:المصالحة الارترية ـ الارترية ودور السودان

مفاتيح : جمال همد :المصالحة الارترية ـ الارترية ودور السودان*
‎يتحدث الساسة في ارتريا عن علاقات أخوية وصداقة متينة تربطهم مع شريكي الحكم في السودان المؤتمر الوطني والحركة الشعبية ، وان جهودهم ( لحل ) مشكلة الشرق قد أينعت ثمارها ، كما إن جهودهم تجاه مشكلة دارفور في طريقها إلى ذلك ... الخ .

ويؤكدون دائما على عودة العلاقات الطبيعية بين البلدين وغياب المهددات السابقة ، ويبادلهم نظرائهم في السودان في ذلك، لكن دون ان يبذلوا الجهد نفسه لحل مشكلات اريتريا السياسية ومهدداتها الأمنية . ومن الطبيعي ان تحافظ حكومتا ارتريا والسودان على ما أنجز ومنع كل ما من شأنه العودة بالعلاقات إلى ما قبل 1994م وهذا يستدعي إطفاء بؤر التوتر وبناء علاقات تحقق المصالح الحقيقية للشعبين . ولكي يكون الأمر كذلك لابد من تحقيق مصالحة ارترية ارترية وهذا بالضرورة سوف يتبعه إصلاحات جوهرية في نظام الحكم في اسمرا كما جرى في السودان ، وبالرغم من ان اسمرا ترفض الحديث عن معارضة ارترية مسلحة وغير مسلحة قائمة على الأرض إلا ان ذلك هو واحد من الأسباب التي دفعت الحكومة الارترية لقطع العلاقات من جانب واحد تحت ذريعة تسلل مسلحين من الحركات المسلحة الارترية من الأراضي السودانية لزعزعن الأمن في البلاد . وتصدير المشروع الإسلامي إليها . ولا يمكن تجاوز المعارضة الارترية بالتضييق والمطاردة لان ذلك لايحل مشكلة الأمن المنشود في ارتريا الرسمية حتى تلتفت إلى التنمية والاستفادة من إمكانيات دول الجوار .

أيضا وجود أكثر من نصف مليون ارتري لاجئ يتزايدون يوميا حيث يعبر الحدود مابين 20الى 30 شاب وشابة ومشكلتهم الأساسية هي سياسية ولا غيرها مشكلين ظاهرة في المدن السودانية ومعسكرات اللجوء أليس ذلك مهدد امنيا وسياسيا للعلاقة المنشودة ؟؟ . وهي مشكلة ظهرت للوجود منذ عام 1967م إبان الاستعمار الإثيوبي ولازالت قائمة تحت ظل الحكم الوطني دون ان تتغير الأسباب وكان من المفترض عودتهم بعد زول الأسباب حسب قوانين اللجوء منذ عقد ونصف ، ألا يحتاج هذا الملف لإغلاق ؟؟ . اذا كان هذه الأسباب وغيرها كافية لزعزعت كل متين في العلاقات فان الحديث عن تجاوز ذلك يكون حديث المكابر ولا يصمد على الأرض طويلا . إذا على الحكومة السودانية بطرفيها وعلى أحزاب المعارضة بذل ما يمكن فعله من اجل استقرار الحدود واستقرار ارتريا والسودان ، والسؤال هل يملك السودان الإمكانية لحل المشكل الارتري ؟ الإجابة دون جهد هي بنعم فالسودان يستضيف العدد الأكبر من ظاهرة اللجوء الارتري سابقه ولاحقة كما إنه يتملك العلاقات الجيدة مع قوى المعارضة الارترية بكل أطيافها السياسية وكذلك هو الذي يملك مفاتيح إنعاش الاقتصاد الارتري أو دفعه باتجاه الانهيار لذلك هو قادر أكثر من قدر ارتريا على حل مشكلة شرق السودان التي أدخلتها في نفق جديد .

نتوجه للدكتور مصطفى عثمان إسماعيل مستشار الرئيس البشير للعب هذا الدور لكونه ملما بتفاصيل الملف الارتري وتشابكه مع المحيط الإقليمي كما يعلم جيدا ان انهيار ارتريا سوف ينعكس على كل دول الجوار والسودان أول الخاسرين .

ويظل الحديث عن عودة علاقات دون إيجاد حلول للمشكلات الارترية يظل بعيدا عن الواقع .

أديس أبابا وأسمرا والسباق نحو الخرطوم

أديس أبابا وأسمرا والسباق نحو الخرطوم .. عبدالمنعم أبو إدريس
‎الأربعاء الفائت العشرين من يونيو 2007 وصل الى الخرطوم دون سابق اعلان وزير الخارجية الاثيوبي سيوم مسفن الرجل الذى تربطه صلات وثيقة مع الحكومة السودانية عبر بوابة السياسة، كما انه قضى جزءً من حياته في معسكر للاجئين بولاية القضارف حسب ما كشف عندما رأس الجانب الاثيوبي في اللجنة المشتركة لتنمية الحدود التى انعقدت فى الحادي والعشرين من نوفمبر 2005.

وقد حطت طائرة سيوم بعد ان غادر الخرطوم الامين محمد سعيد امين اللجنة الشعبية للعدالة والديمقراطية الحزب الحاكم بارتريا في زيارة عنوانها كان مشاركة الجالية الارترية بالسودان احتفالاتها بالاستقلال.

وحظي سيوم باحتفاء فى الخرطوم الذي لم يقف عند الحد الرسمي فقد التقى رئيس الجمهورية ونائبه ووزير الدفاع ،وجاء على المستوى الرسمي بعد ان التقى في اديس عددا من المسؤولين الغربيين حول ملف دارفور ،وعندما جلس للرئيس البشير نقل له رسالة من رئيس الوزراء الاثيوبي مليس زناوي حول الوضع في دارفور.

كما احتفت الخرطوم بسيوم من خلال دعوة عشاء اقامها وزير الدفاع الفريق عبد الرحيم محمد حسين وهو آخر مسؤول سوداني كبير يزور اديس ابابا يوم ان خرج على السطح عدم رضا اثيوبيا من تسلل معارضيها الموجودين في ارتريا عبر الاراضي السودانية ،كما انه من اكثر المسؤولين الذين يحملون رسائل من البشير لزناوي .

وغير دعوة وزير الدفاع اقامت له الخرطوم دعوة لرحلة نيلية شارك فيها عدد من المسؤولين ،وقد قال لنا احد النافذين الحكوميين ومعي الزميل عارف الصاوي ان موقف الخرطوم من اديس خاضع لعلاقات صداقة تربط مسؤولين اثيوبيين بسودانيين

ولكن السفير عثمان السيد مدير مركز دراسات الشرق الاوسط وافريقيا في ندوة اقامها مركزه في يناير الماضي وصف العلاقة مع اثيوبيا بالاستراتيجية والمهمة للسودان .

واستمرت العلاقة بين البلدين منذ عام 1997 تتسم باعلى درجات التعاون حتى ظهرت قضية الصومال ودخول اثيوبيا بقواتها الى هناك اضافة لموقفها من تنظيم المحاكم ،بينما احتفظت الخرطوم بحبال ود مع المحاكم الاسلامية .

وعلى مستوى الحدود بين الدولتين مازالت قضية منطقة الفشقة بولاية القضارف وما يحيط بها ما درجت الدولة على تسميته بالاستيطان الزراعي

ورغم عن تباين المواقف حظي سيوم بالحفاوة وتغطية اعلامية عبر كل الوسائط لم تتوفر لزيارة الوفد الارتري بل ان الاحتفال الذي اقامته ارتريا في قاعة الصداقة ووفر التلفزيون السوداني معينات نقله على الهواء للتلفزة الارترية لم يكن له صدى في التلفزيون الارتري وقال لي ناشط في المعارضة الارترية فضل حجب اسمه كانما هناك تعتيم اعلامي مقصود

وارتريا غير وساطتها في اتفاقية شرق السودان فانها تنشط في الحل السياسي لقضية دارفور بل انه اثناء زيارة الامين محمد سعيد جاء يماني قبراب الرجل الذي يمسك بالملفات السودانية في ارتريا وقدم للمسؤولين السودانيين نتائج جهده في انجمينا لتوحيد حركات دارفور ،وبعدها نقل رئيس الجمهورية الى الامين العام للامم المتحدة خلال اتصال هاتفى بينهما ان بشريات كبيرة حملها لنا الارتريون.

اذن الارتريون والاثيوبيون يخطبون ود الخرطوم عبر بوابة دارفور وما يجري بين السودان والمجتمع الدولي في شأن نشر القوات الدولية.

وفي جانب آخر سيوم جاء للخرطوم قبل ثماني واربعين ساعة فقط من انعقاد مؤتمر دول مبادرة حوض النيل .وقد قال الدكتور صلاح يوسف مدير الادارة الفنية لمياه النيل بوزارة الري للصحفيين ان هذه الاجتماعات ستشهد توقيع اتفاقية تاريخية في شأن مياه النيل ،واثيوبيا تنافح منذ وقت من اجل ان يكون لديها حصة في مقابل ذلك تتمسك مصر بأن يكون لدول المنبع حق الانتفاع وليس حصص في مواجهة ذلك سيكون الموقف السوداني مهم سواء لاثيوبيا او مصر .

كما ان ارتريا التى لا تشملها مبادرة دول حوض النيل رغم عن انها جغرافيا ضمن الحوض حيث ان الضفة الشرقية لنهر عطبرة الذي يغذي النيل بنصيب مقدر من المياه موجود داخل اراضيها

واجمالا اثيوبيا التى تزيد حدودها مع السودان في طولها عن 1700 كيلو متر ويبلغ تعداد سكانها حوالي 80 مليون نسمة في مقابل ارتريا طول حدودها 600 كيلو متر وتعداد سكانها لايزيد عن الاربعة ملايين تتسابقا نحو الخرطوم من كل الاتجاهات.

قطر تتبرع بمليوني دولار لإزالة الألغام وتشييد طريقين بشرق السودان

قطر تتبرع بمليوني دولار لإزالة الألغام وتشييد طريقين بشرق السودان
الثلاثاء 26 يونيو 2007

الراية (smc)
أشاد الدكتور مصطفي عثمان إسماعيل مستشار الرئيس السوداني بالدعم الذي قدمته دولة قطر بملبغ مليوني دولار لحملة إزالة الألغام وتشييد طريقين في إطار إعادة التوطين والإعمار بشرق السودان ومؤكدا مواصلة حملة الاستقطاب والدعم لإعمار الشرق السوداني.

وكانت قطر قد أعلنت مساهمتها في تنمية الحدود السودانية الاريترية بعد الاتفاق الذي وقع في اسمرا بين الحكومة السودانية وجبهة الشرق.

وأعلن الدكتور مصطفي عن بداية حملة كبيرة لإزالة الألغام في شرق السودان تنطلق بالورشة الكبرى بقاعة الصداقة بالخرطوم في الرابع من يوليو القادم تحت شعار (شرق خال من الألغام) وذلك لوضع خطة زمنية محددة لإزالة الألغام بشرق السودان, مشيراً إلى تسليم خرائط مزارع الألغام ومعلنا ضربة البداية يوم السبت الرابع عشر من يوليو القادم.

Eastern Sudan Front: Quiescence at war & discordance in peace (2)

Eastern Sudan Front: Quiescence at war & discordance in peace (2)


By Mohamed Ibrahim

June 25, 2007 — The Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESAP )signed in October 14th last year in the Eritrean capital Asmara between Government Of Sudan (GOS) and the Eastern front (EF) had silenced the low scale insurgency in the Sudanese –Eritrean borders , but the real conflict is yet to start Mohamed Osman Ibrahim continues his argument ….

The NCP didn’t try to hide its strategy of incorporating the EF issue in the security negotiations suitcase with Eritrea. Its senior officials stated it publicly but stood short from confronting the EF leaders when they encounter them with this degrading stunt until May 2006 (the same month President El-Bashir declared his government approval to the Asmara negations) . A GOS senior official met with a group of Eastern Sudanese activists as Abu Mohamed Abu Amna described it in www.sudaneseonline.com/ar /article_11671.shtml "the GOS official amazed the audience when he revealed that the Eastern- Sudan’s issue had been sorted out between the two countries …he emphasized that Eritrea had an interest to improve things with Sudan …he mentioned that the talks would not take longer & will only be of a formalization kind) .In fact no one should be amazed by the NCP man’s revelation . It was the secret that everyone knows.

GOS never felt threatened by the EF neither politically nor militarily .The NCP officials followed the tactic of starving the EF from the educated cadres by offering those (potential cadres) with better alternatives or maintaining close security monitoring on them .The Ala group did the same as GOS to the educated cadres by maltreating them & pushing them to escape. In that atmosphere educated were labeled as opportunists & unequipped to cope with the difficulties of the armed struggle.

In this occasion it’s worth-mentioning the real joke emerged from a conversation between some of the BC Central Committee (BCCC) members. One member enthusiastically kept asking for a 4 literate cadres to be attached to his department .Another responded impatiently to this request by saying "hang on there; we don’t have 4 literate members in the BCCC .You better forget about your department "! The sour repartee said it all.

With the Naivasha agreement and Abuja negotiations with Darfur rebels, some of the Beja activists in Port Sudan (mainly from the large Ommar Aar tribe) felt that their people might get sidelined in the new redistribution of the power & wealth .They infuriated the government with their excessive political activities until January the 26th 2006 when the GOS committed a massacre by shooting more than 25 innocent Beja(s) to death.

The incident attracted wide condemnation but the government was defiant. NCP power broker Kamal Obeid who was in Cairo at the

time ,declared the government’s move to investigate the matter but he described the armless protesters as "very aggressive and the police fired in self defense". Instead of consoling the victim’s families, the government detained some 60 Beja activists in a prison almost 2000km far from their hometown Port Sudan.

Bearing in mind the importance of Port Sudan for the lucrative oil industry the GOS opted for compensating the Beja & the EF with a saving face solution. The move was propelled by the GOS Beja members who were embarrassed by the Port Sudan massacre. The Relations between GOS and the Ethiopian government were wearing thin because of the Addis Ababa occupation of a large fertile land in el-Gedarif state & its expanding US-backed regional exercises.

The GOS is always get paranoid by the US activities, so it’s better to sort out everything & minimize the Yankee’s chances of having a pretext to intervene from the East.

On the other hand Eritrea was in a situation! A part from its need of the oil from its booming-with petrol revenues neighbour and its need to secure its 600 kilometers bordering tape with Sudan, Asmara needed to be released from the Sudanese opposition burden to address some other challenges.

Let us read from Dr. Jan Pronk’s blog "the increased tension between Ethiopia and Eritrea may result in a third war between these countries in four decades. This too would have major consequences for their common neighbor, and in particular East Sudan. UN agencies have already started preparations for a massive inflow of refugees".

Highly regarded researcher John Young wrote in his paper mentioned in part (1) of this essay ; that " a major obstacle to Eritrea launching a war against Ethiopia to regain the lost territories is the need to ensure that its western borders with Sudan is secure. And that border can only be made secure by the imposition of a radically different government in Khartoum than at present (in the short term that appears unlikely), or reaching a peace agreement between the EF and the GOS".

In addition to that Eritrea’s relations with the international community are not at their best; on the contrary they are at their worst since the independence of the beautiful country in 1991. With the expulsion of the UN peace keepers(US , Canada, Russia troops) from the borders area with Ethiopia, the growing tensions with the US & the decrease in the international aid, apparently Asmara made its mind to deal positively with the realities of Geography and History .It’s hard to see an Eritrean person without affectionate reminiscences from Sudan.

In this sense it’s good for the Eritrean Government to win its peoples hearts in this crucial time.

In summary both Sudan & Eritrea are in need of each other .All is Greek to the poor EF so, let the negotiations start.

The highly discreet Eritrean Government obviously didn’t disclose the game’s regulations to the all parts involved .Every one was silent on the issue of the international guarantors to the agreement but not Abdella Musa (the self-installed EF spokesman in Sudan ) .He told Alsahafa Arabic daily www.alsahafa.info/index.php?type=3&id=2147499222 that they are insisting on international guarantors to their future agreement with GOS . He named the UN & Britain as potential guarantors. The interviewer asked him " why international guarantees?" and he replied "because of what happened to the Khartoum Peace Agreement , the reason of its failure was the absence of the international guarantees , at the same time what made the Naivasha succeeds is the international community ".

