number of exceptions to this. People in Red Sea State remarked
that INGOs working in their region have contributed
to organise communities, build their capacities and
raise their awareness about their entitlements. A notable
3 The agencies have pointed out that their reasons for not so far signing the Protocol include concerns about humanitarian space and independence as
well as a lack of clarity on the protocol.
Beja boy on a camel.
35
success has been the catalytic role in bringing about
changes in gender relations in Halaib mahallia. Beja
women who until ten years ago could not even meet with
other women from outside their immediate communities
are now involved in joint project management and community
initiatives with the men. There are a number of
islands of success in Red Sea State in particular, including
a successful micro-finance programme in Port Sudan and
an agricultural rehabilitation programme in Khor Arba’at,
but these are very much the exception and their impact
THREE: PEACE, STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN EASTERN SUDAN
is negligible in the wider picture. Positive comments have
been made concerning the life-saving impact of some of
the emergency assistance, both in government and NDA
controlled areas. SHALA officials pointed out that mortality
rates in the area had declined thanks to the support
INGOs were providing in the health sector. However,
throughout the region the overall feeling is that international
agencies are failing to tackle the root causes of
underdevelopment and poverty sustainably.
36
COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN
4.1 Humanitarian issues
1. Improve co-ordination between humanitarian agencies
Improved co-ordination should be fostered between agencies providing humanitarian assistance (both national
and international) in order to avoid overlap and duplication and standardise targeting criteria, registration and
operational procedures for assistance.
2. Establish an emergency early warning system linked to a
Disaster Management Plan
Local authorities should be supported by the central government to prepare a detailed Disaster Management
Plan and to set up a system to track key indicators of vulnerability throughout the region in order to inform the
action of government, UN and NGO actors operating in the two states.
3. Build up the Strategic Grain Reserves in Port Sudan
The local government should prioritise the building up of the Reserves with the support of the federal government
and international agencies and use them to stabilise sorghum prices in the market, in order to make it
more affordable for the poor.
4. Ensure better targeting of humanitarian assistance for
vulnerable communities
Humanitarian assistance programmes should be targeted at the most vulnerable communities in the East. This
would mean extending the current concentration on IDPs and refugees to include communities in rural areas
and in urban slums where indicators of vulnerability point to the need for humanitarian aid.
5. Establish and reinforce assistance programmes aimed at
eradicating tuberculosis, anaemia and other diseases
Establish and reinforce assistance programmes aimed at eradicating tuberculosis, anaemia and other diseases:
Whilst several diseases are widespread in eastern Sudan, tuberculosis and anaemia are reported to be the most
significant killers. International agencies specialising in the public health sector should support local authorities
to design effective systems for TB prevention and treatment and devise initiatives of support to pregnant
women to prevent anaemia.
4.2 Development issues
1. Establish a mechanism for strategic, coordinated action by
international agencies and donors
International agencies and donors should better coordinate interventions and focus on strategic responses to
key livelihoods issues for the region including joint advocacy to catalyse attention to the situation on the East
and enlist donor support for a large scale, integrated, strategic and sustainable response to the development
needs of the region aimed at de-escalating tension.
4. Recommendations for Action
37
FOUR: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
2. Support local government planning capacity
The inclusive development of a master plan for eastern Sudan is seen by many actors as crucial to ensure coherence
in development interventions. Local government officials suggested that the central government send
skilled financial cadres to Red Sea and Kassala State to design and help implement and comprehensive development
plan for the region.
3. Support income generating activities in urban areas
It is imperative for the Government of National Unity of the Sudan and international agencies to identify appropriate
mechanisms to address income poverty of people living in urban slums, especially those directly affected
by the mechanisation of the port in Port Sudan. This should help mitigate urban poverty and de-escalate the
tension, particularly amongst the recently unemployed and youth. Lessons should be learnt from the very few
positive initiatives of support to small scale enterprises and micro-credit in eastern Sudan to see how these
could be scaled up.
4. Support key services in rural areas
The Government of National Unity and local authorities, with the support of the international community, should
review the current availability of basic services (health, water and education) in rural part of Kassala and Red Sea
States and endeavour to extend adequate provision, starting with areas where vulnerability indicators and mortality
rates are highest. Service provision should however be accompanied by support to the strengthening of
local economic and productive capacity (see below).
5. Harness existing resources for economic development
Eastern Sudan has many untapped resources which can be utilised to improve the income capacity of the population
living in the rural areas. Government departments and local authorities, with the support of international
agencies, should explore the potential of utilising water around the khors for agricultural development through
spray irrigation and micro-catchments and support the expansion of the fishery sector. Preliminary positive results
reached by INGOs operating in Halaib mahallia should be built upon and replicated where possible. Interventions
to increase the productivity of existing agricultural schemes and improving the processing and conservation
of agricultural produce for marketing should also be considered.