Abdella Musa is one of the most influential Beja leftist activists .He is belonging to a well connected family .He spent a great deal of his time advocating for the labour movement as a trade unionist and a communist. In my only encounter with him I was amazed to hear him urging for a transformation in Sinkat village politics from a tribal conflict to a type of conflict that might involve labourers vs. employers or so. A man with such great talents is not welcomed to the glory of the EF .Later on, the EF guardians made him learn that.

It’s conspicuous that Mr A.Musa’s statement was not in harmony with the elusive EF agenda. During the Concordis International seminar in Asmara the EF chairman stated that they will not negotiate with the GOS without international guarantors and he promised transparent talks, but he was just talking.

When the real negotiations started; a bunch of new leaders emerged in the hallways. They talked to journalists and took some funny titles. One used to describe himself as the head of wealth-sharing committee while another one was tipped by his compatriots to take care of the same very file.

What infuriated the Omar Aar tribe in the Red Sea is the fact that they haven’t been represented in the EF negotiating delegation. In Port Sudan they were not in good terms with the government. They felt that they have forced the GOS to the negotiation table with the EF by their active work and protests in Port Sudan.The resentment amongst their elite was extraordinary.

Some of the Omar Aar members accused Eritrea of implanting some of its citizens from the Tigre tribes in the EF to act as Fifth Columnists in the negotiations and in the future power sharing.

Exactly as the NCP senior official predicted when he met with Eastern-Sudanese activists in Europe, the negotiation went on very smoothly and a quick agreement was reached in October the 14th last year. No one hailed the agreement like the Eritrean Ministry of Information’s website which described it as historic.

Eritrea held a ceremony and some dignitaries attended. In the ceremony EF Chairman Musa Mohamed Ahmed dedicated long passages of his speech to praise Eritrea, struggling with the reading of the pre-written remarks he conveyed the message of allegiance to Eritrea rather than anything else.

Not every one was happy with the outcome but many waited until the distribution of the booty.

Mohamed Jameil Ahmed was not among the waiting for the booty group. The brilliant Beja writer, poet and novelist was the first to study the agreement and speak out his mind about its loopholes. He wrote an outstanding critique in Arabic with the title (Asmara agreement: a just settlement or an intermittent tactic).He mentioned that the agreement appeared to be a settlement for the two regimes differences rather than a just settlement to the Eastern Sudan crisis.

While some of the Omar Aar tribesmen are accusing Asmara of serving the Tigre tribes interests at their expense, Mr. Jameil had another point of view. He wrote "what happened in Asmara was a margin for maneuvering, polarization & rearranging of the exchanged cards between the two regimes at the expense of the real interests of the East of Sudan citizens in general & against one of the population blocs of the area: the Tigre in particular ).

He went on describing the EF as an umbrella organization comprising movements carrying symbolic names while in fact they are serving tribal interests. The FLO represented the Arab Rashaida , the BC represented the Hadendowa and the Atmun (Ommar Aar ) but no real representation of the Tigre, he wrote.

Jameil described the Tigre activists who participated in the negotiations as names admitted by the (pressure and compromise) of the two regimes.

He mentioned many of the Tigre grievances to be neglected by ESAP and described the Tigre as the biggest loser of the political game "the substantial proof for that is the effects of the war took place between the government & the opposition in 1997 in Southern Tokar area which inhabits the Tigre who had been forced to flee more than 20 villages & centres between Garora & Marafit. This people had never been resettled, compensated or even accommodated in temporary camps around the big cities. They are still living with their kin(s) without any kind of support from the government or humanitarian aid agencies), he wrote.

The Beja tribes are mainly the Hadendowa, Ommar Aar, Beni Amir-Habab (the Tigre) and some other six groups. The biggest Hadendowa component (the Jamilab headed by influential Betai family), ninety percent of the educated & affluent Ommar Aar and the highly organized Tigre are not happy with the outcome. Some are regrouping for yet another split and reorganization on tribal and racist basis. The EF will deploy a couple of thousands soldiers in Eastern Sudan obviously to guard its gains but no doubt this troops will poison the atmosphere of the political conflict and might lead the armless to acquire this kind of new political tool.

The NCP with its strong newly acquired support within the Beja people will monitor the EF activities closely and would save no effort to have them in hand. The stigmatizing campaign against the EF troops is already in place.

In this bleak & tense situation one could only hope that all parties involved will stick to the democratic means in solving any future differences.

CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY EASTERN SUDAN

CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF

UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN

EASTERN SUDAN

العمر لكل الاعمار - افكار و اراء - نشر فى: 20/12/05 03:03 AM - جدد فى : 20/12/05 03:03 AM - الحالة: لم تكتمل بعد - الحجم: 146.39 ك ب
[ تعديل القصة | اضف قصة ] كل الكتاب المسجلين يمكنهم المشاركة او المداخلة هنا

1


Comprehensive

Peace?

CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF

UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN

EASTERN SUDAN

2

COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN

Sara Pantuliano

Institute of Development Studies, University of Dar es Salaam (sarapantuliano@imapmail.org)

This report was researched and authored by Dr. Sara Pantuliano. The study was commissioned by the International Rescue

Committee, with support from CARE International, Christian Aid, Oxfam International, Save the Children UK and Tearfund.

This work was made possible through funding from the UK Government’s Department for International Development

(DFID) and contributions from the six agencies. It was done with cooperation from the Humanitarian Aid Commission

(HAC) of the Sudanese Government of National Unity and the Secretariat for Humanitarian Affairs in the Liberated Areas

(SHALA), which facilitated the work.

The views presented are those of the author and not necessarily those of the agencies involved. Similarly, the analysis

does not necessarily reflect the views of individual stakeholders or interviewees, or the Government of National Unity.

Credits

Sara Pantuliano is a Lecturer in Conflict Analysis and Development at the University of Dar es Salaam. She has a long

standing association with the Sudan, which includes carrying out her doctoral research with the Beja in the East, developing

and managing an innovative aid response to the crisis in the Nuba Mountains (NMPACT) and being involved in the

IGAD peace process as a resource person and an observer for the Government of Italy.

All photos in this report are copyrighted to Thomas Goisque. For the past ten years, Thomas Goisque has been travelling

around the world capturing international events and hidden worlds. His photos are featured in many French news magazines

and he has also published six photography books, including his most recent on Iraq in 2004 (“Irak, année zero”;

Gallimard). He works with Sébastien Degalaup who is an independent journalist, writer, and editor of the web magazine

Terra Australis Incognita (www.tai-expeditions.org). His next book is dedicated to “Rebel Peoples all over the World” (to be

published in 2007 by Editions du Rocher).

Report editing and formatting was done by Joyce Maxwell.

For further information, contact the agency spokespersons: +254 20 364247 or +249 9121 60771.

3

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the staff of the six agencies which

commissioned and supported this study for their input

throughout the assessment and for shouldering the logistical

demands. Sorcha O’Callaghan (CARE), Dan Jarman

(Save the Children), Rebecca Dale (IRC), Nadia Ali El Tom

(IRC) and Robert Warwick (IRC) deserve special mention

for the time and energy invested in supporting every dimension

of the research.

In particular, I would like to extend my appreciation to

the team members who accompanied me throughout the

assessment in the government controlled areas of eastern

Sudan: Abu Amna Hashim, Eatizaz Mohammad (IRC),

Dr. Mohammad Hussein Dafaalla (HAC), Dr. Mohammad

Fadlalla Sirageddin (HAC) and Ali Karim. The team spirit

and the professionalism and friendliness of all team members

made the experience very enjoyable. To Ali in particular

I am very grateful for his experienced facilitation

of community meetings and incisive analysis of the context

in eastern Sudan. I would like to thank Amna Osman

Taha (IRC) and Jamila Imam Abdelrahman (IRC) for their

assistance with the translation from and to TuBedawye in

meetings with women.

I also wish to express gratitude to the Government of

National Unity in the Sudan, the Civil Administration of

the NDA controlled areas and the Government of Eritrea

for their cooperation and to HAC and SHALA for their involvement

and support.

Finally and importantly, I would like to thank the communities

of eastern Sudan, the key informants, the officials

and the local authorities, who gave a lot of their time

and patiently discussed and debated the issues raised in

the report during the assessment. All the people listed in

Annex I deserve special thanks for the time and interest

they have devoted to the research and for sitting in

lengthy interviews, in some cases in extreme weather

conditions. I hope this work will contribute to making the

situation in eastern Sudan better understood and helping

the people in the region to finally start to reverse long,

ongoing patterns of underdevelopment and

marginalisation.

Sara Pantuliano

Acknowledgements

4

COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN

Acknowledgements 3

Acronyms 5

Map of Eastern Sudan 6

Executive Summary 7

Recommendations 8

Introduction and Methodology 11

1. Background 12

1.1 Historical trends 12

1.2 Main actors 14

2. Peace and Development in Eastern Sudan: Current Perceptions and Perspectives 21

2.1 The perceived causes of unrest 21

2.2 The significance of the CPA in eastern Sudan 23

2.3 The agenda for peace and development: emerging perspectives 25

3. Peace, Stability and Development in Eastern Sudan: An Attainable Dream? 30

3.1 Unemployment and key livelihoods issues 30

3.2 The impact of international assistance in eastern Sudan 33

4. Recommendations for Action 36

4.1 Humanitarian issues 36

4.2 Development issues 36

4.3 Conflict mitigation and peace building 39

Selected References 42

Annex I - List of People Met 44

Contents

5

ACRONYMS

ACORD Agency for Co-operation and Research in

Development

CBO Community Based Organisation

CMR Crude Mortality Rates

CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement

CSO Civil Society Organisation

DfID Department for International Development,

UK

DUP Democratic Unionist Party

EU European Union

FAO Food and Agricultural Organisation

GAM Global Acute Malnutrition

GNU Government of National Unity

GOS Government of the Sudan

HAC Humanitarian Aid Commission

IDP Internally Displaced Person

IFAD International Fund for Agricultural

Development

IGAD Inter-Governmental Authority on

Development

INGO International Non-Governmental

Organisation

IRC International Rescue Committee

JEM Justice and Equality Movement

NC National Congress

NDA National Democratic Alliance

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

NMPACT Nuba Mountains Programme Advancing

Conflict Transformation

Acronyms

NRM National Revolutionary Movement

OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

PDF Popular Defence Force

RSS Red Sea State

SAF Sudan Alliance Forces

SHALA Secretariat for Humanitarian Affairs in the

Liberated Areas

SC-UK Save the Children UK

SECS Sudanese Environmental Conservation

Society

SLM/A Sudan Liberation Movement/Army

SPLM/A Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army

SRC Sudanese Red Crescent

TANGO Technical Assistance to NGOs

TB Tuberculosis

UN United Nations

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund

UNMAS United Nations Mine Action Service

UNMIS United Nations Mission to Sudan

UN-OCHAUnited Nations Office for the Co-ordination

of Humanitarian Affairs

US United States of America

USAID United States Agency for International

Development

UXO Unexploded Ordinance

6

COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN

Map of Eastern Sudan

7

This study was undertaken to gain a better understanding

of the situation in eastern Sudan in order to inform

the development of an appropriate action oriented programming

strategy for a number of agencies with interests

in the region. The findings of the research were generated

through extensive fieldwork with large numbers

of key informants, including senior government and opposition

representatives, local leaders, diplomats, academics,

international agencies staff and community members.

The document describes how the Beja and others in eastern

Sudan have coped with the complexity of their local

eco-system and been able to recover from recurrent

drought and outbreak of famine. It argues that the resilience

of their livelihoods system has been significantly

weakened due to external factors, many of which date

back to misguided policies in colonial times. Such policies

continued after independence, resulting in systematic

underdevelopment and marginalisation. This situation

led to the emergence of a political opposition and

latterly to tension and armed confrontation in part of the

region. Whilst the conflict has been very low key over the

last decade, it is apparent that the tension is rising in many

parts of eastern Sudan, particularly in urban centres.

The research analyses in detail the main actors to the conflict

and highlights how traditional political and tribal

leadership in eastern Sudan appears to have progressively

lost support within the communities. This is especially

evident in urban centres where a new generation of

young militant leaders has emerged, which draws its support

from the disaffected youth, particularly in towns. The

document discusses the involvement of and the

interlinkages between established actors such as the Beja

Congress, the Raishada Free Lions, the NDA, the SPLM/A

and the government, as well as the implications of the

presence of newer forces such as the JEM and SLM/A for

the politics of the region. Finally, the role and impact of

the regional and international players is also analysed.

The complex set of interrelated factors which drives the

conflict is examined. These include underlying grievances

such as historical feelings of exclusion and

marginalisation, demands for fair sharing of power between

different groups, inequitable distribution of economic

resources, underdevelopment, the absence of a

genuine democratic process and other governance issues,

including the failure of national leaders to address grievances

dating back to independence. In the last few years,

though, environmental factors have contributed to aggravate

the already dire socio-economic conditions of the

population in eastern Sudan and led long-standing discontent

and grievances to erupt into conflict. There are a

number of flash points which have exacerbated feelings

in the region, such as the loss of traditionally owned land

to mechanised agricultural schemes and the

mechanisation of the port in Port Sudan. Rampant poverty

and shockingly high malnutrition and mortality rates

have created widespread anger amongst the community,

who feel that the region is excluded from the national

context notwithstanding the fact that it is very rich in strategic

and natural resources. Most recently, the fallout from

the violence that occurred during the demonstrations in

Port Sudan in January 2005 has itself become a factor of

further resentment. Perspectives of key stakeholders in

the East on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA),

as well as its impact on the escalation of the tension in

the region are discussed in detail.

The study analyses the danger of a further escalation of

the conflict. The youth in urban centres are becoming increasingly

militant largely due to the lack of employment

opportunities and livelihoods options. There is a general

sense that resorting to armed confrontation is the only

option left to attract attention to the plight of the

marginalised in the East. The planned withdrawal of the

SPLM/A from the NDA controlled areas in accordance with

the CPA appears to be leading to a more confrontational

and less conventional military strategy by the Eastern

Front. The prospect of negotiations between the government

and the armed opposition in eastern Sudan has so

far acted as a restraining factor to those advocating more

militant solutions. However, the widespread distrust of

any initiative associated with the central government

means that there is an urgent need for a series of confidence

building measures around critical issues such as

employment opportunities in town and services in the

rural areas. Such initiatives need to be accompanied by

Executive Summary

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

8

COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN

an immediate international effort to identify a negotiated

solution to the underlying causes of conflict.

Contemporary socio-economic data illustrate the degree

of chronic underdevelopment that characterises eastern

Sudan. Neonatal, post-natal and infant mortality are the

highest in the country. Annual income per household varies

between US$ 156 per capita in rural Kassala to US$ 93

in rural Red Sea State. Illiteracy is highly pervasive, with

rates of over 50% being the norm for the entire region

and there being pockets as high as 89%. The limited health

services are almost exclusively to be found in town, in a

context where anaemia (a major killer of pregnant women

and newborns) and TB are endemic. Whilst the lack of services

and livelihood opportunities are the core issue in

rural areas, in town, where services are available, the level

of income earning is so low that people cannot afford to

access food or services. This condition has worsened as a

result of the considerable loss of jobs caused by the

mechanisation of the port, a development which fuelled

discontent by depriving many households of a critical

safety net.

The last section of the study reviews the role of the international

community in eastern Sudan which, despite

more than a decade of conflict, has shown little to no interest

in understanding its roots causes or attempting to

mitigate the situation. International humanitarian and development

funding has been extremely limited and interventions

have been mostly confined to small scale,

short-term emergency projects.

However, appropriate assistance could greatly help to

mitigate the tension in the East, where the conflict is

closely linked to socio-economic marginalisation and livelihoods

issues. In conclusion, the paper argues with concrete

examples that the international community could

help stem the escalating crisis in eastern Sudan with relatively

little investment at this stage, while the costs of a

potential humanitarian crisis further down the line would

be much higher.

Boy at a well under construction.

9

Recommendations

The two most urgent recommendations from this study

are as follows:

• Esablish a mechanism for a strategic, co-ordinated action

by international agencies: International agencies

should better co-ordinate interventions and focus on

strategic responses to key livelihoods issues for the

region, including joint advocacy to catalyse attention

to the situation in the East and enlist donor support

for a large scale, integrated, strategic and sustainable

response to the development needs of the region,

aimed at de-escalating tension.

• Sustain the momentum for negotiations: The international

community should prioritise the identification

of a suitable venue and mediation institution to initiate

talks between the concerned actors and to support

the implementation of a possible agreement with

adequate resources. Rehabilitation and development

assistance to the East should start immediately to

strengthen people’s confidence in the peace process.

A detailed set of recommendations is presented at the

end of the document which advocates for immediate action

to address triggers and fundamental causes of the

conflict in eastern Sudan through a multi-pronged approach

focused on humanitarian, development and

peace-building issues. Main recommendations include

the following:

Humanitarian issues

• Establish an emergency early warning system linked to

a Disaster Management Plan: Prepare a detailed Disaster

Management Plan to set up a system to track key

indicators of vulnerability throughout the region in

order to inform key actors in the East.

• Build up the Strategic Grain Reserves in Port Sudan: Build

up the Reserves to stabilise sorghum prices in the

market, in order to make it more affordable for the

poor.

• Establish assistance programmes aimed at eradicating

tuberculosis, anaemia and other diseases: International

agencies specialising in the health sector should support

local authorities to design effective systems to

combat TB and anaemia.

Development issues

• Support local government planning capacity: International

donors and agencies should support local government

reform, decentralisation and civil society capacity

building. Central government should send

skilled financial cadres to Red Sea and Kassala States

to design and help implement an inclusive, comprehensive

development plan for the region.

• Support income generating activities in urban areas:

Appropriate mechanisms should be identified to address

income poverty of people living in urban slums,

particularly those directly affected by the

mechanisation of the port in Port Sudan.

• Support key services in rural areas: Basic services should

be developed, particularly in areas with worst vulnerability

and mortality indicators, but should be accompanied

by support to local economic and productive

capacity, including pastoralist livelihoods.

• Introduce TuBedawye in schools: Introduction of

TuBedawye as primary or complementary means of

instruction should be considered for the first years of

primary school, in order to reduce the educational disadvantage

for Beja children.

• Exploring the possibility of a cross-line operation: The

possibility of devising an access mechanism to deliver

assistance cross-line to the NDA controlled areas

should be explored in order to reduce costs and

maximise assistance for the local communities.

Conflict mitigation and

peace building

• Facilitate confidence building measures: While plans for

the negotiations progress, the government should promote

confidence building measures to mitigate tension

in the region, including 1) the prompt payment

of the diyya to the families of those killed and in the

29/1 incidents in Port Sudan and to the injured; 2) carry

out an independent investigation into the killings and

disclose its findings; 3) engage with local community

and youth leaders to initiate a dialogue about development

priorities at the local level;.

• Promote emergency employment projects: Launch emergency

employment projects aimed primarily at unskilled

youth in urban areas to help de-escalate tension

by providing immediate job opportunities

through labour intensive initiatives. These

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

10

COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN

programmes should be accompanied by support to

small business, micro-finance projects and employment

skills training to create sustainable opportunities

for the youth long term.

• Support reduction of natural resources based conflict

between pastoralists and farmers: Urgent attention

must be paid to land tenure issues. Legislative reforms

should be promoted to acknowledge pastoralists’

rights to land where these have been alienated, possibly

through the institution of transparent and representative

State Land Commissions.

• Promote awareness about the Comprehensive Peace

Agreement through the dissemination of simplified

Arabic versions of the CPA and radio and TV

programmes in TuBedawye.

11

This study was commissioned by IRC with the support of

CARE, Christian Aid, Oxfam International, Save the Children

UK and Tearfund. The primary objective of the research

was to gain a better understanding of the situation

in eastern Sudan in order to inform the development

of an appropriate action oriented programming strategy

for the agencies concerned as well as other national and

international actors. The study focused on analysing the

underlying causes of underdevelopment and conflict in

eastern Sudan by identifying and exploring the socio-economic,

political, humanitarian and cultural issues that

have given rise to underdevelopment, tension and/or conflict,

in order to provide action oriented recommendations

to develop appropriate agency responses.

The research was conducted between 26th July and 23rd

September 2005 and included visits to Khartoum, Port

Sudan, Sinkat, Tokar, Kassala, Asmara, Tessnay and the NDA

controlled areas of Telkuk, Rubda and Hamashkoreb. In

Khartoum, Asmara and the NDA controlled areas the research

was conducted by the author with the support of

an international agency staff, while in the government

controlled areas of eastern Sudan the author was accompanied

by a national consultant, a national agency staff,

two senior HAC officials, a local community facilitator and

two translators.

In order to provide an in-depth analysis of the current situation

in eastern Sudan and appropriate recommendations

for action, a combination of data collection procedures

was used which included:

• A literary review of secondary sources, both published

and grey, which included relevant academic material

Introduction and Methodology

on eastern Sudan, humanitarian assessment reports,

policy briefings, conflict analysis reports and countrywide

studies with regional data breakdown. The material

reviewed was then used to formulate two separate

questionnaires which were used during the assessment

on the ground with key informants and community

groups respectively.

• Primary data collection was carried out through semistructured

interviews based on the questionnaires described

above. The questionnaires aimed at gaining an

understanding about underlying causes of underdevelopment

and insecurity in the region through a number

of different entry points. The questionnaire for the

key informants was developed on the basis of a conflict

assessment methodology with the purpose of

examining structures, actors and dynamics of the conflict

in eastern Sudan. The community questionnaire

was structured along the lines of a livelihoods framework

and focused on analysing local and meso-level

political and economic structures and processes in

eastern Sudanese society and understanding how patterns

of power and vulnerability in the region have

come about and are developing at present.

• A total of 376 people were interviewed, which included

representatives from government institutions at different

levels, local authorities, traditional leaders, members

of the Native Administration, diplomats, academics,

staff of international agencies, key informants and

community members. In total, officials and key informants

amounted to 147 while community members

interviewed were 229.

INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

12

COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN

1.1 Historical trends

Eastern Sudan is made up of the states of Red Sea, Kassala

and Al-Gedaref. The total population of the three states

is estimated to be approximately 3,746,000. The two states

which are the focus of the study, Kassala and Red Sea, have

respective populations of 1,507,000 and 724,000 (World

Bank, 2003b:2), occupying about 260,000 square

kilometres (TANGO, 2005:6) and with very low population

density in rural areas (about 3.3. per square kilometre in

Red Sea State). Red Sea State’s capital city, Port Sudan, is

however home to about 55.2% of the State population

and over 90% of the overall urban population in the region.

Environmental conditions are adverse in both states,

though these are more extreme in Red Sea State, where

rainfall is highly variable, with mean annual rainfall being

between 33mm in Halaib and 307mm in Kassala, and the

annual coefficient of variation being as high as 200% in

Halaib Province, as compared to 27% in Kassala. Second,

water is very scarce, with the annual moisture range in

Red Sea State varying between –40mm and –60mm. Third,

the natural biological productivity is low, the soils being

predominantly saline, rocky and sandy, with decreasing

vegetational cover. Finally, there are extreme temperatures

with the mean annual temperature varying between

28oand 32o; cyclical droughts occur every three to six years

(Pantuliano, 2000:66-72).

The area is primarily inhabited by Beja pastoralists and

agro-pastoralists, although a wide variety of ethnic groups

from across the Sudan can be found in the two state capitals,

Port Sudan and Kassala. The Beja are a confederation

of tribes united by a common language, TuBedawye, a

Cushitic idiom, and a common segmentary structure,

where each lineage is linked to a common ownership and

use of land. The Beja have retained a distinct culture and

their own language despite having mixed for centuries

with Arab immigrants into their region. The three main

groups making up the Beja are the Bishariyyn, the

1. Background

Amar’ar/Atmaan and the Hadendowa. There is much discussion

in the literature (Palmisano, 1991; Morton, 1989)

and amongst Beja intellectuals over whether another

group, the Beni Amer, can also be considered Beja, given

that the large majority of them speak a different language,

Tigre’ (a Semitic language related to Tigrinya and Amharic)

and have a different social structure based on a caste system

rather than a segmentary structure. The region is also

inhabited by another pastoral group, the Rashaida, who

are mostly found in the Kassala area, although their mobility

patterns see them move throughout the eastern

region, up to the Egyptian border and beyond. The

Rashaida are a Bedouin group who migrated from the

northern Arabian peninsula in the 19th century; many of

them maintain close social and economic connection

with Gulf countries.

Over the centuries the Beja and other pastoral groups in

the region have devised flexible and dynamic strategies

to cope with the complexity and the variability of their

eco-system and to recover from droughts and outbreaks

of famine. Such strategies include mobility, herd diversification

and redistribution1, rules for environmental protection

(e.g. the prohibition of cutting trees) and the development

of a multi-resource economy where livestock

keeping is complemented by a set of alternative livelihoods,

including cultivation and labour migration to

town. The life of the Beja groups has been regulated by a

customary law called silif, a complex but flexible body of

rules based on Beja traditional values. Silif regulates access

to and redistribution of resources, reciprocal use of

environmental resources (grazing land, water points, arable

land or firewood), conflict resolution and reciprocity

around major social events (birth, marriage and death).

Clear land rights codes embodied in the silif (asl and

amara)2 have helped minimise conflict over land, supported

by the mediation of the tribal authorities who

were entrusted with the management of land rights. However,

the resilience of this system has significantly weak-

1 Lahagen and yahamot, respectively gift and loan of livestock to destitute households.

2 Asl is the customary right over a piece of land and its resources inherited from the ancestors for the entire lineage; amara is the usufruct right

given to non lineage members to use pasture, water and cultivable land on the asl of another lineage against the payment of a tribute called

gwadab.

13

ONE: BACKGROUND

ened over the last three or four decades due to a number

of external factors.

Under the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, the Beja suffered

from colonial policies which contributed to undermine

the basis of their economic and social well being. A

number of agricultural schemes which had been introduced

by the Turko-Egyptian administration in the southern

part of the region (Gash and Tokar Delta) were considerably

expanded by the British to increase cotton cultivation.

The expansion of the schemes deprived the Beja

of key pasture reserves which they had used in years of

severe drought and laid the basis for the decline of their

pastoral economy (Niblock, 1987:148). In the northern

part of the region the Bishariyyn Beja were affected by

the impact of the damming of the River Atbara for the

irrigation of the New Halfa Agricultural Scheme, which

reduced the amount of downstream water in the area they

occupied, as well as by the seizure of land around the gold

mines of Gebeit al Ma’adin and Ariab.

The effects of the British colonisation were also felt at the

political level with the imposition of the Native Administration

system in eastern Sudan. The model of Native Administration

created for the Beja did not mirror existing

indigenous leadership but imposed artificial hierarchical

units onto a flexible institutional setting. This resulted in

undermining traditional leadership and creating ruling

elites which were not truly representative of the local

population. In addition, in the planning of Port Sudan (created

in 1905), which was developed along strict ethnic and

social lines, the Beja were confined by the British administrators

to the worst of the four classes of residential areas

created in the town, the ‘native lodging areas’, which

accommodated casual labourers on the docks and the

railway (Pantuliano, 2000:114; Gubti, 1993:3).

The discrimination felt during the British colonisation

pushed the Beja to organise a regional political movement.

This was precipitated by the publication by a Beja

intellectual, M. Ismail, of a political pamphlet entitled

Kifah al-Bija (‘The Struggle of the Beja’) in 1953, in which

he denounced the social and economic conditions in

which the Beja were living and pointed to the destructive

effects that the agricultural schemes and the gold

mines were having on Beja interests. The pamphlet called

for the development of the Beja and the rural areas in

which they lived socially, economic and politically. The

pamphlet generated much discussion amongst Beja in-

Beja fighters on patrol near the front line.

14

COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN

tellectuals and notables and eventually led to the formation

of the Beja Congress in October 1958 by a group of

educated Beja who had come together to discuss how to

attract the attention of Sudan’s political leaders to the

problems facing the Beja areas (Niblock, ibid.:149).

The Beja Congress’s main aim was to draw attention to

the underdevelopment and marginalisation of Beja areas

and to advocate for more administrative and political autonomy.

However, its leaders were soon arrested and imprisoned

when the parliamentary government was overthrown

by General Abboud later in 1958. The Congress

was then allowed to engage in democratic elections in

the 1960s, when it was able to win several parliamentary

seats. With the advent of Numairi’s regime, political parties

were disbanded, including the Beja Congress, though

Beja politicians loyal to Numairi were able to attain high

political office at regional level. These leaders however

badly let down their people when they failed to catalyse

national attention to the famine which caused considerable

loss of life amongst the Beja and killed 80% of their

livestock in the mid-1980s.

The brief democratic interlude from 1985 to 1989 between

Numairi and the Government of National Salvation

saw the return of the Beja Congress. At that point the

political focus, which had previously concentrated on the

marginalisation of the Beja, started to shift towards the

preservation of Beja culture and land, largely as a reaction

to the demographic transformation that the region

had begun to experience due to the influx of refugees

form Eritrea, Internally Displaced People (IDPs) from

southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains and economic

migrants from the north and west of the Sudan. The Congress

was however once again banned in 1989 along with

other political parties. Form this time the party was accused

of fomenting political destabilisation in eastern

Sudan. Repression against Beja dissidents, the execution

of the former Governor of the Eastern Region, Major General

Mohammad Karrar, following his participation in a

coup attempt, the continued alienation of land and the

reported conscription of Beja into the Popular Defence

Force (PDF) combined to create a resurgence of Beja resistance

(Johnson, 2003:138). The Government of the

Sudan also denounced Eritrea for training Sudanese Beja

in camps in their country (Verney, 1995:28) while the

Eritrean government severed diplomatic relations with

the Sudan in December 1994 on the grounds that Islamic

terrorists had been training in the Sudan and then infiltrated

into groups of Eritrean returnees. The Beja Congress

resurfaced again in Asmara under the umbrella of the

National Democratic Alliance (NDA), a coalition of northern

opposition parties a well as the SPLM/A (see 1.2.3

below), and for the first time in its history it became involved

in military operations in collaboration with other

NDA forces. Fighting between the Sudanese army and

NDA groups started along the Sudano-Eritrean border in

1995, although military operations largely consisted of

guerrilla strikes against government military installations

as well as the Khartoum-Port Sudan highway and the oil

pipeline. The border was mined and this had a terrible

effect on traditional pastoral migration. In 1996 the Beja

Congress was charged with having backed a failed coup

attempt in Port Sudan in August of that year and fighting

between the parties intensified in the southern area of

Tokar and Kassala Provinces, with the opposition groups

eventually occupying most of the area between the border

and the areas surrounding Tokar town in spring 1997.

The area around Tokar was retaken by government forces

shortly afterwards, but the NDA continues to control

much of the border region, including the towns of Telkuk

and Hamashkoreb.

1.2 Main actors

1.2.1 The Beja Congress/Eastern

Front

Like many regional movements in the Sudan, the Beja

Congress was the creation of an educated political elite

which rejected their families’ affiliation to the two dominant

sectarian political parties, the Umma and the Democratic

Unionist Party (DUP). The dissatisfaction with the

DUP, which traditionally dominated the political life of the

Beja, was a direct consequence of the perceived neglect

by the party of the Beja quest for development, its failure

to address the uneven distribution of development resources

in the region and the appropriation of land by

traders loyal to sectarian political parties (Salih, 1999:97).

All these factors led to the creation of the Beja Congress

and to the development of an agenda of regional autonomy

to fight against the marginalisation and underdevelopment

of the Beja areas and protect Beja identity

and land.

15

The agenda of the Congress has not changed much from

that of its early days, although there is now a much stronger

emphasis by Congress leaders on equitable power and

wealth sharing as well as political representation both at

the regional and national levels. Although during the

study some of the Congress leaders met called for the

right of the Beja to self-determination, the central demand

seems to focus on the establishment of a genuine

federal system with true devolution of powers to the regions

and fair representation of all political forces at the

local and national levels within a united Sudan.

Today the Congress is represented by its political and

military leadership based in the NDA controlled areas as

well as by representatives based inside the Sudan. Over

the last few years the Congress leaders have worked to

expand their political platform to other groups living in

eastern Sudan. This led to the formation of the Eastern

Front in February 2005. The Front is a political alliance

between the Beja Congress, the Rashaida Free Lions (see

1.2.2 below) and representatives from other small ethnopolitical

groups belonging to the Shukriya and the

Dabaina. The formation of the Front is an attempt by the

Beja Congress and the Rashaida Free Lions to deethnicisise

their political agenda and appeal to other

communities in eastern Sudan to unite in the fight against

the marginalisation and the underdevelopment of the

region. However, interviews with non Beja and non

Rashaida groups, particularly in Kassala, revealed that the

Front is still largely seen as closely affiliated to its two

main ethnic groups and therefore not representative of

other eastern Sudan communities, including immigrants

from northern, western and southern Sudan.