6. Strengthen pastoral livelihoods system
Ecological degradation coupled with the loss of key land resources has forced an increasing number of households
to abandon the pastoral sector with no alternative economic opportunities. Strategic support should be
extended to pastoral communities in order to prevent a further haemorrhage of households out of the pastoral
sector, with the risk that they will end up in the already swarming urban slums. Local and central authorities,
with the support of the international community, should identify suitable support strategies, which could include
tailoring of services to mobile households (mobile services, key service concentration points, boarding
schools, etc. according to community priorities), livestock vaccination campaigns, eradication of mesquite trees
from pasture land, reopening and rehabilitation of transhumance routes and support to marketing of livestock
(see below) and animal products.
7. Support livestock marketing
There are a number of major constraints to pastoralists marketing livestock that include: long distances to town
based markets, lack of physical infrastructure, weak veterinary services and the need for slaughter houses on
site. Government and international agencies should develop a comprehensive understanding of the constraints
and identify appropriate strategies to support this key productive resource which lies at the core of the rural
economy in the East.
38
COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN
8. Build local capacity
International agencies should build on their current area of success and expand ongoing support to local actors,
particularly by continuing to build the capacity of local CBOs and CSOs for advocacy, social mobilisation, responsible
citizenship, project implementation and conflict resolution. This is particularly important in NDA controlled
areas.
9. Support women’s strategic needs
The type of assistance offered to women in the region lacks strategic vision and implements an anachronistic
model of support which reinforces existing stereotypes about women’s role. Beja and Rashaida women are notoriously
amongst the most (if not the most) secluded and socially marginalised groups in the country. In most
communities women are not allowed access to public places and in Hamashkoreb not even eye contact is allowed
between men and women! Lessons should be learned from the very successful experience of ACORD’s
programme in the Red Sea Hills in order to replicate similar approaches (with the necessary adjustments) throughout
the region.
10. Facilitate good governance programmes
International agencies and donors should explore the possibility of developing programmes focused on support
to local government reform, decentralisation and civil society capacity building.
11. Introduce TuBedawye in schools
It would be important for the government to consider the introduction of TuBedawye as primary or complementary
means of instruction for the first two to three years of primary school, in order to reduce the inevitable
educational disadvantage Beja children face when presented with tuition in Arabic from the very beginning. The
pilot use of TuBedawye in early primary school in NDA controlled areas points to a preliminary reduction in the
rate of school drop outs.
12. Support initiatives in TuBedawye
Radio programmes in TuBedawye should be considered to spread health education and civic education messages
as well as information about the CPA, particularly in the urban slums where radios are often available.
Theatre shows in local language or simple Arabic should also be thought about, building on the very successful
experience of the Band Aid supported Taqaddum Centre Theatre in Port Sudan in the mid 1980s.
13. Explore the possibility of a cross-line operation
Some of the international actors operating in the NDA controlled areas pointed out the excessive costs of logistics
for their operation. UN-OCHA and other mandated UN bodies should endeavour to explore with Government
of National Unity and Eastern Front officials the possibility of devising an access mechanism to deliver
assistance cross-line to the NDA controlled areas, in order to maximise the amount of assistance for the local
communities. The necessary safeguards for the protection of humanitarian personnel should also be discussed
and agreed upon. In this regard, lessons could be learned from the successful cross-line experience of the Nuba
Mountains Programme Advancing Conflict Transformation (NMPACT).
14.Ensure in-depth understanding of the local context and
lessons learning
Several key actors stressed the importance for external interventions to be appropriately contextualised and
aware of the socio-political context in the region and the need for new agencies to learn lessons from past
experience and work in partnership with long standing actors in the East to develop common strategies to
promote peace and development in the region.
39
15.Increase advocacy action to raise awareness about the
situation in eastern Sudan
The findings of this study should be shared with a wide variety of stakeholders in the region and in other parts of
the country, including Khartoum and Juba, through focused workshops to increase the knowledge of government
and non-government actors about the situation in the East and discuss priorities for action.
16.Co-ordinate advocacy action to the donors
Despite the appalling vulnerability indicators, eastern Sudan receives very little international assistance compared
to other areas of the country. International agencies should develop a co-ordinated advocacy action to
disseminate the content of this study, as asked by many local actors during the fieldwork, and enlist donor support
for a large scale, integrated, strategic and sustainable response to the development needs of the region
aimed at de-escalating the tension amongst the most deprived communities.