The Beja Congress enjoys a widespread political following

in rural areas and amongst the Beja in Port Sudan,

where it is extremely popular amongst the youth and the

intellectuals. Both groups see the Congress as the only

genuine representative of Beja interests, unlike traditional

parties like the DUP or traditional leaders, who have lost

much of their clout amongst the younger generations

(see 1.2.3 and 1.2.7 below). Despite its vast popularity,

though, many external observers have commented that

the Congress has so far failed to build an efficient

organisation on the ground and that its transformation

from a protest movement into a fully fledged political

party is far from realised.

1.2.2 The Rashaida Free Lions

The Rashaida Free Lions were created in the late 1990s

and have been carrying out military operations in the area

south of Kassala over the last few years, although not in

co-ordination with the NDA forces. The political agenda

of the Free Lions is similar to that of the Beja Congress

and is centred on the marginalisation and the underdevelopment

of the region, the lack of fair representation

and power sharing and the expansion of mechanised

farming at the expense of nomadic migration routes

which is affecting Rashaida livelihoods. Many of the

Rashaida interviewed have mentioned the confiscation of

a large number of 4WD vehicles by the government in the

mid 1990s as an indicator of oppressive policies against

the Rashaida and as a trigger for rebellion.

Notwithstanding the fact that there is now an alliance

between the Beja Congress and the Rashaida Free Lions,

many external observers feel that the relations between

the two groups are rather uneasy and that the alliance

could be only transient given the animosity that has

characterised Beja-Rashaida relations in the past and the

fact that part of the Rashaida do not support the Free Lions.

Over the last two decades Beja and Rashaida groups

have been embroiled in local strife over land and water

use. In addition, in the mid 1980s the Rashaida requested

from the government the appointment of their own Nazir,

the highest tribal authority, in order to disenfranchise

Rashaida omdas from the overall authority of the

Hadendowa Nazir. However, Nazirates are linked to the

possession of tribal land and historically the Rashaida

have no claim to land in eastern Sudan; their transhumance

routes have always been negotiated with Beja

tribal leaders and they have traditionally paid the symbolic

tribute which sanctioned the recognition that they

were guests on Beja land. In 1989, though, the government

of Sadiq el Mahdi decided to grant the Rashaida a Nazirate,

but this provoked heated reaction from the four Beja

Nazirs and the government had to backtrack and downgrade

the Nazir to the rank of Rais al Idara (Head of Administration),

a de facto Nazir without land. The dispute is

however far from settled and the Rashaida claim that they

have a full Nazirate with land that has been granted to

them by the current government. While the Eastern Front

dismisses this dispute as an anachronistic battle over old

tribal feuds, Rashaida and Beja communities met in and

around Kassala still seem to attach much importance to

ONE: BACKGROUND

16

COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN

the issue and tension over land and water resources between

the two groups continue to exist and flare up from

time to time. The Rashaida Free Lions feel that the

Rashaida are Sudanese citizens and as such they have a

right to land, regardless of historical claims by tribal

groups over the whole region. The right of all eastern

Sudan citizens to have equitable access to resources was

further underscored by Beja Congress leaders.

Another element which is important to underline is that

unlike the Beja Congress where support is unconditional

with the exception of a few Beja politicians close to the

ruling party, there seems to be much less unquestioning

support for the Free Lions amongst the Rashaida. The Free

Lions seem to enjoy following amongst the youth, but

community and tribal leaders question the need for the

rebellion, especially, as they emphasise, since the government

has recently been very supportive of Rashaida communities,

allotting them land and providing services.

Many external observers have commented on the danger

of a split amongst the Rashaida, with some potentially

supporting the government against the Free Lions.

1.2.3 The National Democratic

Alliance

The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) was created in

October 1989 as a reaction to the policies of the new

Government of National Salvation. The Alliance included

key northern opposition parties such as the Democratic

Unionist Party (DUP), the Umma (which left the alliance

in 2000), the Sudan Alliance Forces, the Communist Party,

the Baathist Party as well as the SPLM/A. The Beja Congress

became part of the Alliance in 1993 while the Dar

Fur based Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)

joined it in 2004. The NDA’s main aim was to overthrow

the dictatorship through a non-violent campaign to abolish

Islamic laws and form a new transitional government.

The rivalry of the Umma and DUP within the alliance and

intense government repression, though, undermined its

capacity to be very effective in northern Sudan.

Beja girls on donkey along the Eritrean-Sudanese border, near

the Sawa river.

17

Over the last few years the relations between some of the

partners within the Alliance have been put under considerable

strain. The signing of the Machakos Protocol in

2002 led to serious complaints to the SPLM/A by the NDA

leadership and the DUP in particular, since it was felt that

the deal on issues of religion and state and self-determination

exclusively for the South undermined the NDA

agenda of radical transformation of the Sudan as a whole

and left the marginalised areas in the North out of the

agreement. The evolution of the Naivasha process has

forced the NDA to discuss a strategy about its future role

in the country. An important turn of events for eastern

Sudan took place at the NDA Leadership Summit of July

2004, when the DUP representatives asked for the expulsion

of the Beja Congress after this had signed a memorandum

of understanding with the Justice and Equality

Movement (JEM), one of the main rebel movements in Dar

Fur. The Beja Congress on the other hand accused the DUP

of taking a conciliatory line with the government with the

aim of getting to power at all costs and recovering its old

constituencies in eastern Sudan (Polloni, 2004:19). The

friction between the two parties worsened during one of

the earlier rounds of the NDA-government talks in Cairo

in December 2004, when the Beja Congress walked out

of the talks, claiming that their interests were not represented

and subsequently threatened to withdraw fully

from the NDA (Justice Africa, 2005:6).

Although the Beja Congress never left the NDA, the split

with the DUP has never been mended. The main reasons

behind the friction lie in the different political demands

of the two movements, with the Beja Congress advocating

for strong regional autonomy and the DUP not being

favourable to regional autonomy settlements for minorities

in northern Sudan. The divide also reflects a fight over

leadership in eastern Sudan, with the Beja Congress

emerging as a strong and popular political force and the

DUP suffering from a significant loss of credibility and

support in many quarters.

Attempts to reconcile the two former allies have been

made by other forces within the NDA, but with little success

so far. The Eastern Front (the Beja Congress and the

Rashaida Free Lions) resent the fact that the DUP has

reached an agreement with the government and has done

little to raise issues related to eastern Sudan during the

Cairo negotiations. DUP representatives have argued that

the Cairo talks had a national focus and that a separate

track is being prepared for the negotiations on eastern

Sudan, although this is only a very recent development.

Now that the negotiations on eastern Sudan seem likely

to happen, the DUP and the Eastern Front are also fighting

for representation around the table. The Front feels

that the DUP has no role to play in what will be a forum

to discuss issues specific to eastern Sudan and that the

only groups with legitimacy to negotiate with the government

are those directly involved in the armed struggle.

Although many Beja still follow the Khatmiyya tariqa, the

Sufi order of which the DUP is the political expression,

the most senior Congress leaders think that the party has

lost any political following and people resent the DUP’s

attempt to exploit their religious influence for political

purposes. In addition, the Eastern Front feels that the DUP

has no significant military forces on the ground and that

it is now a government allied force.

The DUP obviously believes that they should be part of

the negotiations since they have traditionally had a strong

presence in eastern Sudan together with their military

wing, the National Revolutionary Movement (NRM), which

others though discount as almost non existent. Although

DUP leaders are aware of their diminishing support in the

region, especially amongst the younger generations, they

feel that the ethnicisation of politics in eastern Sudan is

very dangerous in that it represents a step backward in

the evolution of Sudan’s politics and could create further

divisions within the opposition movements as with the

case of Dar Fur. DUP leaders also commented that most

ethnic based parties are protest movements more than

structured political parties, but felt that the return of

ethno-regional politics in the Sudan is weakening the

DUP and other national political parties.

1.2.4 The SPLM/A

The SPLM has been active in eastern Sudan since the early

1990s within the NDA umbrella, although its military involvement

scaled up after 1997 with the creation of the

New Sudan Brigade. The relation between the SPLM and

its allied forces in the NDA has been evolving after the

signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA),

particularly in light of the commitment of the SPLM/A to

withdraw its troops from the NDA controlled areas by 9th

January 2006. Whilst the planned SPLM withdrawal does

not please the Eastern Front, they seem to understand the

motivations behind the agreement to withdraw and do

ONE: BACKGROUND

18

COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN

not seem to hold hard feelings towards their ally. Less

understanding was instead voiced by JEM leaders who felt

that the SPLM has exploited the Beja and their land for

its own political objectives.

Many of the actors interviewed during the assessment,

including representatives from the Eastern Front, the

SPLM and the government had high hopes that the movement

could play a pivotal conciliatory role in the forthcoming

negotiations between the Eastern Front and the

government. The SPLM leaders emphasised that they are

now part of the government and as such want to play a

role in quelling the fighting all over the country. Some

Beja actors expressed preoccupation that the SPLM may

have a less inclusive agenda after the death of former Vice-

President Garang, but hoped that the new leadership

would uphold his vision.

1.2.5 The JEM and the SLM/A

A new element in the political and military dynamics of

eastern Sudan is the presence of the two main forces engaged

in the insurgency in Dar Fur. The JEM was the first

of the two movements to become involved in eastern

Sudan and to date has the largest military presence on

the ground. JEM senior leaders met during the assessment

emphasised the national nature of the movement, which

seeks to fight for justice and equality all over the country.

The JEM started operating in eastern Sudan through local

activists of Dar Furi origin, but is increasingly recruiting

militants amongst indigenous eastern Sudanese (especially

Beja) as well, particularly amongst refugees along

the Sudano-Eritrean border. The movement’s leadership

has stressed that they do not want to import fighters from

Dar Fur into eastern Sudan, but are now working at setting

up a separate eastern Sudan JEM cell to maintain

overall control of the movement’s operations in eastern

Sudan. The JEM is also working to define its relations with

the Eastern Front beyond the memorandum of understanding

signed in July 2004 with the Beja Congress. The

two movements have already carried out a number of

joint operations in the region (most notably the kidnapping

of three Sudanese MPs after the Kassala Conference

in April 2005 and an attack on Dolobiay in June 2005) and

both sides stated that their collaboration is cordial and

fruitful. The JEM is not a member of the NDA and has no

intention of joining the Alliance. JEM leaders emphasised

several times that the nature of the problems in eastern

Sudan is similar to that of Dar Fur and other marginalised

parts of the Sudan and that there are minimal differences

between the JEM and the Eastern Front about the approach

to take to tackle such problems. It is important to

underline that many external observers commented that

without the additional presence of the JEM the recent

escalation of the conflict in eastern Sudan would have

probably not taken place, particularly after the SPLA

stopped all military operations in the region, leaving the

Eastern Front in a much weaker military position.

The SLM/A became a member of the NDA in February

2004 and has also been involved in part of the Cairo negotiations.

However, so far they have not been active militarily

in eastern Sudan, although they have military personnel

in the region, and do not have ambitions to take

part to the negotiations for eastern Sudan. As with the

JEM, the SLM/A leaders met during the study emphasised

the national nature of the movement and their objective

to promote fundamental change throughout the country.

Although the movement is yet to engage in military

action, it is considering the possibility of future military

operations in eastern Sudan along with the Eastern Front.

Notwithstanding the emphasis placed by both movements

on their national character and their efforts to

bring about political change throughout the Sudan, some

well-informed observers have commented that the involvement

of the Dar Furi movements in eastern Sudan is

probably due to reasons of military expediency and aims

to overstretch government forces particularly because

they fear that government troops being withdrawn from

southern Sudan may be redeployed in Dar Fur.

1.2.6 The Government of the

Sudan

The Government of the Sudan is seen by the opposition

groups in the East as the primary cause of the tension

because of its lack of attention to the region and its adverse

policies. Senior government officials met during the

assessment emphasised that the government is aware of

the problems of eastern Sudan and of its chronic underdevelopment

and marginalisation affecting in particular

Beja communities and stressed the openness and readiness

of the government to find a negotiated settlement

to people’s demands. The government has been negotiating

separately with the various actors in the eastern

19

Sudan conflict but is now ready to consider opening a

new negotiating table focused on eastern Sudan only.

Despite the stated good intentions of the government,

concern was expressed in several quarters by both opposition

leaders and local youth in Port Sudan and Kassala

that some government elements may be trying to play

the local tribal tensions to their advantage, particularly

by offering support to pro-government Beni Amer militia

to patrol the border as well as by promoting a new

political group called Beja Congress for Reform and Development.

Youth in Kassala in particular remarked that

there was an attempt to politicise tribal conflict and ignite

division between the Beni Amer (particularly of

Eritrean origin, living now in the Sudan) and other Beja

groups, and that this could have dangerous repercussions

for the region.

1.2.7 The traditional and the

emerging leadership

An important actor in the evolving dynamics of eastern

Sudan is the traditional leadership, in particular the Native

Administration and the religious leadership linked to

the Khatmiyya and Betai tariqas. As said above, the Beja

have four Nazirates who have traditionally exercised considerable

power over the decisions of the tribal groups

and have played an important role in mediating conflict

at the local level both amongst the Beja and with other

groups like the Rashaida. However, over the last two decades

the power and influence of the Native Administration

seems to have considerably weakened, particularly

in urban areas. Many in eastern Sudan consider this institution

as elitist, undemocratic, highly politicised and gender

blind and feel that it should undergo profound restructuring

to become truly representative of their communities.

During the interviews many Beja community

representatives throughout eastern Sudan voiced their

dissatisfaction with a leadership that they saw more inclined

to advance the interests of the central government

than to advocate for the rights of the Beja to adequate

resources and services. Such people felt that the Native

Administration has lost its leadership capacity and is more

focused on personal gain. These feelings were particularly

widespread amongst educated urban dwellers and youth

in town, though to a considerably lesser extent in the rural

areas. In urban areas the Native Administration seems

to have lost its leadership to a new and younger generation

whose authority is not based on tribal loyalties. The

new leaders are educated or semi-educated youth who

appear to have authority over the whole community, particularly

in Port Sudan deims (suburbs). The youth have

organised themselves and are widely represented, especially

in the bigger towns. The politics of the new leadership

are such that they promote solidarity across the Beja

and speak of all the Beja groups as one, including the Beni

Amer; their support for the Beja Congress and the Eastern

Front appears to be unreserved.

1.2.8 The regional players

The geographical location of eastern Sudan puts it in the

political sphere of influence of its neighbours, particularly

Eritrea. Almost all the actors interviewed spoke of the role

the Government of Eritrea has been playing in influencing

eastern Sudan politics over the last decade. Many track

down its involvement to the support allegedly provided

by the Government of the Sudan to Islamic elements

amongst Eritrean youth (the ‘Eritrean Islamic Jihad’) in

camps set up in eastern Sudan in the early 1990s, which

eventually led Eritrea to sever relations with the Sudan in

1994, given the threat that fundamentalists pose to the

country’s religious and ethnic stability. Other actors felt

that the support provided by Eritrea to eastern Sudan

groups can be ascribed to the fact that the Government

of Eritrea sees the growing relation between Sudan and

Ethiopia as a threat and the Sudanese border as a danger

in a new, potential Eritrea-Ethiopia war, so the Eritreans

want to create a buffer zone.

There are vastly different perceptions about the role of

the Eritrean support to the Eastern Front and its allied

forces. The Government of the Sudan has publicly denounced

Eritrea for providing military support to these

groups and attempting to undermine the implementation

of the CPA in the Sudan. Such a position underplays

the role of national actors in leading the conflict. The

Government of Eritrea claims that their role is limited to

logistical and moral support to the NDA forces. Field observation

during the assessment suggests that Eritrean

support is not overt on the ground; Eritrean military personnel

do not appear to be present in the NDA controlled

areas. However, it is clear that Eritrea is actively involved

with Sudan opposition movements hosted on its territory.

ONE: BACKGROUND

20

COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN

Another regional player which cannot be ignored is Egypt,

which has co-opted a sizable piece of land known as the

‘Halaib triangle’ in the northern part of Red Sea State and

has kept it under its control since 1994, injecting considerable

resources to build infrastructure and services and

develop work opportunities. The development that has

demonstrably taken place in the triangle has, in the view

of some Beja interviewees, served to heighten a sense

amongst the Beja youth of the wholesale neglect of the

region by the Sudanese government.

1.2.9 The international

community

Very little attention has been paid so far to the dynamics

of the conflict in eastern Sudan by the international community.