4.3 Conflict mitigation and peace building
1. Sustain the momentum for negotiations
It is imperative that the international community continues to explore the options for a suitable venue and
mediation institution in order to initiate talks between the Government and the Eastern Front at the earliest
opportunity. The UN should be immediately supported by member governments in its search for an acceptable
body. The plans for negotiation are playing an important deterring role amongst the youth, particularly in Port
Sudan, and such precious opportunity to help differing or dissipating a possible escalation of the conflict in the
region should not be wasted.
2. Support a genuine and constructive dialogue between the
parties
Once negotiations get underway, the international community should nurture the dialogue between the parties
and accompany the negotiation process in order to facilitate the reaching of a final settlement without too
much delay.
3. Uphold any peace process and possible agreement with
financial support
If and when a peace agreement is signed, it is essential that the international donors support its implementation
with the allocation of adequate resources. However, it is important to start extending rehabilitation and development
assistance to eastern Sudan immediately, in order to strengthen people’s confidence in the peace process
and offer adequate peace dividends to the communities involved. If lessons are to be learned from the Dar
Fur experience, a speedy response before too much damage is done could save a lot of suffering, lives and resources
further down the line.
4. Facilitate confidence building measures
While the plans to hold negotiations progress, the Government of the Sudan should promote a series of confidence
building measures in order to mitigate the level of tension in the region. These initiatives should include
(but not be limited to) the following:
• proceed to a prompt payment of the diyya to the families of those killed in the 29/1 incidents in Port Sudan
and to the injured;
• carry out an independent investigation into the killings and disclose its findings;
FOUR: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
40
COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN
• engage with local community and youth leaders to initiate a dialogue about development priorities at the
local level;
• explore the potential for affirmative action for eastern Sudanese in allocating public sector jobs;
• share accurate information on the value of resources exploited in the region (gold, iron, gas, port revenues,
etc.) and the value retained in the region and spent on local development and take steps to engage key
actors from the region in the decision making concerning some of these resources;
• promote labour intensive projects (see below).
5. Promote emergency employment projects
The international community should explore ways of supporting the Government of National Unity to launch
emergency employment projects aimed primarily at unskilled youth in urban areas. Such projects could help
de-escalate tension amongst the youth by providing immediate job opportunities through a set of labour intensive
interventions that can generate work for both skilled and unskilled people. UNDP has tested these
programmes in the Gaza Strip and Afghanistan and could import lessons from those experiences. Possible initiatives
could include development of agricultural or water infrastructure, waste collection and road building (in
particular the highway to Egypt currently being improved). The feasibility of supporting the manual eradication
of mesquite trees should be assessed, as this would benefit people twice since they could also make charcoal
out of the hollowed out trees. Labour intensive programmes should though be accompanied by support to
small business, micro-finance initiatives and employment skills training to create sustainable opportunities for
the youth in the long term.
Beja fighter standing before an Eastern Front compound.
41
6. Support reduction of natural resource based conflict
Conflict over land and water between pastoralists and farmers (both within Hadendowa communities and between
Hadendowa and Rashaida) is common in the region and local conflict resolution mechanisms are not
always capable of solving the disputes. In order to minimise the risk of such conflict and the possible manipulation
of existing animosities in political terms, urgent attention must be paid to the issue of land tenure in the
region, with special attention to pastoralists’ rights. The Government of National Unity should promote legislative
reforms to acknowledge pastoralists’ rights to land where this has been alienated, possibly through the
institutions of transparent and representative State Land Commissions. Such Commissions should endeavour to
incorporate customary arrangements into statutory laws, clarify and endorse transhumance routes and increase
complementary use of land by various types of land users, particularly in and around the agricultural schemes in
Kassala State, where grazing rights for pastoralists must be recognised.
7. Encourage grassroots reconciliation and peace building in the
areas directly affected by the conflict
Where people have experienced loss of lives and assets, efforts should be made by the international community
to support local actors in promoting grassroots reconciliation initiatives as appropriate.
8. Eradicate landmines
The international community should engage with the warring parties to explore the possibility of undertaking
mine clearance programmes as the negotiations progress. Whilst an agreement to proceed with mine clearance
is reached, the government and the Eastern Front should allow UNMAS, in collaboration with local bodies, to
proceed to clearly demarcate minefields in order to prevent further loss of life.