Although the conflict has been active in the region

for more than a decade, international actors have

shown little to no interest in understanding its root causes

or attempting to mitigate the situation. Government representatives

met during the assessment have stated that

they have requested the support of the international

community both in terms of development assistance to

mitigate some of the causes of unrest in the region and

to foster a dialogue between the government and armed

opposition troops. All the senior government officials met

emphasised that it is important to tackle the roots of the

conflict in eastern Sudan before further escalation and

that the support of the international community is

needed at this stage in order to identify preventive measures

to de-escalate the crisis in eastern Sudan and prevent

its degeneration into a Dar Fur-like situation. Many

interviewees concurred that the window of opportunity

to mitigate conflict in eastern Sudan is still open, but that

it is shrinking and commented that the international community

could help stem the crisis with relatively little investment

at this stage, while the costs of potential humanitarian

crisis further down the line would be much

higher.

However, although there has been a marginal increase in

the attention of the international community towards

eastern Sudan recently, this is yet to translate into material

assistance to the population of the region, which

could greatly help to mitigate the tension in the East

where the conflict is closely linked to socio-economic

marginalisation and livelihoods issues (see 3.1 below).

Although a number of international organisations, primarily

small and medium sized INGOs, have been operating

in eastern Sudan for a number of years, the amount of

humanitarian and development assistance extended to

the region by the international community has been extremely

limited and mostly confined to small scale, short

term emergency projects. The limited space awarded to

eastern Sudan in the UN Country Workplan for 2006 confirms

this trend.

21

TWO: PEACE AND DEVELPMENT IN EASTERN SUDAN

2.1 The perceived causes

of unrest

As with many other conflicts taking place in the Sudan,

there is no single root cause for the fighting in the East. A

complex set of interrelated factors is driving the war

which, as described above, has been at its height since

1997 and includes the military occupation of the NDAcontrolled

territory. Historical grievances, feelings of exclusion

and marginalisation, demands for fair sharing of

power between different groups, inequitable distribution

of economic resources and benefits, underdevelopment,

the absence of a genuine democratic process and other

governance issues are all interlocking factors to the conflict,

but none of them is a sole or primary cause. Unequal

access to resources and services and disparities in resource

distribution has been exacerbated by the long

standing failure of national leaders to address the grievances

stemming from the region since independence. In

the last few years, though, environmental factors have

contributed to aggravate the already dire socio-economic

conditions of the population in eastern Sudan and led

2. Peace and Development in Eastern Sudan:

Current Perceptions and Perspectives

long-standing discontent and grievances to erupt into

conflict.

As discussed in section 1.1 above, grievances in eastern

Sudan, particularly amongst the Beja, date back to the

colonial time and are primarily linked to the seizure of

prime land and the ensuing dwindling of pasture which

badly affected people’s livelihoods and generated local

conflict around resources. Dissatisfaction about the lack

of political representation for the Beja, socio-economic

marginalisation, underdevelopment and lack of services

were also amongst the reasons which led to the formation

of the Beja Congress in 1958. Today the causes of the

conflict cited by the different actors met during the study

are not much different from the grievances voiced by the

Beja Congress 60 years ago. One of the most recurrent

complaints that communities, local and political leaders,

and external observers alike quoted as a cause of conflict

was the socio-economic marginalisation of the people in

eastern Sudan, particularly the Beja, and the feeling of

social exclusion which is so pervasive within their com-

Eastern Front troops.

22

COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN

munities. One international observer commented that she

was stunned by the extent of the exclusion from the national

context felt by many communities in Port Sudan.

Eastern Sudan is one of the poorest regions in the country

and most of the people resent the state of neglect in

which its communities have been left, both in the rural

areas and in the urban slums. People have complained

consistently and incessantly about the lack of services

(education, health and water), lack of job opportunities,

barriers to access to natural resources (e.g. agricultural

land and water), general state of underdevelopment, extremely

high rates of maternal and infant mortality, poverty,

food insecurity, vulnerability and morbidity. Some of

these issues are discussed in detail in section 3.1 with the

help of available data and indicators.

Several of the actors interviewed, particularly the Beja

youth in the towns and the communities in the NDA controlled

areas, have linked the general state of neglect and

marginalisation of eastern Sudan to the lack of eastern

Sudan representatives, particularly Beja, in the central and

to a lesser extent in the state government. Many local and

external observers have emphasised that eastern Sudan

is a very rich region, considering that it has prime agricultural

land, gas, gold and other minerals, livestock, fisheries,

oil potential and the only port in the country, as well

as being crossed by the highways to Egypt and to

Khartoum, the railway and the oil pipeline. Some Beja

leaders commented that the Beja occupy the most strategic

piece of land in the country and one of the richest,

but do not share any of the wealth which is produced by

the region. Similar comments were made by Rashaida

leaders who remarked that the Rashaida do not receive

any services in return for the levies they pay on their livestock,

remittances and trade. There was a widespread feeling

amongst local communities that many private companies

and well connected individuals are doing profitable

business in the area, especially with the gold, oil, gas

and fishery sectors, without any benefit trickling down

to the community. Interviewees felt strongly that in general

revenues earned from eastern Sudanese resources are

not redistributed locally; on the contrary, people complained

that they were being directly deprived of their

land, as in the case of the community in Hosheiry (rural

Port Sudan), whose land has been confiscated to develop

a new port for oil exports. The resentment against the

central and local government for the unfair redistribution

of resources and lack of development affecting the region

was very strongly articulated by almost all actors met in

eastern Sudan, including pro-government actors. At the

community level resentment gave way to anger and a

feeling that people had to fight to attract attention to the

situation in the East.

Many complained about the fact that the almost total

absence of services and development initiatives in the

rural areas has pushed much of the population to move

to the towns, particularly Port Sudan. In town, where services

are available, the complaint was that rampant poverty

does not allow people to be able to afford school

fees or pay for drugs. A very high number of people are

vulnerable to diseases such as tuberculosis, which is directly

linked to malnutrition. In Port Sudan anger was very

palpable amongst many communities about the

mechanisation of the port, which has had a direct impact

on individual and household income for thousands of

families (the number of people laid off was reported by

local government officials to be in excess of 28,000) and

which people felt should have been compensated by parallel

employment creation. The mechanisation of the port

in Port Sudan has undoubtedly contributed to radicalise

anti-government feelings amongst the Beja. Beja men,

particularly Amar’ar/Atmaan, have been working on the

docks as porters and casual labours since the early 1930s

and stevedoring work was a crucial safety net for the Beja.

Seasonal male youth casual labour on the port was a key

source of complementary income for rural households,

but the port also provided an alternative source of livelihoods

to those who have lost all their livestock, particularly

after the mid-1980s famine. Much frustration was

voiced by young university graduates in Port Sudan and

Kassala about the general lack of job opportunities for

educated people as well and about the perception that

ethnic Beja were being discriminated against when applying

for jobs. Similar grievances were voiced by the

youth in Kassala, where the lack of job and labour opportunities

were lamented by almost all people met. In

Kassala much resentment was also voiced about the lack

of government investment in preventing and controlling

the flash floods which recur almost every year along the

river Gash.

In Kassala there was mention of the alienation of land to

non indigenous landowners who have progressively come

to own much of the agricultural schemes, while local

people no longer have access to farming land. While it was

23

not possible to verify the extent of these allegations, it is

nonetheless important to mention that many Beja in

Kassala have a perception that their land has now been

seized by other people and they can only work as agricultural

labourers on other people’s farms. Furthermore,

a limited number of Beja actors claimed that their culture

and their language have been discriminated against

by a series of governments and that it is important for

the Beja to preserve the use of TuBedawye. The desire to

retain TuBedawye as a language and a form of cultural

expression was widely expressed. However, the communities

interviewed indicated an almost univocal preference

for Arabic as a means of instruction, since they believe

that this would allow them to overcome some of the

traditional isolation of Beja communities and would increase

access to economic opportunities. Many felt that

the lack of use of TuBedawye during the first years of primary

school puts Beja children at disadvantage vis-à-vis

children of Arab origin and is one of the main reasons for

the high drop out rates amongst the Beja.

Traditional tribal leaders, many of whom are affiliated to

the ruling party, felt that most of the grievances raised by

the Beja youth and by the communities were legitimate

and that the Native Administration has been alerting the

central government to the tension in the region and warning

that immediate action is required to avoid eastern

Sudan becoming another Dar Fur. However, the general

view amongst much of the Beja youth was that lack of

job opportunities and development were a direct consequence

of the political marginalisation of the Beja and

their lack of power. Much of the justification behind the

fighting was attributed to the need for the Beja and other

local groups to take charge of the decision making affecting

their communities in order to reverse the prevailing

trend of marginalisation and underdevelopment and redistribute

economic resources more fairly. Many felt that

although some Beja are already part of the local government

they are more focused on their own personal gain

than on the well being of the community and that in any

case there is no systematic, institutionalised attempt to

address community problems. Some commented that

more people are dying because of the neglect of the authorities

than because of the conflict.

It is apparent that the Beja youth, particularly in Port

Sudan, are seething with anger and resentment and that

many feel that armed confrontation is the only means to

reverse the situation in the region. Some of the actors

observed that such feelings can be easily manipulated for

political purposes. Whilst this is undoubtedly true, the

perception was, though, that the feeling of desperation

ran so deep amongst the communities at all levels in Port

Sudan slums that the youth were prepared to do whatever

they could to attract national and international attention

to the situation in eastern Sudan. It is clear that

the call for action has been prompted by the Naivasha

process as well as the fighting in Dar Fur, with more Beja

youth coming to the conclusion that armed confrontation

is the only route to change. Such feelings have been

aggravated by the killing of an estimated 25 Beja men and

the wounding of 196 others1 by the police during the

demonstrations by a large numbers of Beja in late January

2005 in Port Sudan to protest against the exclusion of

eastern Sudan from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

The events of 29th January 2005 have become a symbolic

turning point for many Beja in Port Sudan and have directly

contributed to escalate tension in the region, since

many reportedly have started to feel that the police action

was the proof that dialogue with the government is

not possible. The delay in the payment of the diyya (blood

money) and in releasing the results of the investigation

into the killings promised by the government is also contributing

to further exacerbate tension.

Eastern Front leaders emphasised that the demands of

the people of eastern Sudan are not any different from

those of the groups fighting in Dar Fur or from the SPLM

in the South. Lack of development, basic services and

employment in eastern Sudan are in their opinion the

direct result of the concentration of power in the hands

of a restricted elite, which has resulted in political

marginalisation and lack of attention to the peripheries

throughout the country. Similar comments were made by

the leaders of the Rashaida Free Lions as well as the JEM.

1 Source: Associated Press, 1st February 2005 (quoting Amna Derar, Eastern Front spokesperson).

TWO: PEACE AND DEVELPMENT IN EASTERN SUDAN

24

COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN

2.2 The significance of the CPA

in eastern Sudan

There is no doubt that the signing of the Comprehensive

Peace Agreement has prompted the Beja and other

groups in eastern Sudan to seek redress similar to that

gained by the SPLM in the South. The CPA was seen by

most actors in the region as a bilateral agreement between

the National Congress Party and the SPLM/A, which

has failed to take into account the instances of the many

different groups living in the Sudan. Many people

emphasised that the title ‘comprehensive’ is highly inappropriate

for an agreement that has been so exclusive.

Most of the people interviewed in eastern Sudan felt that

the signing of the Machakos Agreement and the process

leading to the signing of the other Protocols has led other

groups to resort to armed confrontation (e.g. in Dar Fur)

or to escalate fighting (e.g. in eastern Sudan). However,

many actors, including representatives from the Beja Congress

and the Rashaida Free Lions, believed that the CPA

also represents an opportunity for stakeholders in eastern

Sudan and elsewhere to address and resolve some of

the grievances which lie behind the tension in the region,

including issues of power and wealth sharing. One commentator

observed that the attention should be placed

on the CPA as a process, rather than on its text, as the process

deriving from the CPA could inform change in eastern

Sudan, unlike the letter of the agreement which focuses

exclusively on the North/South conflict. Some of

the issues addressed in the CPA (e.g. fairer political representation,

effective decentralisation) are all relevant to

eastern Sudan and many interviewees felt that if the CPA

were effectively implemented, it would definitely carry

benefits for the region. In order to do so, though, the

agreement would have to be ‘Easternised’, with power and

wealth sharing made relevant to the different parts and

groups in the region and through in-depth restructuring

of local institutions.

Some of the Eastern Front leaders commented that they

consider the CPA to be a good framework for change, but

that it has to be amended to accommodate the interests

of the other groups in the country which have been ignored

by the CPA in the redistribution of power and

wealth. Many of the demands raised by the Front and the

other groups fighting in eastern Sudan are framed along

the lines of the CPA and focus on allocation of power for

eastern Sudanese actors at both the national and the re-

A camp of the Beja Congress Movement, near Balasit.

25

gional levels and fairer redistribution of wealth in the region.

Several opposition leaders stated that the distribution

of power at the federal level should reflect the population

size in the different regions while many external

observers saw the Two Area Protocol as a possible framework

for negotiation between the government and the

Eastern Front.

The Beja youth, in Port Sudan in particular, felt that there

is no guarantee that the agreement will bring real redistribution

of power and wealth in the country. They

emphasised that the CPA process has heightened the feeling

of exclusion amongst the Beja and that people have

gathered together to ask for the agreement to be extended

to include provisions for eastern Sudan (this is

what they were demanding during the January 2005 demonstration).

They remarked that the CPA could provide an

entry point for the solution of other conflicts in the Sudan

if the international community strongly supported an

extension of the CPA process to Dar Fur and eastern Sudan

that would make the agreement truly comprehensive.

Some international observers commented that the CPA

could provide a platform to address most of the mains

causes of tension in eastern Sudan and offer a framework

to reach a separate agreement between the Eastern Front

and the government. However, they felt that while waiting

for the positive effects of the agreement to be realised,

action is required to deal with the immediate impact the

agreement has had on exacerbating the already existing

tension in the region.

One obvious gap in the CPA highlighted by many of the

people interviewed is that the provision envisaging the

withdrawal of the SPLA from the NDA controlled areas and

the handover of the region to government forces has not

taken into account the presence of other armed groups

in the area such as the Eastern Front. Eastern Front leaders

emphasised that they are not bound by any agreement

to withdraw their forces and that they do not have

a cease-fire agreement with the government, therefore

they will continue military operations in the area after the

withdrawal of the SPLA unless an agreement is reached

with the government. JEM representatives in particular

stressed that UN monitors should wait to move in until

an agreement is reached between the government and

armed groups operating in eastern Sudan because the

region will be the theatre of military operations until a

negotiated solution is reached by all the parties involved.

An important element which emerged throughout the

assessment is that most people, particularly rural communities

as well as of much of the people living in urban

slums know very little about the CPA, its provisions and

the implications that it will have for eastern Sudan and

the country as a whole. An important issue for the region,

for instance, is the establishment of the Land Commission

envisaged in the Wealth Sharing Protocol. However,

it is not clear how people in remote rural areas will be

made aware of the Commission in order to claim back

their land where entitled to. Importantly, the mechanisms

of implementation of the agreement are not even clear

to some of the leadership in the region.

2.3 The agenda for peace and

development: emerging

perspectives

2.3.1 Possible escalation

Several factors need to be considered when weighing the

possibility of further escalation of the conflict in eastern

Sudan. While the planned withdrawal of SPLA forces may

point to an inevitable reduction of the military capacity

of NDA forces in the region, other factors have surfaced

in recent months that seem to suggest that the possibility

of an escalation of the tension should not be discounted.

The events of Port Sudan in late January 2005

have exacerbated feelings among the Beja in Port Sudan,

particularly the youth. Many of them were reported to

have joined the fighters in the NDA controlled areas in

the months following the killings in Port Sudan and several

others of those met during the study spoke openly

about their willingness to join the fight since they felt that

they had nothing to lose and, as they put it, ‘they are dying

of a slow death anyway’ (Deim al Arab - Port Sudan,

31st July 2005). It was astounding to hear young Beja

women, who are traditionally confined to a very secluded

life away from public and political life in Beja society,

speaking vehemently about their desire to ‘sacrifice’

themselves for their tribe. In addition, the presence of new

actors such as the JEM has bolstered the military capacity

of the armed rebellion in the East. At present the JEM

is reported to be actively recruiting amongst the youth

in IDPs and refugee camps along the Sudano-Eritrean

border.

TWO: PEACE AND DEVELPMENT IN EASTERN SUDAN

26

COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN

Despite the recent strengthening of their military capacity

and the support of new allies, the Eastern Front seems

to be aware that the withdrawal of the SPLA will inevitably

weaken its capacity to expand the territory under its

control. However, discussions with several well informed

actors seem to point to a change of military strategy and

an escalation that would focus on ‘hit and run’ operations

and targeting of the many strategic economic installations

located inside government controlled areas of the

East. Beja leaders commented that the port, the highway

and the pipeline could all become targets of a military

escalation which would find many supporters amongst

the Beja and other communities in eastern Sudan. Beja

youth representatives in Port Sudan argued that so far

economic infrastructure in the East have not been attacked

in sign of respect for the tribal leaders (the Nazirs)

who asked Beja communities to protect key installations

such as the pipeline. However, they felt that now there is

no alternative but to resort to new military tactics. There

was awareness amongst Eastern Front leaders that resorting

to unconventional military tactics and guerrilla warfare

may alienate the sympathy of the international community

towards the plea of the Beja people. However,

some of them commented that the international community

has never offered any meaningful support to the Beja,

so they would not stand to lose.

Notwithstanding the stated intentions to escalate the

fighting, all Eastern Front political and military leaders

stressed vigorously that the recourse to further violence

would be the last option and that they are keen to find a

negotiated settlement with the government. Several of

them emphasised that the offer of the government to

negotiate has deferred the immediate danger of an expansion

of the conflict, but that an escalation would be

inevitable if the promise to negotiate is not upheld. The

youth in Port Sudan made similar comments and remarked

that they want peace and are prepared to find a

solution through negotiations, but that negotiations will

have to be genuine and constructive and address people’s

grievances.

Should an escalation ever take place, some actors have

pointed out that it will be important to try and prevent

clashes between Beja groups, particularly between Beni

Amer and Hadendowa in the Kassala area. Other observers

also saw the possibility of a split within the Rashaida,

with some taking arms in support of the government

along with existing Beni Amer militia. Generally, though,

it was felt by most interviewees that the homogeneity of

much of the ethnic groups in eastern Sudan makes the

risk of an escalation of internal tribal conflict a low level

possibility and degeneration into a Dar Fur-like situation

unlikely.

2.3.2 Efforts to mitigate tension

There are attempts underway by many actors to try and

mitigate the tension in eastern Sudan. Government representatives

mentioned several initiatives the government

has undertaken recently to try and meet some of

the demands coming from the region. These include the

launch of a recruitment drive of Beja graduates from Port

Sudan, the recent launch of a two year project financed

by the Chinese government to divert water from the river

Atbara towards dry areas of eastern Sudan, including Port

Sudan and Suakin, and the expansion of the electricity

grid in Red Sea and Kassala States. The government has

also set up a Higher Committee for Eastern Sudan, chaired

by the Minister of Finance and National Economy and attended

by the Ministers of Agriculture, Irrigation and Humanitarian

Affairs as well as line ministries and state authorities.

The Committee is overseeing some of the

projects mentioned above as well as others, including an

intervention to eradicate the mesquite trees from Delta

Tokar in order to clear land for people to cultivate2, the

building of small dams in various parts of Red Sea State

and the initiation of studies to explore the potential for

treatment of salty water. Government officials have also

mentioned a series of emergency interventions they have

undertaken in the area, including government provision

of food aid to poorer households and school feeding

programmes. The government is also planning to re-open

boarding schools in the region to facilitate education for

children of nomadic families; this is in response to a widespread

local demand for the reopening of such schools3.

Local government officials also mentioned the compensation

for those who lost their jobs on the port through a

national insurance payment.

2 The need for the eradication of mesquite trees in the region was underscored by all communities met as well as by local leaders, including members

of the Beja Congress. Mesquite infestation has rendered large amounts of land unusable for either pasture or cultivation and has affected the

quality of underground water in much of the two states.

3 Whilst the interest of the government in re-establishing boarding schools following local requests is laudable, it is important to bear in mind that

27

These government efforts are not being met with much

enthusiasm by many community leaders and youth representatives,

though. Importantly, both Beja youth leaders

and some representatives of the Beja Congress have

acknowledged that after the events of January 2005 there

have been efforts by the government to take initial steps

to address some of the main grievances in the area. However,

the Beja youth leaders commented that projects

have been planned by the government unilaterally, without

community involvement, and that some of the initiatives

mentioned (e.g. the extension of the electricity grid)

will not benefit the communities at the grassroots level,

but only middle class urban dwellers. Much of the blame

was apportioned to traditional leaders working closely

with the government for not raising the issues which local

people consider as key. In addition, several actors in

the region commented that the much of the food which

was supposed to be distributed freely in the region went

astray and held traditional leaders responsible for its disappearance.

Several local actors observed that the

projects being promoted by the government are piecemeal

initiatives which do not fall within an overall strategic

plan to address the long standing problems of the

region.

Several Beja leaders, particularly in Port Sudan, remarked

that because of the chronic neglect and marginalisation,

people have completely lost their trust in the government,

so even initiatives aimed at improving the situation

locally are looked at with suspicion. Local leaders and

external observers stressed the importance for the government

to promote confidence building measures aimed

at rebuilding the social contract between the government

and the communities in eastern Sudan. People

emphasised the need for the government to open a dialogue

with the communities throughout the region, not

just in Port Sudan. Mention was made of the fact that

Halaib mahallia (administrative unit equivalent to a province)

has never received an official visit by the central

government (or at least this was the local perception).

People felt that the central government is hardly aware

of the actual living conditions of many communities in

TWO: PEACE AND DEVELPMENT IN EASTERN SUDAN

A patrol of Eastern Front fighters near the front line.

the re-opening of these schools should be placed in a wider strategy for support to nomadic education drawing on experience from other locations.

28

COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN

the rural areas and in the urban slums and suggested that

a good first step to start rebuilding a relation would be

to visit the areas and discuss priorities with the communities,

to be followed up by prompt action. An immediate

priority area highlighted by the majority of the

interviewees is that of employment for the youth, followed

by provision of services in the rural areas and the

initiation or rehabilitation of large scale development

schemes aimed at rebuilding people’s livelihoods. The

implementation of real decentralisation as well as fairer

redistribution of power and wealth were also mentioned

by several interviewees. In Port Sudan people saw the

payment of the diyya and the completion of a full and

transparent investigation as an essential step to de-escalate

tension locally. Some community leaders observed

that the elders are trying to mitigate the resentment

which is so pervasive amongst the youth, but the youth

are sceptical that a peaceful solution can be found to the

problems of eastern Sudan.

Negotiations with the Eastern Front were seen by most

actors as the key element to reduce tension in the region

and the declared readiness of the government to negotiate

was seen as having undoubtedly contributed to prevent

the escalation of the conflict in the immediate term.

2.3.3 The plans for negotiations

The need for a negotiated solution to the conflict in eastern

Sudan was without exception highlighted by all actors

during the study. Senior government officials

emphasised that the government is aware of the problems

in the East and is ready to sit with the armed opposition

to find a solution to the problems. Eastern Front

leaders also stressed their readiness to negotiate with the

government.

The government pointed out that it has already tried to

facilitate dialogue by organising the Kassala Conference

in April this year, which was attended by several prominent

Beja leaders, who in the view of the government articulated

clear demands centred on services and development

to which the government has already started to

respond through the initiatives mentioned in the previous

section. The Conference was however dismissed by

Beja youth and Eastern Front leaders as unrepresentative

since in their view it was attended only by pro-government

officials and did not include members of the Beja

Congress or the Rashaida Free Lions. However, youth leaders

in Port Sudan recognised that it is essential that the

negotiations be preceded by an attempt to build a conducive

environment for dialogue and suggested that a

step in this direction would be to stop adverse media

campaigns on both sides prior to the talks.

It is still not clear when and how the talks will be held.

Preliminary attempts to create a dialogue between the

parties had been made by the British NGO Concordis International,

which organised a first consultation between

the government and the Eastern Front in February 2005.

However, in June this year the Special Representative of

the UN Secretary-General, Mr Jan Pronk, offered his offices

to identify a venue and a mediator for the talks. Representatives

from both parties were under the impression

that negotiations were ready to start in August 2005, but

there appeared to be delays that neither of the two parties

could explain, given the readiness and willingness of

both to negotiate. The delay started spreading suspicions

amongst Eastern Front leaders that the government was

not genuinely interested to negotiate and was buying

time. However, well informed observers attributed the

delays to internal technicalities which had slowed the

action of the UN in identifying a suitable venue and mediator.

In addition, several actors commented that there

is a lack of clarity as to the extent to which this initiative

has been fully institutionalised within the United Nations

Mission to Sudan (UNMIS), given that the mission’s mandate

does not extend to eastern Sudan beyond the monitoring

of the SPLA redeployment. If this is the real reason,

it is essential that the international community supports

the identification of a suitable negotiating forum without

further delay since this could undermine the current

willingness of the parties to negotiate. The Eastern Front

also mentioned that they had asked the UN for capacity

building support for their representatives ahead of the

negotiation but that such support has failed to

materialise as yet. Frustration appeared to be rising

amongst some of the Eastern Front leaders who stated

that they were considering approaching other bodies in

the international community should the UN be unable to

overcome the impasse speedily.

Once an agreement about the venue and the mediating

body is reached, one of the problems to address will be

to reach a decision about who is to sit at the negotiating

table. Whilst the government and the Eastern Front are

29

the two obvious actors, a number of other stakeholders

are discussing their participation. The first is the SPLM/A,

which many expect to be part of the negotiations in its

new capacity as a member of the Government of National

Unity (GNU). Many youth and community leaders as well

as representatives of opposition parties and some government

officials felt that the SPLM/A could play an important

role in solving the conflict in eastern Sudan, given

its relations with the armed opposition, although several

interviewees feared that the death of former Vice-President

Garang made this mediation role less likely. Eastern

Front leaders remarked that the Front wanted to negotiate

with the Government of the Sudan, not with the National

Congress Party. SPLM/A representatives saw the

movement taking part in the negotiations as part of the

GNU and stressed that they would work to help the parties

reach a win-win compromise. The tribal leaders felt

that their presence at the negotiations was also crucial

to facilitate reaching an agreement quickly, although the

Eastern Front did not share the same opinion. The squabbling

between the Eastern Front and the DUP over the

participation of the latter in the negotiations has already

been described above in section 1.2.3. As for the Dar Fur

related movement, while the SLM/A is not asking to be

involved in the talks, it is clear that the JEM has ambitions

to sit around the table, although it is not yet clear whether

or not such ambition will be fulfilled. Senior JEM representatives

stressed that they had asked for a unified approach

to solve the problems in Dar Fur and in eastern

Sudan in order to avoid reaching piecemeal solutions and

to make the agreement really comprehensive, but that

their proposal had not been taken on board.

The agenda for the negotiations is still being discussed

at the time of writing. However, some of the questions

that may be put on the table by the Eastern Front and

other armed groups in the East came up clearly and repeatedly

during the assessment. The focus is on greater

access to power and wealth in order to be able to reverse

the socio-economic marginalisation of eastern Sudan and

to invest more resources to develop the region and provide

more services to its people. Claims to increased

power and wealth are being articulated within the context

of the CPA, with percentages being discussed for both

the federal and local levels. The Eastern Front and the JEM

stated very clearly that the division of power and wealth

sanctioned by the Naivasha agreement was unacceptable

and that allocations had to be amended, possibly on the

basis of regional population sizes, if a solution to the conflict

was to be identified for eastern Sudan (as well as for

Dar Fur). They strongly welcomed the proposal made by

Vice-President Kiir to the National Congress Party in late

August 2005 to amend the national power sharing percentages

of the SPLM/A and the National Congress in order

to redistribute some to opposition parties, including

armed movements in Dar Fur and the East. JEM representatives

also mentioned the request for a rotating vicepresidency

for both Dar Fur and eastern Sudan. Some of

the external actors suggested that the Two Areas Protocol

could provide a useful framework for negotiation at

the local level, but the issue was not broached with Eastern

Front leaders.

All actors involved underscored the importance of the

support of the international community in making the

negotiations successful. The Eastern Front commented

several times that the attitude of some international brokers

who consider the CPA as sacred is unhelpful and that

unless the international community realises that the

agreement has to become truly comprehensive there will

not be peace in the country and even the CPA process in

the South could be derailed. They however hoped that

the international community would support the parties

to reach a negotiated solution which will put an end to

the fighting in eastern Sudan.

TWO: PEACE AND DEVELPMENT IN EASTERN SUDAN

30

COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN

3.1 Unemployment and key

livelihoods issues

It is clear from the description of people’s perceptions and

perspectives presented in the previous section that issues

related to marginalisation and underdevelopment are key

in explaining the conflict and the current state of tension

in much of the region. It is therefore crucial to understand

some of these issues more in detail in order to identify a

possible response, from both national and international

actors, that could help mitigate the tension in eastern

Sudan.

Whilst the region suffers from a chronic lack of reliable

data (as does much of the country), some indicators are

available to illustrate the situation on the ground. UNICEF

data presented in the World Bank Country Economic

Memorandum (World Bank, 2003b:3) indicate that neonatal,

post-neonatal and infant mortality in Red Sea State

are the highest in the country; Kassala State is the second

worst for post-natal and infant mortality and third

worst for under-five mortality 1. With 56 deaths for 1,000

live births Red Sea State is also the third worst state for

child mortality (after the two war affected states of Blue

3. Peace, Stability and Development in Eastern

Sudan: An Attainable Dream?

Nile and Southern Kordofan) and with 165 deaths for 1,000

live births is second only to Blue Nile for under-five mortality.

In the NDA controlled areas crude mortality rates

(CMR) are estimated to be at 1.01 per 10,000 per day and

under-five mortality rates are reported to be as high as

2.01 per 10,000 per day (IRC, 2005:19).

The TANGO report recently undertaken in rural Kassala

and rural Red Sea States uncovered shocking levels of

malnutrition in the two states as shown in Table 1.

The same study showed that the annual income per

household in rural Kassala State is approximately 250,000

SD (US$ 156 per capita) while in rural Red Sea State is

125,000 SD (US$ 93 per capita); both indicators are well

beneath the international extreme poverty line of US$ 1

per capita (TANGO, ibid.:28).

In the NDA controlled areas a recent survey using a sample

size of 625 children indicated that the percentage of Global

Acute Malnutrition (GAM) is at a level of around 21.5%

while the prevalence of wasting is 7.8% with a 2.1% prevalence

of severe wasting (IRC, 2005:35). Reliable data on

income levels in NDA controlled areas are not available,

1 In the Red Sea State neonatal, post-neonatal, infant and child mortality rates are estimated to be at 50, 66, 116 and 56 respectively per 1,000 live

births; in Kassala State post-natal, infant and under-five mortality rates are respectively 63, 101 and 148 per 1,000 live births.

2 Wasting, stunting and underweight are all expressed using z-scores with internationally defined cut-off points for normal, moderate and severe

levels of under-nutrition, as follows (TANGO, ibid.:43):

· Normal: > -2 z-scores;

· Moderate malnutrition: < -2 z-scores and > -3 z-scores;

· Severe malnutrition: < -3 z-scores.

Table 1. Malnutrition rates in eastern Sudan (TANGO, 2005:44)

Levels of malnutrition Red Sea State Kassala State

Acute Malnutrition

Severe wasting (<-3.0 z-score2) 3.7% 5.8%

Global Acute Malnutrition (<-2.0 z-score) 19.4% 17.7%

Chronic Malnutrition

Severe stunting (<-3.0 z-score) 15.0% 19.1%

Global Chronic Malnutrition (<-2.0 z-score) 38.5% 43.8%

Underweight

Severe underweight 17.0 17.5

Moderate + severe underweight (<-2.0 z-score) 45.4 42.3

31

but the vast majority of the population is believed to be

living below the extreme poverty line (IRC staff, Rubda,

24th August 2005).

The TANGO study also showed that there is a significant

correlation between the literacy of household heads and

the chronic malnutrition in Kassala State and acute malnutrition

in Red Sea State: in rural Kassala State 43% of

the household heads are illiterate, compared with 54% in

rural Red Sea State; amongst the population over 15 years

of age, 56% are illiterate in rural Kassala State, against the

62% in rural Red Sea State (TANGO, ibid.:17). Official Ministry

of Education data relative to the entire region (including

urban areas) show that the illiteracy rate for the

over 15 is 48% in Red Sea State, 56.7% in Al-Gedaref State

and 62% in Kassala State (World Bank, ibid.:19). A survey

conducted in 1999 in Halaib mahallia though revealed

that the illiteracy rate is as high as 89% in Halaib mahallia,

where children currently in school represent 86.7% of

those educated; only 0.75% have secondary education in

the mahallia, of which only 11.5% are women (Abdel

Ati:1999). During the assessment people complained frequently

about the lack of school feeding and of qualified

teachers and whilst they acknowledged that some nomadic

communities would be reluctant to send their children

to school, they also pointed out that the abolition

of boarding schools has had a very negative impact on

the capacity of mobile children to have access to education.