9. Promote awareness about the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement
Local and central authorities, supported by the international communities, should endeavour to raise awareness
about the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in eastern Sudan. Simplified versions of the CPA, approved by the
Government of National Unity, could be reproduced in Arabic for dissemination and radio and TV programmes
in TuBedawye could be aired to enhance knowledge of the agreement amongst the Beja population, especially
women and communities in the rural areas whose knowledge of Arabic is extremely limited.
10.Increase advocacy about eastern Sudan
International agencies involved in eastern Sudan must use the findings of this and other studies to inform the
Sudanese public as well as the international community about the situation in eastern Sudan and ensure that
enough attention and resources are devoted to the East in order to help prevent any further deterioration of the
conflict in the region.
FOUR: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
42
COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN
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SELECTED REFERENCES
44
COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN
Khartoum
Dr. Asha Al Karib, ACORD
Hashim Abu Zaid, Beja key informant
Mark Bryson-Richardson, British Embassy
Sara Musa, Christian Aid
Rocco Blume, Christian Aid
Alistair McArthur, DfID
Dr. Amna Dirar, Eastern Front (Beja Congress)
Ali Mohammad Bagadim, Eastern Front (Beja Congress)
Mahmoud Al Khidir Mohammad, Eastern Front (Beja
Congress)
Dr. Hassan Abdel Ati, EDGE
Hassabou Abdel Rahman, HAC (Commissioner)
Nadia Ali El Tom, IRC
Taha Sid Ahmad, IRC
H.E. Lorenzo Angeloni, Italian Embassy
Dr. Mutrif Siddiq, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
H.E. Taj el-Sir Mahgoub, Ministry of Labour
Barbara Manzi, OCHA
Kate Farnsworth, OFDA
George Were, Oxfam
H. E. Yahia Babiker, Presidency
Abdel Hamid Rahmatallah, SC-UK
Cdr. Abdel Aziz Al Hilu, SPLM/A
Ed Walker, Tearfund
Dr. Khalid El Amin, UNDP
Dr. Omar Egemi, UNDP
Dr. Samia El Nagar, UNDP
Prof. Mohammad Yusuf Sulaiman, University of Khartoum
Primrose Oteng, UNMIS
Domenico Polloni, UNMIS
Janice Elmore, US Embassy
Port Sudan
Eisa Yacoub, ACORD
Elmutalib Ibrahim, ACORD
Saida Mohammad Badri, ACORD
Dr. Ahmad Adam Tamim, ACORD
Omar Adam Ali, Beja Club
Mohammad Ahmad Dirar, Beja Club
Hamid Abu Fatima, Beja Club
Gaffar Baamkar, Beja leader
Mohammad Abyerb, Beja Youth
Osman Al Bagir, Beja Youth
Annex I - List of People Met
Hashim Ali, Beja Youth
Abdelrahim Hamad, Beja Youth
Amna Ibrahim, Beja Youth
Hamad Kasha, Beja Youth
Ghada Khidir, Beja Youth
Mohammad Musa, Beja Youth
Sheiaba Sidi, Beja Youth
Women’s group, Deim al Arab (16 representatives)
Men’s group, Deim al Arab (20 representatives)
Adam Omar, Head of Salvation Committee, Gadisia
Mohammad Mahmud Salih, omda Beni Amer, Gadisia
Mahmud Idriss Musa, Idara Sha’abia Gadisia
Community meeting, Gadisia (15 representatives)
Community meeting, Hosheiry (8 representatives)
Mohammad Tom Abu Shana, IRC
Mohammad Idriss Biriq, HAC (Commissioner)
Baqash Abdulgadir, journalist
H.E. Mohammed Bedawi, Minister of Agriculture and
Animal Wealth, RSS
Sayed Dabloub, Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Wealth,
RSS
Mohammad Hassan Abu Zeinab Shegeira, Ministry of
Social Affairs, RSS
Josephn Atonia, Oxfam
Ahmed Hassan, Oxfam
Jaqueline Jacob, Oxfam
Hassan Sir Elkhatim, Oxfam
Dr. Taha Bedawi, SECS
Mohammad Karrar, Umma Party
Abu Ali Sharif Al Milek, UNDP
Sinkat
Women’s groups, Abu Hadia Centre (24 representatives)
Mohammad Hamad Elnieel, Commissioner Sinkat
Sharif Taha, HAC
Abdalla Haenab, SRC
Mohammad Salih, SRC
Ahmed Shash, traditional leader (Hadendowa)
Hashim Baamkar, traditional leader (Hadendowa)
Tokar
Ummad Kisha Hamid, Acting Head of mahallia
Sulaiman Al Kanzei, Commissioner, Tokar
Abdel Gadir Farag, Oxfam
Halima Musa, Oxfam
45
El Haj Hassan El Fawal, Tokar Delta Scheme Manager
Tahir Onur Tahir, Secretary, Umm Hill CBO, Dolobiay (met
in Tokar)
Obshak Oshar Okesh Tahir, Chair, Ummhill CBO, Dolobiay
(met in Tokar)
Umm Hill CBO Committee (25 representatives)
Kassala
Ali Ibrahim Digna, Nazir Beni Amer
Idriss Shallal, omda Beni Amer
Khalil Ash-Shifa, omda Beni Amer
Onour Mohammad Osman, Wakil Hadendowa
Eisa Hamad Sheikh, FAO
Omar Onour, HAC (Commissioner)
Community meeting, IDPs Fato (20 representatives)
Community meeting, Haj Es Salaam (32 representatives)
Women’s group meeting, Haj El Shahiid (11
representatives)
Ali Mohammad Din, Head of Development Committee,
IDPs Hamadab
Development Committee, IDPs Dabalawet/Hamadab (5
representatives)
Asha Adam Sidid, IFAD
Ahmad Mohammad Karrar, IFAD
Community meeting, Kadugli locality (30 representatives)
Mohtasir Babiker Ahmed Jaffar, Kassala Mayor
H..E. Mohamed Idris Aukid, Minister of Social Planning,
Kassala State
Ahmed Abbas Mohammad Ar-Razam, Ministry of Justice
Family members (8) of Ahmad Hamid Birqi, Rashaida
‘Nazir’ (Abu Tala)
Ahmed Ante, UNMIS
Joseph Mwaanga, UNMIS
Group meeting, Youth Initiative for Peace Building (15
representatives)
H.E. Farouk Hassan Mohammad Nur, Wali Kassala State
Asmara
Sheikh Ahmad Ali Betai, Betai tariqa
Aklilu Lijam, Dutch Interchurch Aid
Joke Oranji, Dutch Interchurch Aid
Bakri Ahmad, DUP
Cdr Abdalla Mahmoud, DUP
Dr Gaafar Ahmed Abdalla, DUP
Mutaz Osman Elfahal, DUP
Abdalla Kunna, Eastern Front (Beja Congress)
Ali Es-Safi, Eastern Front (Beja Congress)
Salah Barakwin, Eastern Front (Beja Congress)
Mabruk Mubarak Salim, Eastern Front (Rashaida Free
Lions)
Geert Heikens, EU Delegation
Abdalla Jabir, Government of Eritrea
Amb. Mohammad Ali Omaro, Government of Eritrea
Robert Warwick, IRC
Mahmoud Tahir El Hagg, JEM
Dr. Khalil Ibrahim Mohammad, JEM
Abdel Aziz Osher, JEM
Arild Skara, Norwegian Embassy
Dr. Taiesir Ali, SAF
Wilson Gitchinga, Samaritan’s Purse
Asmat Ali, SHALA
Fakki Osman Hagg, SHALA
Tariq Abulgasim, SLM/A
Abdel Wahid Mohamed Ahmed al-Nur, SLM/A
Mohammad Zakaria, SLM/A
Mohammad Mur Salih, SLM/A
Joey Hood, US Embassy
Tessnay
Mohammad Bushara, JEM
Abdel Hadi Siddiq, JEM
Abu Fatna Abdelmagid Mustafa, JEM
Salim Ali, Eastern Front (Rashaida Free Lions)
Sulaiman Salim, Eastern Front (Rashaida Free Lions)
Mohammad Salih Abid, Eastern Front (Rashaida Free
Lions)
Awad Mubarak, Eastern Front (Rashaida Free Lions)
NDA controlled areas
Sheikh Ali Betai, Betai tariqa
Musa Ali Betai, Betai tariqa
Sheikh Mustafa Ali Karrar, Betai tariqa
Musa Salih Osman, Civil Administration
Ibrahim Mohammad Din Osham, Civil Administration
Digna Abu Eisa, Civil Administration
Amin Osheikh Idriss, Civil Administration
Ali El Amin Yusuf, Civil Administration
Ali Ahmad, Commissioner Hamashkoreb
Mohammad Odis, Commissioner Liberated Areas
Hassan Gaffar, Eastern Front (Beja Congress)
Musa Mohammad Ahmad, Eastern Front (Beja Congress)
Community meeting, Hamashkoreb (15 representatives)
Charlie Kwetch, SPLM/A
John Mallis, SPLM/A
Badid Sheikh, SPLM/A
NB. The names of some Eastern Front members met
during the assessment have been withheld upon request
of the interviewees.
ANNEX I - LIST OF PEOPLE MET
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