Health services are mostly concentrated in Port Sudan and

other large centres like Sinkat or Kassala; only 20% of rural

Red Sea State villages has a health centre or a clinic,

while in Kassala State half of the villages have some form

of health facility, although these often lack doctors, laboratories

and medications (TANGO, ibid:17). In the late

1990s in the whole of the then Halaib Province (80,000

km2) there were only five basic primary health care centres

(Pantuliano, 1998: direct observation). Anaemia and

tuberculosis were mentioned in almost every community

as endemic, with anaemia being a major killer for pregnant

women and newborns and tuberculosis affecting a

very high percentage of the adult male population. In

Kassala bilharzia and malaria were also quoted as significant

hazards.

Access to water is grossly inadequate throughout the region,

especially in the rural areas. During the assessment

the communities complained incessantly about the shortage

of water both for human and animal consumption.

THREE: PEACE, STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN EASTERN SUDAN

Beja boys at school.

32

COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN

Drought and mesquite infestation have significantly contributed

to the decrease in water levels, but generally

there is a scarcity of boreholes and micro-catchments

throughout the region and where boreholes exist they

invariably suffer from lack of maintenance. People quoted

the shortage of water as one of the key factors in contributing

to push people out of the rural areas towards

urban centres. In Red Sea State the urban population has

grown from 38% of the total state population in 1993 to

a dramatic 61.2% in 2003. This trend points to ever deteriorating

living conditions in the rural areas.

The development gap and the disparity between urban

and rural centres are significant. However, although in

town there is a greater availability of services, people complain

about the fact that very few of them can afford to

pay for school fees, water or drugs. Official unemployment

rates in Red Sea State are very high, standing at 21.1%

against the national average of 11.8% (quoted in Oxfam,

1998:6), although actual data could be worse than these.

Unemployment rates have risen sharply as a result of the

mechanisation of the port in Port Sudan and the laying

off of many of the port workers, particularly Beja labourers

who were left with very little alternatives on the market.

Some observers have noted that outside the stevedoring

jobs, unskilled labour opportunities in Port Sudan are

available mainly in the construction sector, but the Beja

have to compete with migrant labourers from southern

and western Sudan who are more experienced in this field.

Many people survive by resorting to charcoal making,

especially out of mesquite which is said to make very

good charcoal. In Kassala labour opportunities are available

on the agricultural schemes, but people also complained

about the lack of work on the schemes, especially

since the mesquite infestation has made much land

uncultivable. Very few people from the region (Beja and

Rashaida) are employed in the formal sector, most likely

because of the very low level of education. Constraints to

marketing of livestock in rural areas, due mainly to long

distances, and restricted availability of credit for the poor

make living in much of the region a survival challenge.

It is clear that the modernisation and mechanisation of

the port in Port Sudan have created unacceptable levels

of unemployment amongst the Beja and that the discontent

following the disappearance of this important safety

net has greatly contributed to fuel the tension in the region

This warrants the need for interventions which can

compensate for the loss of employment on the port.

People felt that the government should identify ways to

use the revenues from local resources, including port,

gold, customs and minerals, to fund labour intensive

programmes. People in Port Sudan expressed outrage at

the thought that the government was spending millions

of Sudanese Dinars to build a modern, large meeting hall

in Port Sudan when so many people in the town and in

its surroundings were dying because of poverty and malnutrition.

People also observed that much money has

been spent to improve the appearance of the city through

increased street lights and tarring of roads, while no allocations

had been made to meet community priorities.

In the areas around Tokar and Hamashkoreb local communities

spoke at length about the negative impact of

landmines and Unexploded Ordinance (UXOs) on their

lives and livelihoods, particularly in terms of restricting

access to water and pasture. Very little attempt has been

made so far to explore the possibility of undertaking mine

clearance programmes to enable people to regain access

to key livelihood sources.

In Kassala several communities complained about the loss

of land and pastoral community representatives remarked

that there is no arrangement to register land for transhumance

routes in the current government plan for redistribution

of land in the Gash. They stressed that there is a

need to engage with pastoralist communities to identify

solutions for them as well, since conflict between

pastoralists and farmers (both within Hadendowa communities

and between Hadendowa and Rashaida) breaks

out frequently in and around the Gash scheme, especially

at harvesting times. The loss of key land resources for

many Beja because of drought, ecological degradation

and land alienation, the consequent forced abandonment

of the pastoral sector without alternative opportunities

and inadequate service provision have played a clear role

in creating resentment and tension in the region. Youth

representatives in Kassala complained that assistance by

the international community is mainly concentrated on

IDPs and refugees from Eritrea, while no attention is paid

to destitute Beja pastoralist communities whose living

conditions is far worse than those of the refugees.

33

3.2 The impact of international

assistance in eastern Sudan

Communities, government officials and armed opposition

alike lamented that the involvement of the international

community in eastern Sudan has been very limited. While

the primary responsibility to address socio-economic issues

in eastern Sudan rests with the national authorities,

the international community also has a role to play in

supporting these efforts. UN interventions have traditionally

been very restricted and have largely focused on food

distribution and assistance to the refugee and IDP populations;

the UN has no presence in the NDA controlled

areas. A number of INGOs also operate in the two states,

some of which have been on the ground for nearly two

decades. As this study was not a humanitarian assessment,

it does not provide a detailed analysis of humanitarian or

development activities in the East. Rather, it provides a synthesis

of general perceptions of communities and key stakeholders

on the work of the international community. There

was strong dissatisfaction amongst communities, government

and leaders about the performance of most international

actors in the region. People complained that their

action was mostly focused on emergency assistance and

that projects were short term, small scale and often inadequate

to address people’s real needs. Though there are

some islands of success, it is also clear that some agencies

have spent considerable time and resources on problems

without having brought about any significant

change. Some well informed observers pointed out that

many interventions were often designed without the real

involvement of the community and that they often followed

‘funding fashions’.

People from all areas interviewed, but particularly in government

controlled areas, spoke of their concern that a

high proportion of the little assistance that is coming their

way appears to be spent on administrative and running

costs. People also cited examples of resources going

astray, particularly around relief distribution. There was

dissatisfaction with the biases towards a few target

groups, with IDPs and refugees being particular favourites.

Rural areas were perceived to receive more assistance

than the urban slums where many of the worst socio-economic

problems are found and which are also the hotbeds

of discontent. In Kassala people commented that

some of the most destitute Hadendowa would pretend

to be IDPs in order to access desperately needed support

by moving into displaced camps. When projects are undertaken,

communities observed that there tends to be

something of a predictable package that is offered and

that many of the responses frequently do not address

critical needs in a strategic fashion. Whilst recognising the

contributions of INGOs particularly in the service sectors,

often addressing immediate needs, people commented

that there has been a dearth of interventions which have

created employment or sustainable increased income. The

perceived lack of appropriate programming comes despite

the high number of assessments of which people

are tired of being the subject and which informed observers

point out have invariably been of very low quality.

Government officials also complained that the findings

of the studies conducted by international agencies are

rarely shared with the government or with community

leaders.

Community leaders have noted the fact that INGO responses

have tended to be scattered and isolated and that

there has been a lack of co-ordination between actors.

This has also led to a degree of duplication of projects

and assistance to some communities and what people

and government officials have defined as a ‘piecemeal

approach’. Community leaders and youth in Kassala also

complained about the lack of a facilitative and coordinating

role of the Humanitarian Aid Commission in

the state, which was seen as confined to office work and

‘permits screening’ rather than facilitating co-ordination

between national and international actors and supporting

the harmonisation of plans to avoid duplication and

share lessons. The lack of a government master plan for

the two states which could provide a framework for international

response is also said to be notably lacking.

HAC officials as well as international aid workers operating

in the region indicated the lack of capacity within HAC

as a major constraint in playing a more productive co-ordination

role. The youth in Kassala also lamented the lack

of focus on capacity building of local community structures

and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), a criticism

which was though not echoed in Red Sea State.

Concerns about the creation of a dependency syndrome

because of the free distribution of aid and other relief inputs

was voiced repeatedly both in Kassala and in the NDA

controlled areas. In NDA controlled areas there were similar

complaints about lack of support to local NGOs and

CSOs, lack of community participation in the preparation

THREE: PEACE, STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN EASTERN SUDAN

34

COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN

of proposals and plans and a focus on handouts rather

than long term rehabilitation and development

programmes. The Secretariat for Humanitarian Affairs in

the Liberated Areas (SHALA) has apparently tried to push

the agencies operating in the areas under NDA control to

sign up to a Protocol regulating their engagement in the

region, but the NGOs have so far not signed. According to

SHALA officials, the protocol is meant to set a clear strategy

for humanitarian operations in the NDA controlled

areas3.

The shortcomings of the international response need

however to be contextualised. Whilst international agencies

may be responsible for a number of the weaknesses

described above, there is no doubt that they have been

constrained by certain key factors, chief amongst which

is the long standing lack of availability of donor funding

for rehabilitation and development programmes in the

Sudan. Furthermore, eastern Sudan has never been able

to attract major donor interest notwithstanding the fact

that its development indicators are amongst the worst in

the country. The little funding that has been made available

has often reflected donor rather than community

priorities. Some international aid workers pointed out that

there is a lack of awareness and understanding about the

situation in the East within the international community,

which is most likely linked to the overall marginalisation

of the region in the national context. Well informed observers

feel that expectations on international agencies

are much greater than might otherwise be the case because

of the almost total lack of government assistance

to the poor. In addition, some international donors observed

that in NDA controlled areas the lack of an agreement

for a cross-line operation from the Sudan means

that a lot of resources are used on logistics to reach very

remote areas which could be easily accessed from within

the Sudan.

While the overall picture is not very positive, there are a

number of exceptions to this. People in Red Sea State remarked

that INGOs working in their region have contributed

to organise communities, build their capacities and

raise their awareness about their entitlements. A notable

3 The agencies have pointed out that their reasons for not so far signing the Protocol include concerns about humanitarian space and independence as

well as a lack of clarity on the protocol.

Beja boy on a camel.

35

success has been the catalytic role in bringing about

changes in gender relations in Halaib mahallia. Beja

women who until ten years ago could not even meet with

other women from outside their immediate communities

are now involved in joint project management and community

initiatives with the men. There are a number of

islands of success in Red Sea State in particular, including

a successful micro-finance programme in Port Sudan and

an agricultural rehabilitation programme in Khor Arba’at,

but these are very much the exception and their impact

THREE: PEACE, STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN EASTERN SUDAN

is negligible in the wider picture. Positive comments have

been made concerning the life-saving impact of some of

the emergency assistance, both in government and NDA

controlled areas. SHALA officials pointed out that mortality

rates in the area had declined thanks to the support

INGOs were providing in the health sector. However,

throughout the region the overall feeling is that international

agencies are failing to tackle the root causes of

underdevelopment and poverty sustainably.

36

COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN

4.1 Humanitarian issues

1. Improve co-ordination between humanitarian agencies

Improved co-ordination should be fostered between agencies providing humanitarian assistance (both national

and international) in order to avoid overlap and duplication and standardise targeting criteria, registration and

operational procedures for assistance.

2. Establish an emergency early warning system linked to a

Disaster Management Plan

Local authorities should be supported by the central government to prepare a detailed Disaster Management

Plan and to set up a system to track key indicators of vulnerability throughout the region in order to inform the

action of government, UN and NGO actors operating in the two states.

3. Build up the Strategic Grain Reserves in Port Sudan

The local government should prioritise the building up of the Reserves with the support of the federal government

and international agencies and use them to stabilise sorghum prices in the market, in order to make it

more affordable for the poor.

4. Ensure better targeting of humanitarian assistance for

vulnerable communities

Humanitarian assistance programmes should be targeted at the most vulnerable communities in the East. This

would mean extending the current concentration on IDPs and refugees to include communities in rural areas

and in urban slums where indicators of vulnerability point to the need for humanitarian aid.

5. Establish and reinforce assistance programmes aimed at

eradicating tuberculosis, anaemia and other diseases

Establish and reinforce assistance programmes aimed at eradicating tuberculosis, anaemia and other diseases:

Whilst several diseases are widespread in eastern Sudan, tuberculosis and anaemia are reported to be the most

significant killers. International agencies specialising in the public health sector should support local authorities

to design effective systems for TB prevention and treatment and devise initiatives of support to pregnant

women to prevent anaemia.

4.2 Development issues

1. Establish a mechanism for strategic, coordinated action by

international agencies and donors

International agencies and donors should better coordinate interventions and focus on strategic responses to

key livelihoods issues for the region including joint advocacy to catalyse attention to the situation on the East

and enlist donor support for a large scale, integrated, strategic and sustainable response to the development

needs of the region aimed at de-escalating tension.

4. Recommendations for Action

37

FOUR: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

2. Support local government planning capacity

The inclusive development of a master plan for eastern Sudan is seen by many actors as crucial to ensure coherence

in development interventions. Local government officials suggested that the central government send

skilled financial cadres to Red Sea and Kassala State to design and help implement and comprehensive development

plan for the region.

3. Support income generating activities in urban areas

It is imperative for the Government of National Unity of the Sudan and international agencies to identify appropriate

mechanisms to address income poverty of people living in urban slums, especially those directly affected

by the mechanisation of the port in Port Sudan. This should help mitigate urban poverty and de-escalate the

tension, particularly amongst the recently unemployed and youth. Lessons should be learnt from the very few

positive initiatives of support to small scale enterprises and micro-credit in eastern Sudan to see how these

could be scaled up.

4. Support key services in rural areas

The Government of National Unity and local authorities, with the support of the international community, should

review the current availability of basic services (health, water and education) in rural part of Kassala and Red Sea

States and endeavour to extend adequate provision, starting with areas where vulnerability indicators and mortality

rates are highest. Service provision should however be accompanied by support to the strengthening of

local economic and productive capacity (see below).

5. Harness existing resources for economic development

Eastern Sudan has many untapped resources which can be utilised to improve the income capacity of the population

living in the rural areas. Government departments and local authorities, with the support of international

agencies, should explore the potential of utilising water around the khors for agricultural development through

spray irrigation and micro-catchments and support the expansion of the fishery sector. Preliminary positive results

reached by INGOs operating in Halaib mahallia should be built upon and replicated where possible. Interventions

to increase the productivity of existing agricultural schemes and improving the processing and conservation

of agricultural produce for marketing should also be considered.

6. Strengthen pastoral livelihoods system

Ecological degradation coupled with the loss of key land resources has forced an increasing number of households

to abandon the pastoral sector with no alternative economic opportunities. Strategic support should be

extended to pastoral communities in order to prevent a further haemorrhage of households out of the pastoral

sector, with the risk that they will end up in the already swarming urban slums. Local and central authorities,

with the support of the international community, should identify suitable support strategies, which could include

tailoring of services to mobile households (mobile services, key service concentration points, boarding

schools, etc. according to community priorities), livestock vaccination campaigns, eradication of mesquite trees

from pasture land, reopening and rehabilitation of transhumance routes and support to marketing of livestock

(see below) and animal products.

7. Support livestock marketing

There are a number of major constraints to pastoralists marketing livestock that include: long distances to town

based markets, lack of physical infrastructure, weak veterinary services and the need for slaughter houses on

site. Government and international agencies should develop a comprehensive understanding of the constraints

and identify appropriate strategies to support this key productive resource which lies at the core of the rural

economy in the East.

38

COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN

8. Build local capacity

International agencies should build on their current area of success and expand ongoing support to local actors,

particularly by continuing to build the capacity of local CBOs and CSOs for advocacy, social mobilisation, responsible

citizenship, project implementation and conflict resolution. This is particularly important in NDA controlled

areas.

9. Support women’s strategic needs

The type of assistance offered to women in the region lacks strategic vision and implements an anachronistic

model of support which reinforces existing stereotypes about women’s role. Beja and Rashaida women are notoriously

amongst the most (if not the most) secluded and socially marginalised groups in the country. In most

communities women are not allowed access to public places and in Hamashkoreb not even eye contact is allowed

between men and women! Lessons should be learned from the very successful experience of ACORD’s

programme in the Red Sea Hills in order to replicate similar approaches (with the necessary adjustments) throughout

the region.

10. Facilitate good governance programmes

International agencies and donors should explore the possibility of developing programmes focused on support

to local government reform, decentralisation and civil society capacity building.

11. Introduce TuBedawye in schools

It would be important for the government to consider the introduction of TuBedawye as primary or complementary

means of instruction for the first two to three years of primary school, in order to reduce the inevitable

educational disadvantage Beja children face when presented with tuition in Arabic from the very beginning. The

pilot use of TuBedawye in early primary school in NDA controlled areas points to a preliminary reduction in the

rate of school drop outs.

12. Support initiatives in TuBedawye

Radio programmes in TuBedawye should be considered to spread health education and civic education messages

as well as information about the CPA, particularly in the urban slums where radios are often available.

Theatre shows in local language or simple Arabic should also be thought about, building on the very successful

experience of the Band Aid supported Taqaddum Centre Theatre in Port Sudan in the mid 1980s.

13. Explore the possibility of a cross-line operation

Some of the international actors operating in the NDA controlled areas pointed out the excessive costs of logistics

for their operation. UN-OCHA and other mandated UN bodies should endeavour to explore with Government

of National Unity and Eastern Front officials the possibility of devising an access mechanism to deliver

assistance cross-line to the NDA controlled areas, in order to maximise the amount of assistance for the local

communities. The necessary safeguards for the protection of humanitarian personnel should also be discussed

and agreed upon. In this regard, lessons could be learned from the successful cross-line experience of the Nuba

Mountains Programme Advancing Conflict Transformation (NMPACT).

14.Ensure in-depth understanding of the local context and

lessons learning

Several key actors stressed the importance for external interventions to be appropriately contextualised and

aware of the socio-political context in the region and the need for new agencies to learn lessons from past

experience and work in partnership with long standing actors in the East to develop common strategies to

promote peace and development in the region.

39

15.Increase advocacy action to raise awareness about the

situation in eastern Sudan

The findings of this study should be shared with a wide variety of stakeholders in the region and in other parts of

the country, including Khartoum and Juba, through focused workshops to increase the knowledge of government

and non-government actors about the situation in the East and discuss priorities for action.

16.Co-ordinate advocacy action to the donors

Despite the appalling vulnerability indicators, eastern Sudan receives very little international assistance compared

to other areas of the country. International agencies should develop a co-ordinated advocacy action to

disseminate the content of this study, as asked by many local actors during the fieldwork, and enlist donor support

for a large scale, integrated, strategic and sustainable response to the development needs of the region

aimed at de-escalating the tension amongst the most deprived communities.

4.3 Conflict mitigation and peace building

1. Sustain the momentum for negotiations

It is imperative that the international community continues to explore the options for a suitable venue and

mediation institution in order to initiate talks between the Government and the Eastern Front at the earliest

opportunity. The UN should be immediately supported by member governments in its search for an acceptable

body. The plans for negotiation are playing an important deterring role amongst the youth, particularly in Port

Sudan, and such precious opportunity to help differing or dissipating a possible escalation of the conflict in the

region should not be wasted.

2. Support a genuine and constructive dialogue between the

parties

Once negotiations get underway, the international community should nurture the dialogue between the parties

and accompany the negotiation process in order to facilitate the reaching of a final settlement without too

much delay.

3. Uphold any peace process and possible agreement with

financial support

If and when a peace agreement is signed, it is essential that the international donors support its implementation

with the allocation of adequate resources. However, it is important to start extending rehabilitation and development

assistance to eastern Sudan immediately, in order to strengthen people’s confidence in the peace process

and offer adequate peace dividends to the communities involved. If lessons are to be learned from the Dar

Fur experience, a speedy response before too much damage is done could save a lot of suffering, lives and resources

further down the line.

4. Facilitate confidence building measures

While the plans to hold negotiations progress, the Government of the Sudan should promote a series of confidence

building measures in order to mitigate the level of tension in the region. These initiatives should include

(but not be limited to) the following:

• proceed to a prompt payment of the diyya to the families of those killed in the 29/1 incidents in Port Sudan

and to the injured;

• carry out an independent investigation into the killings and disclose its findings;

FOUR: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

40

COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN

• engage with local community and youth leaders to initiate a dialogue about development priorities at the

local level;

• explore the potential for affirmative action for eastern Sudanese in allocating public sector jobs;

• share accurate information on the value of resources exploited in the region (gold, iron, gas, port revenues,

etc.) and the value retained in the region and spent on local development and take steps to engage key

actors from the region in the decision making concerning some of these resources;

• promote labour intensive projects (see below).

5. Promote emergency employment projects

The international community should explore ways of supporting the Government of National Unity to launch

emergency employment projects aimed primarily at unskilled youth in urban areas. Such projects could help

de-escalate tension amongst the youth by providing immediate job opportunities through a set of labour intensive

interventions that can generate work for both skilled and unskilled people. UNDP has tested these

programmes in the Gaza Strip and Afghanistan and could import lessons from those experiences. Possible initiatives

could include development of agricultural or water infrastructure, waste collection and road building (in

particular the highway to Egypt currently being improved). The feasibility of supporting the manual eradication

of mesquite trees should be assessed, as this would benefit people twice since they could also make charcoal

out of the hollowed out trees. Labour intensive programmes should though be accompanied by support to

small business, micro-finance initiatives and employment skills training to create sustainable opportunities for

the youth in the long term.

Beja fighter standing before an Eastern Front compound.

41

6. Support reduction of natural resource based conflict

Conflict over land and water between pastoralists and farmers (both within Hadendowa communities and between

Hadendowa and Rashaida) is common in the region and local conflict resolution mechanisms are not

always capable of solving the disputes. In order to minimise the risk of such conflict and the possible manipulation

of existing animosities in political terms, urgent attention must be paid to the issue of land tenure in the

region, with special attention to pastoralists’ rights. The Government of National Unity should promote legislative

reforms to acknowledge pastoralists’ rights to land where this has been alienated, possibly through the

institutions of transparent and representative State Land Commissions. Such Commissions should endeavour to

incorporate customary arrangements into statutory laws, clarify and endorse transhumance routes and increase

complementary use of land by various types of land users, particularly in and around the agricultural schemes in

Kassala State, where grazing rights for pastoralists must be recognised.

7. Encourage grassroots reconciliation and peace building in the

areas directly affected by the conflict

Where people have experienced loss of lives and assets, efforts should be made by the international community

to support local actors in promoting grassroots reconciliation initiatives as appropriate.

8. Eradicate landmines

The international community should engage with the warring parties to explore the possibility of undertaking

mine clearance programmes as the negotiations progress. Whilst an agreement to proceed with mine clearance

is reached, the government and the Eastern Front should allow UNMAS, in collaboration with local bodies, to

proceed to clearly demarcate minefields in order to prevent further loss of life.

9. Promote awareness about the Comprehensive Peace

Agreement

Local and central authorities, supported by the international communities, should endeavour to raise awareness

about the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in eastern Sudan. Simplified versions of the CPA, approved by the

Government of National Unity, could be reproduced in Arabic for dissemination and radio and TV programmes

in TuBedawye could be aired to enhance knowledge of the agreement amongst the Beja population, especially

women and communities in the rural areas whose knowledge of Arabic is extremely limited.

10.Increase advocacy about eastern Sudan

International agencies involved in eastern Sudan must use the findings of this and other studies to inform the

Sudanese public as well as the international community about the situation in eastern Sudan and ensure that

enough attention and resources are devoted to the East in order to help prevent any further deterioration of the

conflict in the region.

FOUR: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

42

COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN

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Scoones, I. (ed.) (1994) Living with Uncertainty: New Directions in Pastoral Development in Africa. London: Intermediate

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Shazali, S. and Ahmed, A. G. (1999) Pastoral land tenure and agricultural expansion: Sudan and the Horn of Africa. London:

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2005. Khartoum: WFP with FAO, UNDP and UNICEF.

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World Bank Group.

SELECTED REFERENCES

44

COMPREHENSIVE PEACE? CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND INSTABILITY IN EASTERN SUDAN

Khartoum

Dr. Asha Al Karib, ACORD

Hashim Abu Zaid, Beja key informant

Mark Bryson-Richardson, British Embassy

Sara Musa, Christian Aid

Rocco Blume, Christian Aid

Alistair McArthur, DfID

Dr. Amna Dirar, Eastern Front (Beja Congress)

Ali Mohammad Bagadim, Eastern Front (Beja Congress)

Mahmoud Al Khidir Mohammad, Eastern Front (Beja

Congress)

Dr. Hassan Abdel Ati, EDGE

Hassabou Abdel Rahman, HAC (Commissioner)

Nadia Ali El Tom, IRC

Taha Sid Ahmad, IRC

H.E. Lorenzo Angeloni, Italian Embassy

Dr. Mutrif Siddiq, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

H.E. Taj el-Sir Mahgoub, Ministry of Labour

Barbara Manzi, OCHA

Kate Farnsworth, OFDA

George Were, Oxfam

H. E. Yahia Babiker, Presidency

Abdel Hamid Rahmatallah, SC-UK

Cdr. Abdel Aziz Al Hilu, SPLM/A

Ed Walker, Tearfund

Dr. Khalid El Amin, UNDP

Dr. Omar Egemi, UNDP

Dr. Samia El Nagar, UNDP

Prof. Mohammad Yusuf Sulaiman, University of Khartoum

Primrose Oteng, UNMIS

Domenico Polloni, UNMIS

Janice Elmore, US Embassy

Port Sudan

Eisa Yacoub, ACORD

Elmutalib Ibrahim, ACORD

Saida Mohammad Badri, ACORD

Dr. Ahmad Adam Tamim, ACORD

Omar Adam Ali, Beja Club

Mohammad Ahmad Dirar, Beja Club

Hamid Abu Fatima, Beja Club

Gaffar Baamkar, Beja leader

Mohammad Abyerb, Beja Youth

Osman Al Bagir, Beja Youth

Annex I - List of People Met

Hashim Ali, Beja Youth

Abdelrahim Hamad, Beja Youth

Amna Ibrahim, Beja Youth

Hamad Kasha, Beja Youth

Ghada Khidir, Beja Youth

Mohammad Musa, Beja Youth

Sheiaba Sidi, Beja Youth

Women’s group, Deim al Arab (16 representatives)

Men’s group, Deim al Arab (20 representatives)

Adam Omar, Head of Salvation Committee, Gadisia

Mohammad Mahmud Salih, omda Beni Amer, Gadisia

Mahmud Idriss Musa, Idara Sha’abia Gadisia

Community meeting, Gadisia (15 representatives)

Community meeting, Hosheiry (8 representatives)

Mohammad Tom Abu Shana, IRC

Mohammad Idriss Biriq, HAC (Commissioner)

Baqash Abdulgadir, journalist

H.E. Mohammed Bedawi, Minister of Agriculture and

Animal Wealth, RSS

Sayed Dabloub, Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Wealth,

RSS

Mohammad Hassan Abu Zeinab Shegeira, Ministry of

Social Affairs, RSS

Josephn Atonia, Oxfam

Ahmed Hassan, Oxfam

Jaqueline Jacob, Oxfam

Hassan Sir Elkhatim, Oxfam

Dr. Taha Bedawi, SECS

Mohammad Karrar, Umma Party

Abu Ali Sharif Al Milek, UNDP

Sinkat

Women’s groups, Abu Hadia Centre (24 representatives)

Mohammad Hamad Elnieel, Commissioner Sinkat

Sharif Taha, HAC

Abdalla Haenab, SRC

Mohammad Salih, SRC

Ahmed Shash, traditional leader (Hadendowa)

Hashim Baamkar, traditional leader (Hadendowa)

Tokar

Ummad Kisha Hamid, Acting Head of mahallia

Sulaiman Al Kanzei, Commissioner, Tokar

Abdel Gadir Farag, Oxfam

Halima Musa, Oxfam

45

El Haj Hassan El Fawal, Tokar Delta Scheme Manager

Tahir Onur Tahir, Secretary, Umm Hill CBO, Dolobiay (met

in Tokar)

Obshak Oshar Okesh Tahir, Chair, Ummhill CBO, Dolobiay

(met in Tokar)

Umm Hill CBO Committee (25 representatives)

Kassala

Ali Ibrahim Digna, Nazir Beni Amer

Idriss Shallal, omda Beni Amer

Khalil Ash-Shifa, omda Beni Amer

Onour Mohammad Osman, Wakil Hadendowa

Eisa Hamad Sheikh, FAO

Omar Onour, HAC (Commissioner)

Community meeting, IDPs Fato (20 representatives)

Community meeting, Haj Es Salaam (32 representatives)

Women’s group meeting, Haj El Shahiid (11

representatives)

Ali Mohammad Din, Head of Development Committee,

IDPs Hamadab

Development Committee, IDPs Dabalawet/Hamadab (5

representatives)

Asha Adam Sidid, IFAD

Ahmad Mohammad Karrar, IFAD

Community meeting, Kadugli locality (30 representatives)

Mohtasir Babiker Ahmed Jaffar, Kassala Mayor

H..E. Mohamed Idris Aukid, Minister of Social Planning,

Kassala State

Ahmed Abbas Mohammad Ar-Razam, Ministry of Justice

Family members (8) of Ahmad Hamid Birqi, Rashaida

‘Nazir’ (Abu Tala)

Ahmed Ante, UNMIS

Joseph Mwaanga, UNMIS

Group meeting, Youth Initiative for Peace Building (15

representatives)

H.E. Farouk Hassan Mohammad Nur, Wali Kassala State

Asmara

Sheikh Ahmad Ali Betai, Betai tariqa

Aklilu Lijam, Dutch Interchurch Aid

Joke Oranji, Dutch Interchurch Aid

Bakri Ahmad, DUP

Cdr Abdalla Mahmoud, DUP

Dr Gaafar Ahmed Abdalla, DUP

Mutaz Osman Elfahal, DUP

Abdalla Kunna, Eastern Front (Beja Congress)

Ali Es-Safi, Eastern Front (Beja Congress)

Salah Barakwin, Eastern Front (Beja Congress)

Mabruk Mubarak Salim, Eastern Front (Rashaida Free

Lions)

Geert Heikens, EU Delegation

Abdalla Jabir, Government of Eritrea

Amb. Mohammad Ali Omaro, Government of Eritrea

Robert Warwick, IRC

Mahmoud Tahir El Hagg, JEM

Dr. Khalil Ibrahim Mohammad, JEM

Abdel Aziz Osher, JEM

Arild Skara, Norwegian Embassy

Dr. Taiesir Ali, SAF

Wilson Gitchinga, Samaritan’s Purse

Asmat Ali, SHALA

Fakki Osman Hagg, SHALA

Tariq Abulgasim, SLM/A

Abdel Wahid Mohamed Ahmed al-Nur, SLM/A

Mohammad Zakaria, SLM/A

Mohammad Mur Salih, SLM/A

Joey Hood, US Embassy

Tessnay

Mohammad Bushara, JEM

Abdel Hadi Siddiq, JEM

Abu Fatna Abdelmagid Mustafa, JEM

Salim Ali, Eastern Front (Rashaida Free Lions)

Sulaiman Salim, Eastern Front (Rashaida Free Lions)

Mohammad Salih Abid, Eastern Front (Rashaida Free

Lions)

Awad Mubarak, Eastern Front (Rashaida Free Lions)

NDA controlled areas

Sheikh Ali Betai, Betai tariqa

Musa Ali Betai, Betai tariqa

Sheikh Mustafa Ali Karrar, Betai tariqa

Musa Salih Osman, Civil Administration

Ibrahim Mohammad Din Osham, Civil Administration

Digna Abu Eisa, Civil Administration

Amin Osheikh Idriss, Civil Administration

Ali El Amin Yusuf, Civil Administration

Ali Ahmad, Commissioner Hamashkoreb

Mohammad Odis, Commissioner Liberated Areas

Hassan Gaffar, Eastern Front (Beja Congress)

Musa Mohammad Ahmad, Eastern Front (Beja Congress)

Community meeting, Hamashkoreb (15 representatives)

Charlie Kwetch, SPLM/A

John Mallis, SPLM/A

Badid Sheikh, SPLM/A

NB. The names of some Eastern Front members met

during the assessment have been withheld upon request

of the interviewees.

ANNEX I - LIST OF PEOPLE MET